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ABSTRACT
This is a study of Reinhold Niebuhr’s theory of democracy. 
Niebuhr’s ideas are handled in a comprehensive fashion with his major 
categories and concerns serving as the basis for the focus of each 
chapter. The chapters that present Niebuhr’s approach to the issues 
of democracy are all representative of the unique insight that 
Niebuhr gives to the study of democracy as it relates to the specific 
problems of: power, tolerance, Christian realism, irony, human
nature, and humility. The "untraditional" focus of Niebuhr’s approach 
results: in a theory that is creative and original in many respects. 
Niebuhr’s study of democracy is not based on the usual variables —  
participation, majority rule, and the consent of the governed found 
in most works of democratic theory. Rather it is based on a conception 
of human nature. Instead of using empirical measures of existing 
democracies and then making an application to man, Niebuhr's method 
is to apply his insights into the nature of man to the construction 
of a democratic society. This approach, which Niebuhr terms Christian 
realism, builds a philosophy of democracy based on understanding man's 
capacities for both good and evil, justice and injustice, freedom and 
oppression. Niebuhr concludes that democracy is the best means 
available to allow man to be free and seek justice while at the same 
time providing the social and political order necessary to resist 
injustice and evil. However, Niebuhr warns that democracy is not an 
easy accomplishment but rather, a constant struggle against the powers 
of intolerance, injustice, pride, false ideals, and the abuse of 
power. In view of Niebuhr's accomplishments as a major thinker of 
our century and thetunique insights his approach adds; to the study of 
democracy, I find Niebuhr's understanding of democracy both worthy of 
consideration arid relevant to the issues that confront democracy today.
v
Reinhold Niebuhr on Democracy
INTRODUCTION
The reader who has leaned back in his chair and propped his 
feet up in anticipation of finding easy answers and set formulas to 
the problems of democracy will not find them here. Reinhold Niebuhr 
gives no easy answers to the problems that confront democracy; this 
may discourage the lazy or curious reader but it motivates the student 
of politics who knows that complex problems, by their very nature, 
lack simple solutions. Because the issues that are involved are complex 
and not easily understood, some may opt to construct models and charts 
to simplify the complexity of the situation, but Niebuhr*s approach 
is to accept the complexity of democracy and work with it as it exists.
As such, Niebuhr may frustrate the "accountant" in all of us, who 
longs to see the books balanced and the ends met, but the "philosopher" 
in each of us will be challenged by Niebuhr•in his approach to 
democracy.
Niebuhr, who lived from 1892 to 1971, was a theologian, political 
theorist, philosopher, and teacher of social ethics, who spoke to the 
issues of democracy with insights gathered from all of those fields. An 
important example of Niebuhr's synthesis of different fields of knowledge 
is the sustained relationship between politics and theology in his 
thought. In fact I believe that the theology of Niebuhr provides insight 
into the study of democracy that in other approaches goes unnoticed.
2
3Harry David and Robert Good, who worked as editors for Niebuhr' s, work,
I
On Politics, mention this special relationship between theology and 
politics:
For Niebuhr, theology and politics are not really sepa­
rate fields, but two perspectives on a single reality, 
each helping to illumine the data of the other. His cen­
tral concerns clearly bridge the two disciplines: the
nature and destiny of man, the perplexities of social 
ethics, the conditions of human community. Out of such 
concerns Niebuhr naturally emerges, not as a political 
scientist narrowly defined, but as a political and moral 
philosopher in the grand manner. His calipers are not 
calibrated in micromillimeters but in yards and rods, for 
they are designed to span the height and depth of human 
soul rather than to record those minutiae of human behavior 
susceptible of precise measurement.1
In the same fashion a thesis which deals with Niebuhr’s perspectives on
democracy must concern itself with a number of themes and concepts and
bring together forms of inquiry ordinarily kept separate.. On a personal
level, as. a graduate student in the areas of both political science and
theology, this thesis offers both the challenge and the opportunity to
work with two academic disciplines as they are combined in the works of
Niebuhr.
Two factors were involved in the choice of themes for this 
study. First, the chapter topics are representative of Niebuhr’s 
major concerns, stretching over a period of a half century. The 
chapters therefore present the links in Niebuhr’s chain of thought, 
offering the reader an overview of his work as a major thinker of the 
twentieth, century. On first glance this may confuse some who expect 
chapter titles in specific areas of democratic theory, but in the 
study of Niebuhr one should remember as a general rule his approach to 
the study of democracy deals not with narrow political terms or paradigms, 
but with, the complexity of modern society and the nature and destiny 
of man. The second factor involved in the choice of themes for this
4study was the selection of areas in Niebuhr's thought:that offer insight 
into the problems of democracy. The issues in each chapter are based 
upon specific concepts of Niebuhr which have implications for democratic 
theory. The reason for this approach is to avoid chapters on areas not 
of primary importance to Niebuhr and to avoid issues that have little 
bearing on the study of democracy.
The first chapter serves to focus directly on Niebuhr's view of 
democracy and how it relates to the current literature available on 
democratic theory. In the discussion of the classic concepts by which 
democracy is described, Niebuhr is seen in light of how his perspective 
expands upon and goes beyond a mere repetition of traditional understand­
ings of democracy. Niebuhr stands out in his construction of a philo­
sophy of democracy as he proposes a more adequate theoretical basis for 
the justification of democracy using the insights of theology and 
politics. The unique insight of Niebuhr is expressed in his approach to 
the. study of democracy through a study of man. For Niebuhr the key to 
the survival of democracy is not found in its external variables of 
majority rule, participation, or degrees of equality; rather the key is 
found in man's nature, which has the capacity both to create and corrupt 
a social order.
The second chapter discusses Niebuhr's philosophy of Christian 
realism, this serves to link his approach to politics through human 
nature (Chapter 1) to his analysis of the issues of democracy (Chapter 
3 through 6). This chapter serves as a bridge because it presents 
Niebuhr's theological conception of man in its fullest expression.
Niebuhr attempts to incorporate the full depth of man's nature as a 
creature of time and eternity, a being of natural and spiritual dimen­
sions, into a coherent philosophical position. This position in turn
5serves as a means to evaluate other philosophies that often form the 
basis of democracy.
The third chapter is a discussion of power and its implica­
tions for democracy. This chapter deals primarily with the issues 
of human nature as they apply to the use and abuse of power. Of 
significant importance to this chapter is Niebuhr’s analysis of 
the abuse of power by social and political groups. Niebuhr argues 
that groups with vested interests have inordinate desires to establish 
their ideas and programs that often causes them to be blind to the 
needs of other individuals, groups, or society as a whole. Niebuhr 
argues that if such groups are not somehow regulated or checked they 
will corrupt and destroy democracy. To counter this possibility 
Niebuhr argues that a balance of power within society itself is 
necessary to the existence of social harmony and freedom in democracy.
The fourth chapter, on the issue of irony and democracy, 
serves as an introduction to Niebuhr’s criticism of American democracy. 
In this chapter Niebuhr traces the historic formulation, existence, 
and impact of irony upon both the United States with its democratic 
ideals and the Soviet Union with its Marxist principles. Niebuhr 
argues that such, ideals or principles serve as a type of social ideo­
logy that has an impact upon the nature and function of the state. 
Niebuhr in his study of American democracy attempts to show how false 
images of American innocence and virtue, formed early in the history 
of our nation, serve to affect modern policy decisions. Niebuhr then 
turns to Soviet Communism and in a similar analysis shows how Marxist 
ideals served to develop irony.
The fifth chapter raises the crucial issue of tolerance as it 
applies to a democratic society. Niebuhr argues specifically that
6pride, which he regards as the root of intolerance, is not balanced 
by a spirit of tolerance, will lead to a failure in making the com­
promises necessary for a stable democracy. In the struggle to gain 
the resources and power of society there is a need for all parties 
involved to realize the limitations of their claim, but this is not 
possible when pride leads to intolerance toward others who also seek 
a fair share of social goods and power. As a result Niebuhr proposes 
what is beyond the realm of politics, but to Niebuhr is crucial: 
humility as the means to develop the tolerance that is necessary for 
the existence and survival of democracy.
The sixth chapter, deals with the issue of humility and 
democracy. Niebuhr’s concept of humility is his most highly developed 
application of theology to democracy. The concept of humility is 
based on man’s realization that his claims for power and glory are 
mere pretension and foolishness when judged by the standard of an 
absolute and holy God. In the comparison of his standards to those of 
God, man learns humility. As applied to democracy, humility calls for 
a society in which the finite nature of political truth and program 
is realized so that no one fraction can justify a monopoly of power, 
nor can any minority be denied access to the political process.
Beyond this, Niebuhr applies the concept of humility to democracy it­
self and calls for a new perspective on democracy that goes beyond 
mere prideful adoration or critical condemnation.
In writing this thesis I have attempted to gain a fair and 
comprehensive presentation of Niebuhr’s thought as it relates to 
democracy. Beyond the development of different themes in each chapter 
I have presented arguments that serve as a critique of Niebuhr’s views.
7In the criticism of Niebuhr I have tried to avoid petty arguments 
and trite criticisms by purposely focusing on the broad issues 
discussed in each chapter. As such my critique of Niebuhr is designed 
to be broad and far eaching in an attempt to remain relevant to the 
areas covered by Niebuhr.
A well-traveled man once described an adventure as an ordinary 
trip with pleasant surprises along the way. In reading Niebuhr and 
working out his philosophy and its application to democracy, I 
went through a type of adventure. I would like to urge the reader 
on by saying simply that when Niebuhr is read carefully the path 
is one of pleasant surprises, curiosities, and even shocks. When 
faced with a man who does not conform to any set patterns that are 
often associated with the words "theologian" or "political theorist", 
one is forced to deal with unfamilar ideals in unfamilar places, 
which make the adventure a learning process. Whether this prophet 
and politican named Niebuhr gives us the right direction is a 
question each reader will have to answer through the journey that for 
some will be a challenge to contend with .and for others perhaps a 
new direction, but for all, an adventure.
1960),
INTRODUCTION FOOTNOTES
^Reinhold Niebuhr, On Politics (New York: 
p. VII.
Scribner * s,
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CHAPTER I 
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN NATURE
Niebuhr*s conception of democracy is not limited to 
categories like participation, liberty, equality, representation, 
and majority rule; he also discusses problems of power, irony, 
tolerance, humility and the philosophy behind the development of 
democracy. To avoid any confusion among those who define democracy 
by classical terms, each of the classic measures of democracy will be 
reviewed in this chapter and related briefly to Niebuhr*s approach to 
democratic theory. The purpose of this will be to show how Niebuhr 
interacts with the historic formulations made about democracy.
Beyond this, Niebuhr’s analysis of democracy will be presented and 
developed more fully to clarify further his specific insights into the 
problems of democracy and human nature. This will lay the foundation 
for the later chapter in which Niebuhr deals with the specific problems 
that must be faced by any democratic society.
I
The use of the term participation in a democracy brings up 
the basic question of the proper means and expression of political 
involvement. Historically, this has been based on the comparison of 
direct with representative models of democratic participation. But 
any discussion of direct democracy today is confronted with problems
9
10
involving limitations of a citizens time, political knowledge, willing­
ness to participate, and the fact that a modern society has 
bureaucratic laws beyond the scope of legislative or popular control.^"
In response to the weakness of the so-called "populist" theories 
of democracy, the elitist model of democratic participation promises 
a method for the efficient use of democratic structures by ruling 
elites who would make the political policy decisions for the nation.
But the question that remains is whether in a democracy the role of 
public involvement in the political process takes priority over the 
promise of efficiency? Peter Backrach argues the elitist model is 
basically undemocratic in its application because it limits direct 
participation, questions the role of equality in the democratic process,
and is based upon a method in which political decisions are made by a
2 _ ~
small minority of the voting population.
Robert Dahl uses the term polyarchy to describe the elitist
system in which the decisions made in society are determined by the
3
influence of different elites. In a system of polyarchy the degree 
of voter participation is limited to the selection of competing 
elitists available in the electoral process. Citizen control is there­
fore limited by the lack of alternatives to the elites who determine 
public policy. The problem that results is that the individual citizen 
is unable to control the political process as popular control of govern­
ment is reduced to a democracy in name only.
To bridge the problem caused by separation of the individual 
from the political process, some have argued that the answer is the 
organization of political groups. Seymour Martin Lipset in his book 
Political Man argues that groups are needed both to organize and balance
the individual interests of citizens and to establish a means to bring
11
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about political advantage. It is at this point that Niebuhr contri­
butes to a concept of participation with his critique of the political 
nature of groups."*
Niebuhr argues that groups are based on organized special 
interests that have a tendency to degenerate into intolerant organi­
zations that aim for political advantage at the cost of other groups and 
individuals. This in turn leads to the necessity of setting power 
against power until a tolerable balance of power can be reached.^
Niebuhr, however, goes beyond the confines of the "popularist" and 
’'elitist'1 debate to argue in his analysis of groups that a spirit of 
democratic tolerance is necessary to preserve democracy from the intoler­
ance of individuals, political groups, or elites. This insight goes 
beyond the level of who makes the choices in society in an attempt to 
show how the choices should be made in a way that would not endanger 
democracy. This leads to Niebuhr’s discussion of the problems of tolerance.
Liberty is often proposed as a means to define a concept of 
democracy. Liberty as a democratic concept is based on the right 
that a citizen has in the political and social system. John Locke 
in Two Treaties of Civil Government, argues certain rights are a 
part of man as man, or as Jefferson would say "inalienable rights" 
of man rather than contingent rights based on the whim of government.
Both Locke and Jefferson argued that if the rights of liberty were 
taken from man, then the very authority of government was in question 
because it had breached its proper exercise of power. Such a 
concept of liberty is seen in the "negative” ,sense of liberty as 
a freedom from the encroachment of governmental power. More recently, 
scholars have argued for a concept of liberty in a positive sense
12
of using government as a means to aid and develop the individual 
citizens. Christian Bay, among others, uses the word "positive 
liberty" to describe such a concept of liberty.^ Here the approach 
is to use the power of government as a means to bring about 
political, economic, and social development. Others have also used 
the term positive liberty to describe what one should do as a 
responsible and rational person. This position would allow the 
power of government to bring about the individual development of 
its citizens, much like Rousseau’s idea of forcing men to be free. 
Niebuhr not only argues for a positive approach to liberty on a 
national level but demonstrates that the structure of democracy is 
the best means to bring about individual advancement. In his formation 
of a theory of democracy, Niebuhr relates the development of democratic 
methods in a society to the development of individuals within that 
society. Thus for Niebuhr the structure of a democracy is not an 
end in itself but a means to a process to bring out the best in 
citizens. As such the insight of Niebuhr into liberty does not offer 
a magic structure or promise a certain goal; rather it describes 
democracy in such a way as to make human nature the key to its under­
standing.
The use of the term equality as applied to democratic theory 
has meant anything from the right to vote without racial discrimination 
to a.guaranteed standard of income/ Seymour Lipset, however, attempts 
to maintain a workable definition of equality based on the development 
of a large middle class that would serve to bridge the economic
g
inequality between wealth and poverty. This analysis follows the 
concept of equality proposed by Aristotle in his Politics in which 
it was argued that a democracy could survive only with a large middle
13
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class. Aristotle recognized the dual dangers of "populism" and 
"elitism" which if allowed would destroy democracy through either anarchy 
or the oppression of an oligarchy. The same insight is to be found 
in the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels, who argued that an 
increase in the industrial proletariat would cause instability in 
government that would inevitably lead to the overthrow of the capitalist 
oligarchy by the workers. This may have held true if the growth of the 
middle class in the late nineteenth century did not occur due to unioni­
zation and changes made in capitalist economics to avoid its earlier 
abuses. Niebuhr goes beyond the problem of equality in the sense of 
classes to argue that equality must also be actualized in a development 
of human potential. To Niebuhr, the actual demand of groups for equality 
often involves merely a putting of self-interest before the interest of 
the whole and a seeking to control the instrument of government not to 
restore equality but to ensure domination. Niebuhr's answer to the 
instability caused by class or group claims to power is not a larger 
middle class but a spiritual development of humility which would preserve 
democracy by a cooperative attitude of actions between individuals and 
groups. For Niebuhr this involves a development which can come only 
as a result of faith.^ From this arises Niebuhr's discussion of 
humility as it relates to the problems of democracy.
Many would argue that the concept of representation holds the 
key to a study of democracy. Representation, as mentioned earlier, 
brings up the problem of direct democracy which is operative only in 
nations which have both ,a small population and territory. Another well 
known concept of representation is advocated by Edmund Burke. In 
his speech to the Electors of Bristol, Burke argues that as a representa­
tive in Parliament, he is not a tool of constituent interest but a
14
trustee elected to vote for the general good of the nation as best
his intellect and conscience can determine."^ There is a problem
with both of these conceptions of representation because direct
democracy could not be effectively used in any m o d e m  democracy and the
modern representative with a well-developed conscience would seldom
12survive re-election attempts. To overcome the problems involved
with a theoretical justification for representation, Dahl takes an
Smperical approach in Pluralist Democracy in the United States to define
representation in a structural framework of the American system based
on the two party system, the organization of federalism, and the
13single member electoral districts for Congress. Niebuhr*s insight
comes in where Dahl leaves off; Dahl traces the American system of
democracy back to its structural basis as provided by the constitution
and from there he evaluates the problems of American democracy.
Niebuhr traces the American system back to its ideological basis
provided by Puritanism and Jeffersonianism and from this perspective
14evaluates the problems of American democracy. Niebuhr adds to the 
studies of Dahl because Niebuhr goes beyond the structure of the 
American system to study the ideas behind the structures and their 
impact on modern democracy. For Niebuhr, democracy is not as much a 
problem of proper structure or concepts of representation as it is a 
problem of the right attitudes and ideas that make the formation of 
democracy possible. Niebuhr’s great contribution to an understanding 
of American democracy is found in his concept of irony. From the use 
of irony, Niebuhr develops the basic principles of a democratic 
society freed of the many illusions that would distort democracy.
The term majority rule is often used to characterize a democratic 
state. Henry Mayo in An Introduction to Democratic Theory even goes
15
as far as to argue that majority rule can serve as a definition for
democracy.^ The theoretical justification for government
policy is able to settle conflicts of power without the overthrow of
government. But as a concept, majority rule often suffers from popular
misunderstandings. For example, it cannot be argued that the
majority is right or even justified to act merely because it is the
majority. Also the very claim of majority rule is questioned when
the number of potential voters do not vote to give the winning candidate
a majority of all eligible voters. In addition if an election involves
multiple candidates none of whom win a majority of the vote, then
can the winner justify his authority as majority rule? Roland Pennock
escapes the problem of defining majority by the inclusion of all
adult citizens as the measure.^ The term "rule" is defined as:
.... public policies that are determined either 
directly by vote of the electorate or indirectly by 
officials freely elected at reasonably frequent inter­
vals and by a process in which each voter who chooses 
to vote counts equally ("one person, one vote") and in 
which a plurality is determinative.'^^
Thus Pennock is able to overcome problems with the term "majority rule"
by defining majority and rule separately. Justifications for majority
rule have also had great range. The Bentham-James Mill tradition in
England justified majority rule based on the belief that it would
18
bring the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Faith in the
goodness of the individual man and the rational capacity of man to
make decisions was the basis for their concept of majority rule.
Others have sought to justify majority rule as a means to balance
19
political groups and prevent any one group from domination. It is
the concept of man who seeks power at the expense of others that
20
leads to James Madison’s analysis of "factions." As a result of
16
Madison’s views, the constitution reflects a pessimistic view of 
democracy in which government survives by a balance of powers rather 
than popular rule. It is at this point that Niebuhr’s perspective 
on human nature can add both to the justification of democracy and a 
warning against the abuse of power by any group. Niebuhr’s approach 
to majority rule comes in his concept of power as it applies to the 
problem of democracy.
II
The reader at this point may be disappointed that this paper 
on democracy will not deal directly with the classical views of 
democracy as expressed in liberty, participation, equality, represen­
tation or majority rule. But I personally believe the value of 
Niebuhr’s insight into democracy comes out of the fact that he is not 
content to restate established principles of democracy or rework old 
theories to fit his interpretation in his approach to the study of 
democracy. Niebuhr’s approach to democracy is one based not on a study 
of comparative structures or empirical measures of modes of participation 
or representation, rather it is based on a philosophy of human nature. 
Niebuhr adds much to a study of democracy because for him the study 
of politics is not the study of political structures, but the study of 
man as a political and social being. As a result, for Niebuhr, the 
problems of democracy go beyond classical conceptions that attempt to 
discuss democracy in terms of a few selective measurements. Niebuhr 
deals with the internal nature of democracy in terms of struggles 
with power, tolerance, irony, humility, and a philosophy of the state.
As a philosopher, theologian, and perhaps prophet his insights into
democracy touch upon the means required to build a democracy, and warn
against the attitudes and acts that would cause its destruction. As
such Niebuhr discusses democracy with certain assumptions about its
essential form as a governing force that allows some significant
degree of participation and representation for its citizens. But
for Niebuhr the external expressions of democracy (representation,
majority rule, equality, participation) are merely the result of an
internal social order that allows democracy to survive the forces of
internal disruption that threaten its existence.
Niebuhr’s approach to democracy is based upon his conception
of human nature. Perhaps it is best stated that any introduction to
the thought of Niebuhr on the problems of democracy must first face
the problem of democracy and human nature. A study of Niebuhr will
show that he finds the root cause of the triumph and defeat of democracy
in the nature of man. Kenneth Waltz in his book Man the State and War
provides an analysis of Niebuhr’s view with the classification of
21the "first-image pessimist." In defining the first image Waltz writes
According to the first image...the laws of the important 
causes of war is found in the nature and behavior of 
man... Other causes are secondary and have to be inter­
preted in the light of these factors.22
The term pessimist is one Waltz applies to those who believe that
"restraints upon the forces of evil may be contrived" but that in
23
the end one cannot expect a "permanently good result." To put the 
terms together would be to believe that problems have a root cause in 
human nature which is basically a constant and therefore one cannot 
expect permanent progress in solving the problems that affect man. 
Niebuhr is depicted as a classic example of the "first image 
pessimist" because of his criticism of liberal optimism and Marxist
18
utopianism and his argument that Christian realism is based on an
24
analysis of the true nature of man. Niebuhr*s view of the "true"
nature of man is based upon his theology. Because man is created by
God, he is finite, but because man imagines himself to be the focal
point of all reality,he attempts to escape his limitations which
result in the comic situation of "a pigmy who thinks himself a 
25
giant." As man attempts to escape his finite nature the comedy
quickly turns into a tragedy of destruction. In Niebuhr's conception
of human nature the cause of man’s downfall is his pride and pretension.
It is because man is finite that he is insecure, in and of himself,
and in an attempt to overcome his insecurity he oversteps his limits
and tries to become as God. Niebuhr illustrates this with the Bible
story of the Tower of Babel. This is a story of men who were insecure
and therefore wanted to create a form that would reach into heaven,
the source of absolute security. But their pride and pretension brought
destruction upon them with the judgment of God, the destruction of
26
their tower, and the confounding of their languages. Thus for Niebuhr
the source of man's problems is in man himself whose inordinate pride
27
brings his own destruction. For man to overcome his pride it is
necessary for man to realize that he is a creature of both nature and 
2 8spirit. The basis of Niebuhr's philosophy of Christian realism is 
that man is a finite being and therefore a creature of nature, but he
29
is also created in the image of God and therefore a spiritual being. 
Pride violates the nature of man because it attempts to make man an 
eternal being by a refusal to accept the finite nature of human 
existence. Man must accept that he is limited by his very nature 
and that any attempt to escape such a limitation will bring disaster.
It is Niebuhr's conception of human nature from the perspective
19
of the first image pessimist that enables him to expose the inadequate 
basis of modern democracy which is jeopardized by two false conceptions 
of the nature of man. Niebuhr describes those who support democracy 
as the "children of light" because they tend to be idealistic and have 
an optimistic view of the nature of man. On the other hand are the 
hard-core realists who know only the law of self-interest and power, those 
Niebuhr calls the "children of darkness." The children of light cannot 
support democracy because their optimistic view of human nature makes 
them prone to error in evaluation of the nature of man. The typical 
example of the "foolishness" of the children of light is Neville
Chamberlain, the prime minister of England during the rise of Hitler,
who after consultation with Hitler in 1939 reported the good news that
there was to be "peace in our time." It was obvious that the character
of Hitler was not understood because the peace promised was short lived.
The optimistic view of man leads to a blindness that fails to see the
power of self-interest and pride in man. Such an optimism leaves
democracy without defense against the boundless ambition of a Hitler.
Niebuhr argues that what is necessary for 9. democratic concept of
reality that will escape the faults of optimism is a knowledge of the
selfish drives of man:
The moral cynics, who know no law beyond their will and 
interest, have a scriptural designation of 'children of 
this world' or 'children of darkness.' Those who believe 
that self-interest should be brought under the discipline 
of a higher law could then be termed 'the children of 
light*... The children of darkness are evil because they
know no law beyond the self. They are wise, though evil,
because they understand the power of self-interest. The
children of light are virtuous because they have some 
conception of higher law than their own will. They are 
usually foolish because they do not know the power of self- 
will.
20
Democratic theory needs to balance the extremes of optimism and
realism to avoid the faults of both. The optimism of the children
of light fails to realize the injustice that is part of man’s
nature while the pessimism of the children of darkness keeps them
from realizing the ability of man to act justly in the world.
The problem that results from basing democracy on the optimism
of the children of light is that it does not provide a check against
the power and ambition of man because its view of man is that of a
harmonious and cooperative agent who works for the general good.
Niebuhr warns that such a false estimate of the nature of man will
leave democracy in peril:
But a too consistent optimism in regard to man’s 
ability and inclination to grant justice to his 
fellows obscures the perils of chaos which perennially 
confront every society, including a free society.
In one sense a democratic society is particularly 
exposed to the dangers of confusion. If these perils 
are not appreciated they may overtake a free society 
and invite the alternative evil of tyranny.31
Niebuhr traces the basic misconception of children of light
back to the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Niebuhr argues that
the Enlightenment overstressed the rational powers of man and as a
result felt there was a simple, reasonable path to world peace and 
32justice. The fault of the Enlightenment view of man was in time
incorporated into modern idealistic theories of man. In turn
supporters of democracy formulated a concept of man based on the
false idealism of the Enlightenment. Niebuhr argues that democracy
has a history of struggle against the forces of evil which is far
from any concept of the inherent goodness and harmony of man:
The confidence of modern idealism in the possibility 
of an easy resolution of the tension between individual 
and community, or between classes, races and nations 
is derived from a too optimistic view of human nature...
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The conception of human nature which underlies the 
social and political attitudes of a liberal democratic 
culture is that of an essentially harmless individual... As 
the result - of this persistent_±>J_indness_J:o the obvious 
and tragic facts of man's social history,democracy 
has had to maintain itself precariously against the 
guile and malice of the children of darkness.33
Niebuhr further pinpoints the fault bf the children of light
in connecting their thought not only with the Enlightenment but also
with the philosophy of liberalism. In its evaluation of man liberalism
believes that man, as the children of light would have him, is
basically good and untainted by the powers of evil. It is because man
bears no limit on his goodness that liberalism can posit history in a
progressive sense of man's advancement through time. Using Waltz's
classification of Niebuhr as a first image pessimist, one can easily
see the conflict between the view of human nature held by Niebuhr and
that of liberalism. Liberalism believes that human nature' cannot be
blamed for the faults of history because man's "goodness" is strong
enough to avoid evil. Niebuhr, in contrast, believes that the root of
all evil is in human nature and that institutions or environment cannot
be a scapegoat for the faults of man. It is such liberalism that forms
the basis of the philosophy of the children of light and distorts
their view of reality:
Liberalism is in short a kind of blindness to which those 
are particularly subject who imagine that their intelligence or 
the irrepressible processes of history have emancipated 
them from all the stupidites of the past. It is a 
blindness which does not see the perennial difference between 
human actions and aspirations, the perennial source of 
conflict between life and life, the inevitable tragedy 
of human existence, the irreducible irrationality of 
human behavior, and ths tortuous character of human 
history. To sum up, liberalism is based upon illusions 
as to the nature of man and of history. These two 
illusions were basic to all the political miscalculations 
of the Enlightenment and were the source of its e r r o r s . 34
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Problems arise for the children of the light because their
system of thought is based on two misconceptions; the first being
their view of man; the second being their view of history. The basis
of the problem can be traced to liberalism with its faith in man.
In Niebuhr's view man is always found lacking because when man is
compared to an absolute God, man is always reduced to humility. But
the liberal takes a different approach in that he compares modern man
with man in.:past history and as a result takes great pride in the
many advancements made by man. As a result of man's material progress,
modern man believes that the possibility for the advancement of man is
in the future. Liberalism views history as progressive because man
is reaching a higher state of civilization through time. Niebuhr
argues that human nature is constant; therefore, given that man is the
agent of history, the process<jof history remains in constant flux
between the power of good and evil in man. Niebuhr argues that faith
in progress follows from the basic tenet of liberalism with its
faith in the goodness of man:
What then is the liberal creed? It is primarily faith 
in man; faith in his capacity to subdue nature, and 
faith that the subjection of nature achieves life's 
final good; faith in man's essential goodness, to be 
realized either when man ceases to be spiritual and 
returns to nature (romaniticism), or when he ceases 
to be natural and becomes rational; and finally, 
faith in human history which is conceived as a move­
ment upward by a force immanent within it. Whether 
this faith rests upon Darwin or upon Hegal (that is, 
whether nature is believed to guarantee progress or 
whether progress is conceived of as man's "gradual 
spiritualization" and his emancipation from natural 
impulses, prejudices and parochial attachments) the 
optimistic conclusion is the s a m e . 36
Niebuhr argues that the view of history that proposes the progressive
advancement of man is not based on fact. Faith in history is reflected
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by the problems recorded in history which show that man has made
little progress in history. To trust in history, Niebuhr argues,
is to trust in a false god:
It is because we have trusted history too much that 
we understand neither life nor history. History cannot 
be the answer to our problems, for history is itself 
our problem. History is, in short, an inadequate 
god. We have failed to gauge every contemporary 
problem in its true depth because of this false faith
in history.37
Niebuhr further developed his argument against trust in
history by an argument that an optimistic view of history is based
on certain false presuppositions. First an optimistic view assumes
that man is somehow better or more advanced than he has been in the
past. Niebhur argues that this cannot be proven by any means or
measure other than mere material advances of man. In limiting progress
to "material" advances Niebuhr perhaps overlooks such social advances
as the abolition of slavery and child labor, but he would argue that
such improvements resulted from the development of technology and
science which made such forms of labor unnecessary. Niebuhr would
further argue that the advances of science were of major importance
to Western civilization. Niebuhr does not deny such "progress" but
he does point out that in the abuse of science and the use of
technology for mass destruction that man is far from the "enlightened
38man" image that liberalism presents. Niebuhr develops his objection
based on the record of history itself as a means to refute false
conceptions of history:
There were experiences in previous centuries which 
might well have challeneged this unqualified optimism.
But the expansion of man's power over nature proceeded 
at such a pace that all doubts were quieted, allowing
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the nineteenth century to become the "century of 
hope" and to express the modern mood in its most 
extravagant terms. History, refusing to move by 
the calender, actually permitted the nineteenth 
century to indulge its illusions into the twentieth.
Then came the deluge. Since 1914 one tragic 
experience has followed another, as if history 
had been designed to refute the vain delusions 
of modern man.39
The ultimate point of conflict between the children of 
light and the perspective of Niebuhr is their focal point of faith.
The children of light trust in history as a means gradually to 
redeem man of his current weaknesses. Niebuhr views man as a creation 
of God who stands in a constant tension between his existence as 
a finite creature of nature and an infinite creature of eternity. 
Inherent in man is both the capacity for progress and destruction 
and the ability to serve justice or injustice. Niebuhr recognizes 
both the power of good and evil in man and argues that the formation 
of democracy must take into account the nature of man in its complete 
expression:
But modern democracy requires a more realistic 
philosophic and religious basis, not only in order 
to anticipate and understand the perils to which 
it is exposed; but also to give it a more persuasive 
justification. Man's capacity for justice makes 
democracy possible; but man's inclincation to 
injustice makes democracy necessary.40
At this point it is important to understand that Niebuhr's 
philosophy of history and concept of democracy is based on what he 
calls Christian realism. Christian realism asserts that man is 
both nature and spirit and to fail in realizing this is to distort 
the nature of man. Niebhur uses his model of man as the basis to 
establish that history is meaningful because man is created in the 
image of God and therefore his activity is of importance, but man is
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also a finite creature in time and nature and, accordingly, cannot reach
41
the final fulfillment within history. This framework of faith
serves as a critique to any liberal utopian scheme of history:
We need a faith that throws light upon the importance 
of every historical task and responsibility. But it 
must on the other hand reveal the limits of all 
historical striving... The Christian religion regards 
history as meaningful but as having no fulfillment 
of its meaning within itself... For this reason all 
modern substitutes for the Christian faith, in which 
history is fulfilled in some kind of utopia, naturally 
find the Christian faith incredible because they 
have a simpler answer to the problems of life. The 
Christian faith becomes credible only when those 
simpler answers are refuted by history, as indeed 
they are bound to be.42
The pages of history are for Niebuhr a claim against any shallow
optimistic or utopian view that would promise to deliver man from
his finite existence in history.
Niebuhr*s insight into human nature is based on a theological
concept of man that allows him to escape the flaws of both realism
and optimism. The realists, or children of darkness, fail to take
into account the spiritual nature of man that determines man's
capacity for injustice. This action is q-uite consistent with their
conception of man as a selfish agent who needs to be controled for
the good of society. The idealists, or children of light, reject the
finite nature of man and therefore fail to realize man's capacity
for injustice. It follows that Niebuhr argues that the children of
light provide an inadequate basis for democracy because they fail
to assess the danger of power and ambition among individuals,
groups, and nations. For Niebuhr this is more than a philosopher's
game to determine which theory best fits democracy. Niebuhr argues
that the very existence of democracy is endangered by the fact that
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its concept of man based on the liberal-optimistic view cannot stand 
the test of truth and is in danger of refutation. To this Niebuhr 
says:
It may be that democracy is too intimately bound up 
with these liberal prejudices to survive their 
destruction. This is a pity. For if democracy dies 
it must be b o m  again. There is no way to justice 
without it.43
Niebuhr is not calling for the end of democracy but for a more 
realistic justification and foundation for democracy that will take 
into account both the strength and the weakness of man.
Ill
Niebuhr*s view of human nature is related directly to his 
44concept of sin. Sin according to Niebuhr is not breaking a "thou 
shall not" but rather a failure of man to realize and fully accept 
himself as a man. For man fully to accept himself involves an 
acknowledgement of both his position as a natural and as a 
spiritual creature. When man attempts to overstep the limits of his 
nature»this is an act of rebellion against God, and is the essence 
of sin.^ Such a rebellion leads to man's downfall because not only 
is man acting against God, he is also acting in direct contradiction 
to his very nature. Niebhur also develops this by using the story 
of the Garden of Eden to symbolize man’s rebellion, which was the 
source of evil in the world. The impact of evil was not in the 
objective act of disobedience but in the very will of man to act 
in contradiction to his nature.^ Niebuhr develops the concept of 
evil as the result of sin or rebellion which in turn affects man’s
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total nature:
Man is a sinner. His sin is defined as a rebellion
against God. The Christian estimate of human evil
is so serious precisely because it places evil at 
the very centre of human personality:: in the will.
This evil cannot be regarded complacently as the 
inevitable consequence of his finiteness or the 
fruit of his involvement., in the contingencies and 
necessities of nature.47
Niebuhr argues that a separation from God results in a failure by
man to accept his finite nature, which results in man’s assertion
of pride because the means to accept his limitations have been
rejected. A rejection of the Christian view of human nature leads,
Niebuhr argues, to illusions about the nature of man:
The liberal part of our culture thought that the
Christian idea of the sinfulness of all men was
outmoded. In its place it put the idea of a
harmless egoism, rendered innocuous either by a 
prudent self-interest or by a balance of all 
social forces which would transmute the selfish­
ness of all into a higher social harmony. The 
vanity of that idea was proved by the ever more 
dynamic disproportions of power in our society 
and the ever greater destruction of community 
in a technical society. Sometimes the liberal 
part of our culture conceived the idea of 
redemption through growth and development. Men 
suffered (so it was argued) not from sin but 
from impotence. But fortunately the whole 
historical process was itself redemptive. It 
translated man from impotence to power, from 
ignorance to intelligence, from the victim to 
becoming the master of historical destiny. This 
illusion proved as tragic as the first one. Since 
the sin of man lies in the corruption of his will 
and not in his weakness, the possibilities of 
evil grow with the development of the very freedom 
and power which were supposed to emancipate man.^
In our society sin is an outdated word for many and evil is seen as
' something that exists outside of man. But Niebuhr overcomes the
fear of modern man to accept the responsibility and the guilt that
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is associated with a concept of personal sin by also placing stress
on the social implications of sin. Niebuhr is not the fundamentalist
who talks only of sin as a personal, legalistic concept, nor is he the
liberal who finds sin only in the fault of social structure.
Niebuhr’s construction of a doctrine of sin is based on a tension
of individual and corporate sin that can be a result of one man in
49isolation from others or in the largest of group situations. The 
concept of sin fits Niebuhr’s view of democracy that demands that 
man be honest in accepting both his strength and his limitations.
Niebuhr builds his "solution" to the inadequate philosophy 
of the children of light on concepts that are inclusive of a view
of man and history that are products of sin and evil. The wisdom
of Niebhur's position comes not in his sermons on sin or evil but
in his view of human nature that allows democracy to be based both
on man’s potential and its corruption. Niebuhr realizes the good in 
man can create forms of government that make power the instrument of 
justice. He also realizes the evil in man that can distort justice 
for its own purpose ending in the corruption and destruction of 
democratic government. A democracy that refuses to accept the full 
extent of good and evil in human nature is left between the 
precarious position of an optimistic faith in man's potential and 
a hard realism that can measure only the capacity of man toward 
evil. The children of light or the liberal democracies of the 
twentieth century have opted for the optimistic faith in the capacity 
of man to overcome all o b s t a c l e s . T h e  reason human nature must be 
viewed in its full expression, Niebuhr argues, is that no philosophy
of our age has been able to anticipate or prevent the many conflicts
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and problems that left democracy near catastrophe because of its 
illusionary view of human nature and history.
To those who argue that realism is the answer to the weak­
nesses of optimism, Niebuhr argues that realism in theory and 
practice is anti-democratic. The basis for his reasoning is that its 
view of man is pessimistic, allowing man to be controlled by political 
power rather than citizens to use political power. Niebuhr also 
argues that realism is based on a contradiction that uses power to 
establish order in society but fails to apply limits to the power of 
political leaders who also need to be controlled according to realism:
In all non-democratic political theories the state 
or the ruler is invested with uncontrolled power for 
the sake of achieving order and unity in the 
community. But the pessimism which prompts and 
justifies this policy is not consistent; for it is 
not applied, as it should be, to the ruler... But 
a too consistent optimism in regard to. man’s ability 
and inclination to grant justice to his fellows 
obscures the perils of chaos which perennially 
confront every society. In one sense a democratic
society is particularly exposed to the dangers of
confusion...a Christian view of human nature is
more adequate for the development of a democratic 
society than either the optimism with which 
democracy has become historically associated or 
the moral cynicism which inclines human communi­
ties to tyrannical political s t r a t e g i e s . - ^
Without the spiritual side of man that reflects the image of God,
Niebuhr argues that realism may be a means to critique the false view
of optimism in democracy but will lack a constructive approach on
53which a democracy could be built. Thus any attempt to use realism
as a means to solve the misconceptions of liberal optimism ends with
an unwarranted pessimism that questions the very potential of man to 
establish a democracy.
Niebuhr turns to his philosophy of Christian realism as
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the means to preserve democracy from the extremes of optimistic
liberalism and pessimistic realism. Niebuhr argues that Christianity
gives democracy three elements that are necessary for its success.
First, the basis of faith provides man with a standard of judgment
beyond himself in the "Wholly Other" God whose power humbles the
pretension of man who is forced to accept his limitations. Second,
Christianity with its conception of the individual as created in the
image of God gives a dignity to man that cannot be erased by the
force of government oppression. Third, it recognizes the depth of
human nature in both destructive sin and creative good. It is this
faith that allows the justification of power to control the destructive
urge of man while at the same time giving man freedom for the
creative expression of his will in a constructive fashion. The basis
of Christian realism as it applies to democracy is to reach a balance
between order and freedom that is consistent with the nature of man.
As such Niebuhr argues that the insights of biblical faith are
necessary for the construction and survival of democracy:
But it cannot be denied that biblical faith is unique 
in offering three insights into the human situation 
which are indispensable to democracy. The first is that 
it assumes a source of authority from the standpoint 
of which the individual may defy the authorities of 
this world. OWe must obey God rather than man.*)
The second is an appreciation of the unique worth
of the individual which makes it wrong to fit him
into any political program as a mere instrument. A
scientific humanism frequently offends the dignity
of man, which it ostensibly extols, by regarding
human beings as subject to manipulation and as mere
instruments of some 1 socially approved* ends. It is
this tendency of a scientific age which establishes
its affinity with totalitarianism... The third insight
is the biblical insistence that the same radical
freedom which makes man creative also makes him
potentially destructive and dangerous, that the
dignity of man and the misery of man therefore the same
root. This insight is the basis of all political realism.54
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It is the study of man that brings Niebuhr to the conclusion that
democracy is not something that can be easily achieved or maintained
against the forces of anarchy and authoritarianism. Niebuhr argues
not only for democracy but for a faith that he believes offers the
insight into human nature that can serve as the basis for a philosophy
of democracy:
The Bible contains two approaches, which taken 
together and held in balance do justice to -the
moral ambiguities of government. According to
the one, government is an ordinance of God and 
its authority reflects the Divine Majesty.
According to the other, the rulers and judges of 
nations are particularly subject to divine 
judgment and wrath because they oppress the poor
and defy the divine majesty. These two approaches
do justice to the two aspects of government. It 
is a principle of order and its power prevents 
anarchy; but its power is not identical with 
divine power.5 5
It is the balance between authority and freedom in constant tension
with the nature and spirit of man that poses the challenge to
democracy. It is the insight of Christian realism which reveals the
freedom of man and the corruption of that freedom that makes democracy
both a possibility and a necessity. This does not mean that Niebuhr
regards democracy to be an easy accomplishment. Rather Niebuhr
knows democracy must maintain a constant struggle against man or groups
who would seek to dominate the power structure to end democracy and
establish an oligarchy:
Democracy cannot be validated purely upon the basis 
of early democratic theory. Some of the facts of 
human nature, discerned by Hobbes and Luther, must 
be taken into consideration. These facts prove a 
democratic society to be more difficult of achieve­
ment than idealistic democratic theory assumes; but 
they also prove* it to be more necessary. For 
certainly one perennial justification for democracy 
is that it arms the individual with political and 
constitutional power to resist the inordinate
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ambition of rulers, and to check the tendency of 
the community to achieve order at the price of 
liberty.56
The meaning behind Niebuhr*s plea to examine the basis of a philosophy 
of democracy is his attempt to teach that democracy is not a gift 
but an achievement. His message to us is that the false optimism that 
affects the children of light’s concept of man and history, need not 
refute democracy as it refutes itself on the pages of history. Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. notes that Niebuhr is not calling for the end of 
democracy but for a re-construction of a philosophy of democracy that 
will escape the faults of the narrow optimism of the children of 
light:
Niebuhr shows that the refutation by history of 
democratic illusions need not turn into a refuta­
tion of democracy; that the appalled realization 
that man was not wholly good and reasonable need 
not turn into a repudiation of man as wholly evil
and impotent; that men and women could act more
effectively for decency and justice under the 
banner of a genuine humility than they had under, 
the banner of illusory p e r f e c t i b i l i t y .57
In sum, Niebuhr works toward an end to the illusions that with the
children of light, provide only support for an unrealistic democracy.
IV
While Niebuhr constructed his democratic theory on the basis 
of the nature of man he was not silent about the structural problems
that face the democratic nation. The crucial element for a democracy
in Niebuhr’s opinion is the role of participation. Niebuhr argues 
that the organization of voting power among the citizens of a nation 
serves as the key to political power. The importance of participation
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is found in the process of affecting public policy decisions and 
enabling voters to control their representatives. Niebuhr makes it 
clear that a democracy is based on the popular support of the 
people:
Democracy as a political institution is rooted in 
the principle of universal suffrage; which arms 
every citizen with political power and the chance to 
veto the actions of his rulers. It implements 
the thesis that governments derive their 
authority from the consent of the governed.58
The primary expressions of participation in a democracy are found in
the rights of suffrage and government based on popular consent.
Niebuhr finds tremendous value in the potential of suffrage to be a
means toward greater equality in society. For Niebuhr, it may very
well be the uneducated and poor rather than the educated and elite of
society, who are the best judges of the effectiveness of democracy:
One thanks God for democracy which gives the ignorant 
man just as much power of suffrage as the educated 
man, despite the apprehensions of the elite of all the 
ages that the masses are too ignorant to understand 
the complexities of government. One may also thank 
God for the wisdom which resides in a hungry belly 
rather than a sophisticated mind. The hungry belly 
announces at least that there is something wrong 
in a society which allows insecurity and hunger; and 
the sophisticated mind does not always know this, so 
long as the belly which feeds it is filled. The 
ignorant man may be too ignorant to make a pair of 
shoes; but not so ignorant that he does not know if 
a pair of shoes pinches him. Democracy must depend 
upon the wisdom of the pinched toe and the empty
belly.59
view of democracy embodies the principles of "one man, one 
for him this is the strength of democracy that allows all 
heard without regard to status or level of education. 
Niebuhr concept of participation is a dynamic one because he believes 
that with the vote comes the power to alter social policy and even
Niebuhr1s 
vote" and 
men to be
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alter Inequality in the economic realm:
Democracy gives potential political power to the 
voter as a mere voter without regard to his status 
in economic society. Since there are more poor 
voters than privileged ones it is always possible 
that the ballot may become an instrument for 
putting the apparatus of the state in the hands of 
the disinherited. Indeed the ballot has actually 
served the purpose of equalizing some of the 
inequalities of economic society by rigorous taxation 
policies on the part of political society.60
The power of citizens directly to effect government policy is, for
Niebuhr, what separates democracy from other forms of government.
Niebuhr does have a unique insight into the problem of equality because
he believes that the true test of a democracy comes from those who do
not enjoy its benefits. It is from those who dissent, that democracy
can discover its faults and through the voting process hope to
_-.adjust to the needs that exist. This places democracy at an advantage
over forms of government that suppress all dissent and restrict
voting to a one party choice, such governments, he maintains, are left
unstable because they rule without allowing for popular consent.
Niebuhr sees criticism as the first step to reform and a step that
cannot be eliminated without endangering the! authority of government
which is based on popular consent and reaction to popular complaint.
Democracy is an information system; authoritarians require a coercive
system — the more they suppress sources of information, the more
coercive they become.
Beyond the themes of participation and political and
economic equality, Niebuhr has no specific analysis of topics such as
majority rule, political liberty, or representation. These along
with the concept of the "consent of the governed", Niebuhr takes for
granted as an expression of democracy. Niebuhr accepts almost as a
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matter of definition, that a democracy is based on majority rule, 
political liberty, and maximum representation.^ Majority rule is 
an element of democracy that for Niebuhr provides the means for 
peaceful resolution of power conflicts among groups. Political 
liberty is based on the freedom of man and his ability for just 
social relationships in society. Finally, representation is the 
basis of democracy that on a structural level allows elected repre­
sentatives to be the foundation of popular consent.
V
Two problems that have broad implications for Niebuhr’s 
concept of human nature will now be discussed. The first problem is 
the role of faith as seen in his concept of Christian realism which 
Niebuhr claims is the key to understanding human nature. From this 
problem arises the.second issue^ which involves the validity of 
using human nature as a tool to develop concepts of democratic theory. 
Since human nature and faith are the focal points of Niebuhr’s 
analysis, the basis of a critique of Niebuhr’s view of democracy must 
involve an evaluation of their impact or lack of impact as they are 
applied. A third consideration to be evaluated is Niebuhr’s 
uncritical acceptance of concepts which apply to democracy.
The first problem involves Niebuhr’s application of the 
insights of Christian theology as the means for democracy to overcome 
its inadequate base of belief in the liberal-optimistic view of 
human nature. The problem that results from this is that the analysis 
made by Niebuhr is purely theoretical and not historical. When an
historical approach is taken Christianity cannot brag about any
major contributions to democracy. Many chapters in history are
covered with the problems caused by religious authoritarianism which
supported a "divine right" for the abuse of power and the oppression
of citizens. Other chapters of history record the violence and
anarchy caused by religious war, the Crusades, the Inquisition, the
English Civil War and the present attempts by Christians to create
62anarchy in Latin American nations. Christians are no less
immune than non-Christians to use power to violate their beliefs and
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justify the establishment of authoritarian powers. Christians
have also violated biblical principles against violence and war in
attempts to change governmental power by overthrow of established 
64authority. History has shown that Christians have, like non-Christians 
ignored the insights of faith that recognize that the power of man 
must be limited enough to allow freedom, but strong enough to 
preserve justice. The average student of history would be hard 
pressed to see any unique contributions of Christianity to the 
development of democracy. Perhaps more distressing is that Christians 
themselves when it came to practical application of the insights of 
their faith have often chosen to ignore the implications of their 
belief. As such Niebuhr’s basis for democracy in faith may give 
democracy a greater justification in a theoretical sense but could 
be beyond all possible practical application in history. This of 
course does.not make Niebuhr’s view of faith invalid, but it does 
show that the basis of democracy cannot depend on any one group of 
the "faithful" since history has shown that all have fallen short 
of the requirements for a just society.
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The second problem that faces Niebuhr is the use of the 
term "human nature" as a conceptual tool in democratic theory.
Human nature can easily become a "catch-all" definition that is 
used to explain both specific problems of man and the general nature 
of man. For example the term human nature could be used to show 
that some people are thieves while at the same time arguing that 
theft is a result of human nature. Such would lead to the conclusion 
that man's nature is the cause of theft. This argument uses a concept 
of human nature as a primary cause to the secondary effect of theft 
as if not to steal would violate the human nature of a thief. Any 
attempt to lower theft would have to face the absurdity that man 
cannot act against human nature which would preclude any limitation 
of theft. The problem is that the "particular" acts such as theft 
committed by an individual cannot be separated from the individual 
who is responsible by an appeal to a "universal" causative factor 
such as human nature. The primary nature of man likewise cannot be 
deduced from a selection of the secondary actions of men. Human 
nature as a concept could be used to prove anything if careful steps 
are not taken: German’s have bad tempers, teenagers drive too fast,
Ralph beats his wife - can all be proven by an appeal to human 
nature! Niebuhr recognized this when he wrote:
Human nature is so complex that it justifies
almost every assumption and p r e j u d i c e . 65
Unless carefully used human nature is a concept so broad that for 
all practical purposes it becomes useless.
Niebuhr is able to escape the fallacy of using human nature
to explain all events by the distinction between primary and
66secondary causes. For example, the ideological justification of
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democracy would be a primary cause for the specific policies of
democracy which are secondary causes for the development of
democracy. The problem arises when the secondary cause becomes
the determinate cause for the primary cause; for example,when
cases of theft are used to determine that it is human nature to steal.
It is because Niebuhr is able to separate the primary and secondary
causes that he is able to escape the worldly pessimism that traps
Augustine. Both Augustine and Niebuhr realized that perfection
on earth was not possible but this led Augustine to devalue this
world and separate the "city of man" from the "city of God". Niebuhr
accepted that just because the primary cause of perfection could
not be reached was no reason to scrap all attempts to distinguish
between the secondary option available to man. Rather than give up
on man because human nature is corrupt, Niebuhr sought to deal with
the imperfect in men. Just because perfect justice is not possible
is no reason to give up all attempts to make society more just
67in its imperfect state. It is such a realism that leads Niebuhr 
to accept the imperfection of democracy over the imperfections of 
its alternatives. In sum, Niebuhr overcomes the problems that 
result from the use of human nature as a conceptual tool by using it 
not as an explanation of all acts but as a means to categorize and 
analyze the problems that affect man from a perspective that measures 
both the ability and the limitations of man to react to the problems 
he encounters in the building of a democratic society.
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CHAPTER II
DEMOCRACY AND CHRISTIAN REALISM
Niebuhr develops his philosophy of Christian realism 
around the dialectical nature of man. The nature of man cannot 
fully be explained by his physical existence in nature or his 
rational or eternal forms because man is a finite creature of nature 
and time. Man also cannot be defined as a creature of the natural 
world alone because man is also a spiritual being made in the image 
of an eternal God. For Niebuhr the nature of man is best understood 
in a dialectical perspective that accounts for both man’s nature as 
a being of time and nature with its numerous limitations and man's 
nature as a spiritual being of eternity with the capacity for self­
transcendence. Man, as such, can never be reduced to the level of 
an animal or raised to the level of God. When governments treat 
man only in terms of his limited nature without realizing his abilities 
for justice that flow from his self-transcendence, then man is 
oppressed by government. On the other hand, when the corruption of 
man's abilities are not taken into account, then any attempt to 
construct a government would be helplessly unrealistic. It is from 
the understanding of man as a spiritual being with the ability to 
be just and as creature of nature with selfish and unjust drives, 
that Niebuhr is able to construct an apology for democracy. This 
can clearly be seen in his most well known statement on democracy
43
44
that: "man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible and man’s 
capacity for injustice makes democracy necessary." Democracy, 
unlike other forms of government, is able to allow man’s ability 
to create a just social order to be realized while at the same time 
checked by the need to place restraints upon man’s possible abuse 
of his freedom. Democracy gives man freedom in acknowledgment!c of 
his capacity to secure justice, but also places man under laws 
because it realizes that man can corrupt justice and place self- 
interest before the welfare of society. Other forms of government 
view man either only as a creature of nature, driven by self-interest, 
and thus not deserving of freedom or capable of good or as a being 
who is able to have freedom without limitation. The former is 
based on a pessimistic naturalism, the latter an unrealistic idealism, 
both of which deny the dialectical nature of man.
I
Niebuhr uses his dialectical framework of man as the focal
point of confronting non-Christian philosophies that he argues
distort the nature of man. To begin his critique he limits the
alternatives to Christian realism to two general categories or
applications, in idealism and naturalism:
Broadly speaking these philosophies are either 
idealistic or naturalistic. If the former, they
tend to understand man too much from the standpoint
of his rational faculties only and therefore mis­
understand him. They do not understand the full 
dimension of his "spirit"... The naturalists on 
the other hand seek to equate the statue of man 
as much as possible with the dimension of "nature" 
in which his life is imbedded but which he never­
theless transcends.1
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Niebuhr*s critique develops through the claim that idealism and
naturalism destroy the dialectic because they focus on one side of
2man and make it their total view. Idealism undervalues the role
of man in time and scorns the role of man in the natural order.
In the philosophy of Idealism a dualism between mind and matter leads
3 -
to the view that the mind is entombed in the prison of the body.
Niebuhr objects to this because it fails to understand man’s existence
as a creature of nature is a normal aspect of man’s being. European
theologian, Rousas Rushdoony, traces the impact of neoplatonism in
philosophy and theology in his book, The Flight from Humanity. His
basic argument is that idealism (as represented in neoplatonism) places
man’s rational nature against his physical nature and in turn places the
realm of the transcendent against the real of the material. In Niebuhr’s
terms, the realm of the spiritual is set in opposition to the realm of
nature. As a result, idealism throughout history has undervalued the
sensual and material nature of man and his environment. The nature of
4
man is that of a caged spirit. Idealism breaks the side of nature and 
time in the dialectic in its quest for the eternal and transcendent.
Niebuhr is critical of naturalism for going to the opposite- 
extreme of idealism in its denial of the spiritual and eternal 
aspects of man’s nature. The philosophy of naturalism limits man’s 
essence to his existence as a product of nature in time. Rather than 
placing the spiritual and natural in .opposition, it simply denies 
the spiritual and transcendent nature of man.'* Niebuhr argues that 
the very approach of naturalism to the universe and causality eliminates 
the realm of the human spirit or other spiritual forces as an
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explanation for history or man’s nature. Thus naturalism breaks
the eternal and spiritual side of the dialectic. As a result
Niebuhr finds both naturalism and idealism inadequate in their
understanding of.the nature of man:
Naturalism loses the individual because it does not 
view life in sufficient depth to comprehend the self­
transcendent human spirit. This spirit is a reality 
which does not fit into the category of natural 
causality which is naturalism's sole principle of 
comprehending the universe. Idealism on the other 
hand discovers the human spirit in its height of 
transcendence over natural process, but loses it 
again because the uniqueness and arbitrariness of 
individuality do not conform to its patter of 
rationality, which is its sole principle of inter­
preting reality. It is instructive in this connec­
tion that even a pluralistic philosophy such as 
Leibnitz's with its emphasis upon individuality, can 
find a place for the individual only by seeing it 
as a microcosmic type of macrocosm. 6
The basic point of conflict between Niebuhr's system of
Christian realism and the philosophies of naturalism and idealism
comes at the focal point of his theological interpretation of man.
Niebuhr's justification in using theology as the focal point for a
concept of man is based on his argument that man is inherently a
religious being, who uses religion as a means to determine the
system of values in which he seeks to deal with the "ultimate"
questions of life and reality:
In any case both the foundation and the pinnacles of 
any cultural structure are religious; for any scheme 
of values is finally determined by the ultimate 
question about the meaning of life. This is true 
even of ostensibly secular cultures which covertly 
raise some contingent value of life in the 
position of the ultimate, and worship it as god."'
Recent studies in psychology of religion confirm Niebuhr's argument and
even go so far as to say that humans everywhere are "incurable
Q (
worshippers." It is important to realize that Niebuhr'in seeking
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to establish his philosophy of Christian realism, does not appeal 
to the validity of his own view of Christian theology, rather his 
argument is based on the foundation of the religious nature of 
man's being.
Niebuhr finds fault and danger in naturalism and idealism
when nature and reason are elevated to the level of becoming false
gods. Niebuhr maintains that the philosophies that violate the
dialectical nature of man end by making an "absolute" out of one
facit of man's existence. To make an absolute out of nature or
reason distorts man's true nature because his being is reduced to
a product of time-bound nature or timeless eternity:
There is in short no expectation of Christ, no 
Messianic hope, in classical culture because the 
sovereignty to which man must be subordinated 
is not of the kind which is partly" hidden and 
may be expected to be more fully revealed. In 
the one case Nature is god and obedience to that 
god requires the disavowal of all the unique 
fears, hopes, ambitions and evils which are the 
stuff of history. In the other case Reason is 
god; and the necessities and contingencies of 
history are, from the perspective of reason, 
reduced to pure "chance" or to a mechanistic 
necessity, which means that history is essentially 
meaningless because it is partly imbedded in nature.
There is no necessity or possibility in either case 
of a fuller revelation of the ultimate sovereignty 
of life in history and therefore of a fuller 
disclosure of the meaning of life. The only 
alternatives are either to reduce the meaning of 
life to comparative meaningfulness of the natural 
order, or to emancipate life from this meaning­
lessness by translating it into the dimension of 
pure reason, which is to say, pure eternity.^
Niebuhr's criticism of idealism and naturalism and their tendencies
to make "gods" of reason and nature is not due to their failure to
recognize the religious nature of man rather it is because they
do not fit his dialectical construct of man. This weakens, his
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argument considerably because Niebuhr fails to establish the point 
that idealism and naturalism distort the religious nature of man; 
rather he establishes that their conception of human nature is 
incomplete.
The final point of Niebuhr*s defense of his system of Christian 
realism is based upon his argument that the dialetic is the means 
to establish a unity between time and eternity in man. This in 
turn would unify the physical body with the spiritual soul without 
the destruction of one or the other. At this point Niebuhr tries 
to justify his system not by negative argument against alternatives 
but by construction of a positive argument in favor of Christian 
realism;
The consequence of this conception of the world upon 
the view of human nature in Christian thought is to
allow an appreciation of the unity of body and soul in
human personality which idealists and naturalists have 
sought in vain. Furthermore it prevents the idealistic 
error of regarding the mind as essentially good or 
essentially eternal and the body as essentially evil.
But it also obviates the romantic error of seeking 
for the good in man-as-nature and for evil in man-as- 
spirit or as reason... The second important 
characteristic of the Christian view of man is that he 
is understood primarily from the standpoint of God, 
rather than the uniqueness of his rational faculties 
or his relation to nature. He is made in the image 
of God.10
The positive element of Niebuhr*s system is the balance it provides
between man’s body and soul. If this insight were applied to
church history, it would aid in exposing the mistakes of the mystical
monastic movement that viewed the physical body as sinful and resulted
in the unbiblical establishment of the practice of celibacy among
11Roman Catholic priests. It could also serve to critique the other
extreme that, as a result of nineteenth century higher criticism
49
that questioned the validity of biblical history, would deny the
12
existence of the soul. Niebuhr argues that the ability of
Christianity to relate body and soul finally led to a proper relation
between individual and society:
The religio-cultural foundations for individual self­
hood which were so belately elaborated in the structures 
of free societies were laid by the Judeo-Christian 
faith... Unlike the mystic faiths of the Orient, it 
did not regard the individual and historical ego as an
illusion... On the contrary, it accepted both the self
and the temporal flux in which it was imbedded as a 
real value and encouraged self-realization through the 
notion of a direct relation of the individual to the
ultimate source of meaning, the divine purpose.^3
It is at the point of the individuals relation to society that Niebuhr's
discussion of Christian realism in opposition to naturalism and
idealism applies to democracy. The philosophy of man that an
individual accepts is a determining factor in how such an individual
relates to society. If one views the body to be evil and history to
be meaningless, he will not likely be concerned with politics, but
will seek in one fashion or another, to retreat from the world. If,
on the other hand, one views man as ultimately only a product of
nature and a victim of nature's drives and motivations then one will
judge man to be incapable of freedom and democracy as a virtual sham.
For a democracy to be viable it must be based on an adequate
conception of the nature of man. For Niebuhr the final justification
for a democracy is its ability to organize a political system that
meets the full measure of man's ability to create a social order.
Democracy is not built by a philosophy of man that reduces man to
nature or reason, but rather a philosophy that accepts man as a
creature of time and eternity and a being of both nature and spirit.
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II
Humility is a concept basic to Niebuhr’s philosophy of
Christian realism, for it is the condition necessary for man to
accept his position as a creature in time and eternity. Niebuhr
argues that man by his very nature seeks to escape his limitations
because man is prone to self-love which refuses to acknowledge the
finite nature of man itself. The problem of self love is one that
deeply affects the perception of man:
No matter how wide the perspectives which the human 
mind may reach, how broad the loyalties which the 
human imagination may conceive, how universal the 
community which human statecraft may organize, or how 
pure the aspirations of the saintliest idealist may 
be, there is no level of human moral or social 
achievement in which there is not some corruptions 
of inordinate self-love.14
It is such self-love that is a threat to democracy because it leads
the individual, groups, and nation to favor their own advancement
beyond reason or justification. In the dialetical framework of
Christian realism, self-love refuses to accept the natural limitations
of man as a finite creature. Instead man seeks power, glory, and
immortality because his concern is to make the self an absolute in
eternity. Individuals and groups express different forms of self-love,
but each attempts to hide its self-love and subjective interests in
illusions of procuring the general welfare:
Every nation pretends, on the other hand, that its 
primary loyalty is to a universal value. This is 
the element of deceit which is involved in all 
national life, and in all human existence for that 
matter; for individuals, as well as nations, 
sanctify partial and particular interests by 
identifying them unduly with universal values..
Whether we judge this or that nation more or less 
severely for engaging in these pretenses depends 
upon our own ideological b i a s . 15
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Humility is necessary to overcome the illusions of self-love that
would destroy democracy with ambitious individuals and groups
who make selfish claims for power in the name of the social good.
Niebuhr uses the insight of Augustine to develop his
conception of man as a finite being in Christian realism. It is
Augustine’s doctrine of man and conception of the power of human
egotism that adds insight to Niebuhr’s attempt to evaluate critically
the power of egotism that refuses to acknowledge the finite nature
of man as a creature of God:
Augustine’s approach differs from modern forms of 
sentimental perfectionism in the fact that he takes 
account of the power and persistence of egotism, 
both individual and collective, and seeks to 
establish the most tolerable form of peace and 
justice under conditions set by human sin... Thus 
Augustine, whatever may be the defects of his 
approach to political reality, and whatever may 
be the dangers of a too slavish devotion to his 
insights, nevertheless proves himself a more reliable 
guide than any known thinker.16
The attribute of egotism is regarded as sinful by Niebuhr because it
violates the very nature of man as it leads to extreme conditions of
domination over others or else a separation from others because of
an individualism based on conceit. For Niebuhr Christian realism
can be realized only through self—transcendence to the level of the
eternal:1  ^ This transcendence goes beyond any attempt to base
life upon self love or egotism because it shows that the temporal
realm can never be absolutized. It is because man is finite that
he can never gain enough glory, power, or life to gain infinity.
But when man realizes that he is a being created for eternity then
the desire to make what is limited to histbry import'al, ceases*
Once self-love is exposed as selfish interest, another
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danger is present if a skeptical realism is adopted. A skeptical
realism is one that does not accept the eternal element of man's
nature and as a result interprets all reality from the point of
negative self-interest between individuals, groups, and nations:
Any political philosophy which assumes that natural 
impulses, that is greed, the will-to-power and other 
forms of self-assertion, can never be completely 
controlled or sublimated by reason, is under the 
necessity of counteracting political policies which 
attempt the control of nature in human history by 
setting the forces of nature against the impulses 
of nature. If coercion, self-assertion and conflict 
are regarded as permissible and necessary instruments 
of social redemption, how are perpetual conflict and 
perennial tyranny to be avoided?... A too consistent 
political realism would seem to consign society to 
perpetual warfare.
As such skeptical realism differs from idealistic self-love only
because it realizes the motive of self-interest and exposes the
false pretensions of egotism in its claim to serve the general
welfare. The philosophical problems of skeptical realism and egotism
are the same because neither accept a view of man that can transcend
the limits of time and history. Self-love and egotism attempt to
escape the finite by making it absolute - skeptical realism merely
shows that this is impossible but lacks a solution to the problem
of self-interest. Niebuhr argues the solution is found in the
concept of self-transcendence in Christian realism.
Niebuhr finds skeptical realism barren in an attempt to
form a basis for democracy because it is trapped in the pessimism
of a perspective that exposes idealism, but has no constructive
replacement. E.H. Carr agrees with Niebuhr's analysis of the basis
of extreme realism:
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Consistent realism excludes four things which 
appear to be essential ingredients of all effective 
political thinking: a finite goal, an emotional
appeal, a right moral judgment and a ground for 
action.19
Such realism reaches a destructive level because it attributes all
action to selfish motives and therefore is blind to the acts of man
that are motivated by love or are sacrificial in nature. What
skeptical realism needs, Niebuhr argues, is a basis to transcend the
historical situation which, in isolation, leads to an analysis of
human action as a reflection of vested interest. Such realism fails
to see man's capacity for justice or his ability to compromise
which are the basis of the democratic state. Niebuhr argues that
realism needs to add the insights of Christian realism to develop
a concept to account for the dual nature of man as a material and 
20spiritual being. To save realism, Niebuhr would apply the concept 
of man that derives from his eternal nature, man as a reflection of 
the image of God. This in turn would give realism a basis to appeal 
to standards beyond the temporal realm and provide a realistic 
philosophy based on the dialetical relationship of man to time and 
eternity. In sum, the point Niebuhr argues is that a philosophy of 
democracy cannot be based on the incomplete views of man that are 
offered in idealism which cover shallow self interest or realism 
that is unable to see beyond self-interest.
Ill
, The basis of my critique of Niebuhr will center around the 
problems I see in his philosophy of Christian realism. The first
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problem is that Niebuhr's critique of alternative philosophies is
based riot so much on their faults as on their collision with his
dialetical framework. The critique Niebuhr applies to idealism and
naturalism result from the failure of those philosophies to fit his
"system" of Christian realism. He argues that they destroy the nature
of man by not fitting his dialectical system established for man. An
embarassing problem that arises from this position is that in his
critique of the alternative philosophies, Niebuhr himself argues
against any attempt to fit man into a "system":
The simple fact is that philosophies, whether 
naturalistic or idealistic, fail to understand 
man in so far as they try to fit him into a 
system. The system obscures the height of his 
spirit, the uniqueness of his being, and the 
egoistic corruption of his freedom. That is 
why the dramatic-historical approach to human 
and divine reality validate itself despite the 
prestige of modern science... That is probably 
due to the fact that mysteries of good and evil 
in human nature are obscured to those who insist 
upon making man an object of scientific investi­
gation and try to fit his radical freedom into 
some kind of system.21
Niebuhr's attack upon the efforts of philosophy and science to fit
man into a "system" ring of Dostoevski's "Underground Man" in his
ranting against the attempts to devaluate man by reducing man to
a mere system or formula. The question Niebuhr did not face was
the one that results from the problem of fitting man into a
theological system of Christian realism. The reader has a right to
ask does not this "system" also simplify man or reduce human nature
to set components?
The second point of my critique is based on Niebuhr's
use of the eternal nature of man in Christian realism. Niebuhr
argues that man is a creature of time and eternity and a being with
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both a natural and a spiritual nature. In the realm of the eternal, 
it is Niebuhr’s beliefs in the existence of an eternal soul in
22each man that separates him sharply from naturalism and idealism.
A problem arises.at this point because a philosophy could have a 
adequate understanding of man’s nature as a being of nature and 
time and still be rejected by Niebuhr for failure to consider the 
eternal nature of man. Niebuhr develops an "all or nothing" stance 
in which a philosophy, even if it has correct assumptions about the 
nature of man, is discarded because it lacks a concept of the 
eternal soul or spiritual nature of man. I have problems with this 
because such an authoritative stance is not empirically defended by 
Niebuhr.
At no point does Niebuhr attempt to give "evidence" for the
existence of an eternal nature of man. Rather he expects the reader
to accept the concept of the eternal soul as a "given" and proceeds
23
to base his system upon it. This falls into the trap of fideism
which expects man’s evaluation of truth to be based not on reason or
.24
objective fact but on an uncritical faith. Fideism fails to
differentiate between the basis for belief on an empirical level and
the justification for belief on a subjective level. As a result it
confuses the difference between the "unavoidability" and the
25"justifiability" of belief. This is exactly what Niebuhr does 
because in using his dialectical structure to measure other 
philosophies, he is arguing that Christian realism cannot be avoided 
because idealism and naturalism are inadequate —  not that Christian 
realism is in and of itself "justifiable". Thus Niebuhr’s dialectical 
structure is based on fideism because he tries to prove it truth by
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disproving its apparent alternatives.
The third point of my critique is that Niebuhr’s concept 
of the eternal soul is based on faith rather than evidence. This 
point reduced Niebuhr’s dialectic framework and philosophy of 
Chrisitan realism to subjective belief, thus raising questions as 
to its validity and applicability. For example, Niebuhr argues for 
the eternal nature of man, but so does idealism, and just as 
Niebhur does not prove the existence of the eternal soul, so he 
likewise does not disprove the idealistic view of the soul as eternal 
reason. It follows that Niebuhr’s system cannot maintain or demonstrate 
a claim for objective truth that would be necessary to prove 
alternatives to the system as false. As a result Niebuhr’s argument 
needs to be adjusted from the point where alternatives are false 
because they violate the measurements of his system to the point 
where Niebuhr presents his view as the best of many alternatives 
because of the greater insights and accuracy it provides for the 
concept of man and his environment.
The fourth and final point of this critique is that Niebuhr 
can overcome the problems of his dialectical structure of Christian 
realism only if he bases the system on subjective faith and an 
argument that would present his system as one qualitatively different 
from its alternatives. Niebuhr, does this through his concept of 
revelation. God’s revelation is accepted only on the basis of 
subjective faith which allows Niebuhr to escape the demand for 
objective evidence. It also solves the problem of qualitative 
superiority to other theories because as faith accepts God's 
revelation it submits to it as a superior standard to any discovery
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of man. Thus the problems of "justifiability" is placed in the
realms of belief:
God as will and personality, in concepts of Christian 
faith, is thus the only possible ground of real 
individuality, though not the only possible presupposi­
tion of self-consciousness. But faith in God as will 
and personality depends upon faith in His power to 
reveal Himself. The Christian faith in God’s self- 
disclosure, culminating in the revelation of Christ, 
is thus the basis of the Christian concept of personality 
and individuality... To understand himself truly means 
to begin with a faith that he is understood from beyond 
himself, that he is known and loved of God and must find 
himself in terms of obedience to the divine will. This 
relation, of the divine to the human will makes it 
possible for man to relate himself to God without 
pretending believing that the evil of his nature is 
caused by this finiteness. Man’s finite existence in 
the body and in history can be essentially affirmed, 
as naturalism wants to affirm it. Yet the uniqueness 
of man’s spirit can be appreciated even more than 
idealism appreciates it... These are the ultra- 
rational foundations and presuppositions of Christian 
wisdom about man.26
Acceptance of Niebuhr’s dialectic of Christian realism based on the
"ultra rational" concept of man, in the final analysis must be
accepted like Christianity itself, not on rational proofs but on
the ultra-rational tenets of a faith that transcends the boundaries
of rationality.
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CHAPTER III 
DEMOCRACY AND IRONY
At the conclusion of World War II the United States stood 
at the height of world power and political influence among the 
nations. It was at this time that Niebuhr recognized the need to 
re-examine American ideals and their impact on world affairs. With 
his book, The Irony of American History, Niebuhr looks at history 
from the perspective of an interpretation based on irony. Through 
irony he is able to explore the American historical images which 
have served to distort the proper role of the United States in foreign 
relations. In his analysis, Niebuhr finds that deeply planted in 
the American nation's consciousness are ideals of innocence and 
virtue. He traces the origin of the ideal of virtue to the Calvinists 
of New England who viewed themselves as the chosen people of God who 
played the role of a beacon to the world. In the South, among the 
Jeffersonians, Niebuhr finds a similar ideal of innocence based on 
the idea of America's special nation set apart from the vice and cor­
ruption of Europe. Both of these traditions saw America as "the new 
hope" for Western civilization that had grown old and decadent.
Niebuhr argues that both of these ideals of virtue and innocence 
are not merely overstated but rather they are blinding illusions 
that serve to distort reality. The importance of these false 
ideals is not in their historic origin but in their continuation
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throughout the history of our nation. As the ideals have continued 
into the present they have served, Niebuhr argues, to provide 
both a cause and justification for the abuse of both American 
responsibility and power in foreign affairs. Following an illusion 
of innocence the United States has sought to isolate itself from 
the problems and wars of Europe until forced to'act - this 
Niebuhr argues, is a neglect of responsibility. In the other extreme, 
when the United States does act in world politics,the false ideal of 
virtue turns politics into a moral crusade to end all wars, stop 
immoral tyranny, or establish "true American" freedom. Niebuhr 
argues that to use power as a tool to establish American virtue is 
an abuse of power. While the United States seeks to use power in 
terms of being a "white knight in rescue of those in distress,”
Niebuhr argues that white knights do not exist in world politics. In 
the crisis facing the world after World War II, Niebuhr argues that 
if America is to play the role it must as a world power, it must 
overcome the ironic ideals of our history. To bear the responsibility 
of power is to realize that innocence and' virtue are not meaningful 
ideals in the world of politics in which the exercise of power is 
often a necessary evil but seldom a moral crusade.
In his study of irony, Niebuhr also looks to the counterpart 
to American democracy in the biop>olar world - that of Soviet Communism. 
In the national consciousness of the Soviet State, Niebuhr also finds 
illusions of innocence and virtue that were fostered by Marxist 
ideals. Through the ideals of equality and the hope of revolution 
as the birth of a new age of man, the Soviets have been blind to the 
inequality in their own social system and failure of the revolution
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to improve the economic welfare of the Russian people. Yet, because
they are blinded by national ideals, the Soviets fail critically
to examine their illusions of innocence and virtue. In fact, both
the Americans and the Soviets are bewildered when other nations
fail to see the innocence and virtue they believe so obviously
exists in their nation. As for each other, both the Soviet state
and the American nation view each other as the antithesis of their
national ideals and therefore as the greatest threat to the world.
In the context of democracy, this chapter is limited to
Niebuhr's discussion of American democracy. But Niebuhr goes beyond
this in his discussion of the irony of Soviet Communism which serves
to both illuminate American irony and provide an historic understanding
of the international struggles of the post-war bipolar world. His
insight is important in his attempt to relate national images with
their impact in foreign policy. But, Niebuhr was a social and political
critic of America, not a student of comparative politics. As a result
his focus is on the role America plays in world politics and the
responisbility it bears as a result of its power.
As for the use of irony as a tool for historical investigation,
its effectiveness has been demonstrated by C. Vann Woodward in his
study of the ideals of the American South and their ironic results.
Woodward credits Niebuhr for an insightful evaluation of American
ideals but cautions:
Yet the ironic interpretation of history is rare 
and difficult. In the nature of things the parti­
cipants in an ironic situation are rarely conscious 
of the irony, else they would not become its 
victims. Awareness must ordinarily be contributed 
by an observer, a nonparticipant, and the observer 
must have an unusual combination of detachment 
and sympathy... He must not be so hostile as to
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deny the element of virtue or strength on the one 
side, nor so sympathetic as to ignore the vanity 
and weakness to which the virtue and strength have 
contributed. Obviously, the qualifications of the 
ironic historian are pretty hard to come by.1
This chapter, with Niebuhr’s analysis of American democracy and Soviet
communism, stands as a measure of Niebuhr’s ability to meet the
qualifications for an effective use of irony as a tool of historical
research.
I
In the use of irony to evaluate the images of American
democracy, Niebuhr begins with the early stages of our national
history to trace the origin of the ironic situations: of the twentieth
century to their historic antecedents. Woodward in his study of the
false ideals born and grown in American soil argues that the myths
of Southern culture from which one is so often exposed to in the
stereotype form of the antebellum South, have held far less sway
than the national myths that Niebuhr concentrates on:
While the myths of Southern distinctiveness have 
been waxing, national myths have waxing in power 
and appeal. National myths, American myths have 
proven far more sacrosanct and inviolate than 
Southern myths..2
Niebuhr begins his study of irony with the Puritans whose dreams of 
a new world and new hope brought with them seeds of false ideals and 
claims to virtue. With their escape from Europe and religious 
persecution the Puritans saw the new world as the means to fulfill 
their dream of the "New Israel" - the chosen people of God. This 
dream was expressed in the words of John Winthrop:
64
...wee shall finde that the God of Israeli is among 
us, when teen of us shall be able to resist a thousand 
of our enemies, when hee shall make us a '.prarpe and 
glory, that men shall say of succeeding plantacions: 
the lord make it like that of New England: for wee
must Consider that wee shall be a Citty upon a Hill, 
the eies of all people are uppon us.3
America was established with the dream of being the chosen nation that
would set the example for the sinful nations of the world. One can
easily see that from such a concept of our national role an "image"
of virtue based on God's election could give rise to illusions necessary
for an ironic situation. Niebuhr argues that the Puritan perception
of national virtue and its special role as a beacon to the rest of the
world is still present in our national consciousness. He claims this
is evident in our civil religion which expresses a patriotism that
presents America as a "special nation" set aside by God from all others
and in our foreign policy that tries to export the special virtues of
Americanism to the world.
The historian, though, cannot fully blame the Puritans or
the ideas of the Reformation for the illusion of America as the
"chosen one"; the thought of Jefferson and the Enlightenment philosophy
fell into the same trap of Americanism, but from a different angle.
Rather than a religious haven and home for the saints, the Jeffersonians
dream of America was based on the new start of a nation that had
broken with- the old corruptions of the European order. America
had great appeal, not as a chance to build a new Kingdom of
God, but as a haven of freedom from the oppressions of the
European order. America'was a new society that in its youthful
innocence did not have to contend with the social and
political views of old Europe. In this sense, Niebuhr argues the
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4Jeffersonians could see America as "pure".
Both the Puritans and the Jeffersonians saw America as the 
"Promised Land" of new possibilities in human history. Niebuhr 
argues that this.brought about the formation of irony early in our 
history and attached "images" to our nation as being innocent and 
virtuous."* As Niebuhr interprets the problem with such images he 
argues that once such deceptive images were incorporated into 
Americianism that they could clothe the reality of guilt and vice 
that exist in all nations with illusions of innocence and virtue. 
Niebuhr argues: "From the earliest days of its history to the present
moment, there is a deep layer of Messianic consciousness in the 
mind of America."^ Such a national perspective serves to trap 
America in ironic situations because the historical images that are 
maintained seek expression through political acts that reinforce such 
images. Some may question Niebuhr’s link of early historical images 
to political problems in the twentieth century but some well-known 
American historians have reached similar conclusions. Daniel Boorstin 
in The Genius of American Politics speaks' of a "giveness" of values 
and ideals that were established by the Pilgrim Fathers and Founding 
Fathers that Amercians seek to live by today.^ Boorstin even goes 
one step beyond Niebuhr in making the claim that American history 
reflects an attempt to live within the structure of our nations early
g
ideals and that our history reflects this continuity. Boorstin, 
like Niebuhr, cautions America against pride because he finds the 
source of national strength and power not in the virtue or innocence 
the nation may have, but rather in the abundance of ines our cess ahd the 
unrepeatable circumstances that have provided the means for American 
prosperity and wealth. From a different political perspective is
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Louis Hartz who uses irony to demonstrate how our "positive” 
national images have left Americans blinded to the numerous 
problems of our history that range from slavery to neglect of
9
basic human rights and fundamental elements of social justice.
More important is the confirmation of Niebuhr*s view in American 
Foreign policy which is the second area he wrestles with in his 
analysis of the impact of irony.
The images of an earlier America have contributed to the 
extremes of American isolationism and intervention in American 
Foreign Policy. Our nation, Niebuhr argues has suffered from the 
Jeffersonian illusion of innocence, and has sought to isolate 
itself from the problems of Europe. Moreover, when we have given 
up our innocence to "save" Europe we have justified it by an appeal 
to virtue that turned politics into a moral crusade against evil. 
Such a crusade has also been seen in the attempt to "Americanize" 
others in such a way that one would think the "City upon the Hill" 
could be exported to those of lesser virtue and innocence. Niebuhr 
develops this argument in his book The Godly and the Ungodly in 
which he argues the American consciousness is one of moral and 
political superiority critical of others to the extent that they 
fail to represent the virtues that are characteristic of America.^ 
Thus the historical images of America become a means not only to 
establish our virtue and innocence but the means to measure its 
presence or absence in others.
Niebuhr’s analysis is confirmed by political scientist, 
Ronald Kirkeme, who finds the American role in foreign policy after 
World War II as that of the "exorcist" who would liberate the
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world from communism and dictatorship the same way it liberated
Europe from H i t l e r . T h e  force of such a classification is found
in American action in Korea and Vietnam, not to mention Guatemala
in 1954 or Cuba in 1961. Niebuhr would likewise argue that many
attempts to "liberate" others are, in reality, an attempt to
12protect American global interests. Kirkene also raises the issue
of images in what he sees as our attempt to maintain virtue and
innocence when our acts reflect neither:
If we do undertake such efforts, then we violate 
the basic principle of sovereignity which characterizes 
nations and which is enshrined in the documents signed 
by America. One of these, the Charter of the 
Organization of American States, reads in part,
’No State or group of States has the right to inter­
vene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, 
in the internal or external affairs of any other 
State' ... And what if, after much killing and 
destruction in the effort to overthrow a regime, 
the effort fails? Can we as a foreign nation simply 
wash our hands like Portius Pilate? ^
would describe our American democracy in terms other than
a benevolent liberator in its involvement in the internal
of other nations. Niebuhr finds our national self-image
reconcile with many of our nation’s international activities.
finds it hard to understand that when the nation is found
in the wrong, there is no guilt for what has been done. Niebuhr
would explain this in the image of our nation as a tool of God on
earth that symbolizes the irony of Israel which made claim to being
the elect of God but often refuted their right to such a claim in
their immoral actions. The end result is that American quests for
power are covered by illusions of being a special nation with a
special mission in history:
Niebuhr 
that of 
affairs 
hard to 
Niebuhr
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Except in moments of aberration we have not 
thought of ourselves as potential masters, 
but as tutors of mankind in its pilgrimage 
to perfection.-^
In sum, the American images of virtue and innocence, derived in 
past from the founders who sought new Reformations and new 
Enlightenments to make our nation special have been refuted by our 
own acts, yet they persist today embodied in our national ideals.
Niebuhr offers an explanation of such a persistance of false 
ideals with his concept of the irony of Bablyon or the illusion that 
power and wealth are signs oar tekehss of innocence and virtue.^ The 
danger of such an illusion comes in the association of power with 
goodness. Niebuhr finds this to be an ironic situation because the 
United States became a world power not because of its goodness or as 
a result of a special' divine blessing^ but as an end result of 
favorable economic conditions and historical circumstances.
Niebuhr further develops this idea in what he terms the "paradox of 
Babylon" which, simply stated means that weakness is inherent in great 
strength. Niebuhr finds this in the fact that the increase in 
American power did not bring a greater ability to dominate the inter­
national scene, rather it merely expanded the nations contact with 
other sovereign States whose power had to be taken into account and 
balanced with our own. The power of Babylon did not bring the 
ability to dominate that our national "images" assumed would be our 
role; instead we were forced to compromise when our power conflicted 
with the rule of other sovereign states. Niebuhr finds that as a 
result of our inability to dominate other states, foreign policy has 
been forced into extremes of action and inaction which serve to 
maintain our national images of innocence and virtue.
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The image of American innocence has led the nation to
pursue a policy of irresponsible isolationism when the responsible
action would have been more open to a realist approach to the use
of power. Niebuhr argues that the Jeffersonian image of the "pure"
and innocent nation free from the corruptions of European powers has,
when applied to international politics, led the United States
to neglect the responsibilities of international politics. When America
has sought to stay out of politics, Niebuhr does not downplay the danger
from the standpoint of national responsibility:
It was a rather unique historical phenomenon that 
a nation with our potentialities should have been 
tempted to isolationism and withdrawal from world 
responsibilities. Various factors contributed to 
the persuasiveness of the temptation. We were so 
strong and our continental security seems too im­
pregnable (on cursory glance at least) that we 
were encouraged in the illusion that we could live 
our own life without too much regard for a harassed
world. Our sense of superior virtue over the
alleged evils of European civilization and our 
fear of losing our innocency if we braved the 
tumults of world politics, added spiritual vanity 
to ignoble prudence as the second cause of our 
irresponsibility. We thought', we might keep our­
selves free of the evils of a warring world and 
thus preserve a healthy civilization, amidst the 
expected doom of a decrepit one.16
Niebuhr goes on to remark that if the nation is forced to give up
its innocence by involvement in European politics, it does so in
the spirit of a missionary crusade "to fight a war to end all
wars" or "to save the world from the horrors of H i t l e r . T h u s
when the nation must use power it does so in the name of virtue
and goodness to maintain its image by making the responsible use
of power a mission of morality. Without using the language of
Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau records the same isolationist and moral
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crusade approach in his analysis of twentieth century American
foreign policy. Morgenthau, without tracing its historical roots,
maintains that the foreign policy of the United States is based on
"moral platitudes" which are "made palatable to the people" in an
18attempt to hide the reality of power in political acts. Niebuhr
would add that such attempts merely serve to create anew the ironic
situations that result from illusions of national self-image.
In addition to Morgenthau, Woodward, like Niebuhr, finds the
two dominant themes in American foreign policy to be those of
extreme isolationism and moralistic intervention. Not using the
historical models of the Puritans or Jeffersonians, Woodward’s
conclusions are strikingly similar to Niebuhr’s:
On the one hand are those who would meet the 
foreign challenge by withdrawing from a critical 
community of nations teeming with heresies and, 
by erecting an impregnable barricade, forcibly 
keep out all alien ways, influences, and ideas... 
on the other hand, are those who hold that this 
is an irrepressible conflict, that a world 
divided against itself cannot stand, that the 
issue is essentially a moral one, that we are 
morally obligated to liberate the enslaved 
peoples of the earth, punish the wicked 
oppressors, and convert the liberated peoples 
to our way of thought. The true American 
mission, according to those who support this ^  
view, is a moral crusade on a world-wide scale.
Like Niebuhr, Woodward argues that the two extremes in American foreign
policy are not merely political choices but rather part of the
consciousness of our nation. That consciousness formed by false
ideals of innocence and virtue continue to affect the way foreign
policy is approached no matter what political party is in office.
The third problem of irony in American democracy goes
beyond our historic images and foreign policy approaches to find
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illusions that result from an idealism which is ever-present in the
philosophy of America. This philosophy of idealism, Niebuhr argues,
is found in the belief that history can be managed and altered to
fit national purposes. Such is idealistic because it is blind to
the limits of human destiny and the possibility of corruption in
even the highest philanthropic ideals. Niebuhr argues:
The illusions about the possibility of managing 
historical destiny from any particular standpoint 
in history, always involve... miscalculations 
about both the power and the wisdom of the managers 
and of the weakness and the manageability of the 
historical "stuff" which is to be managed.20
Niebuhr thus argues that the ironic elements of pretension that are
a part of American idealism must come to terms with the reality of
the limits of all human striving and wisdom in the realization that
history is beyond the reach of man’s power to govern it.
Perhaps Niebuhr at this point overstates his case, but he is
reacting against those who would hold that the ability to control
history and the evolution of society is within man's power. Such
a view was found in the declarations made of both the French and
Russian revolutions, and to a lesser extent in American idealists
who claim it is in man's power to shape his destiny. Given the
finite nature of man, and the limitations which place history
beyond his ultimate control, Niebuhr argues that man is more a
participant in, than a maker of, history. To Niebuhr, this in no
way removes man's responsibility as an historical agent* it merely
points out that history cannot be controlled according to a man-made
deterministic plan.
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II
In his discussion of irony in the communist state, Niebuhr 
applies a method similar to his analysis of irony in American 
democracy. He first of all records how national ideals in the 
communist state are linked to images developed in Marxist theory. 
Niebuhr then shows how the historic images of early Marxism exist 
today and influence the policy of the modern communist state. Like 
the irony that confronts America, the Soviets are forced into ironic 
situations that are a result of its attempt to preserve its 
historical images in confrontation with its present realities. 
Niebuhr’s analysis of irony and the Soviet state focuses on the 
national concept of innocence and its implications in international 
politics. The reader of Niebuhr cannot escape the striking 
similarities of the ironies that affect both world powers.
Like America, the Soviet Union suffers from the irony of 
an image of national innocence. The formation of this image is 
based on Marxist theory and its failure to realize that power and 
its corruption cannot be restricted to property ownership. Irony 
results from the failure to account for non-economic power. In the 
belief that the aboli:ti0n>i of private property would lead to greater 
equality, communist states left their workers without the power of 
property to balance the dominant power of the managerial class that 
runs the state. Thus, an irony of communism is that in seeking to 
fulfill Marx’s ideal of equality by taking the power of property 
from the workers, it has caused greater inequality between workers 
and management. The end result of such an irony, argues Niebuhr, is 
"the accumulation of injustice more grievious than those which
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originally inspired the Marxist revolt."
The problem of using economic equality as a sign of
innocence or virtue is compounded when applied to world politics.
Economic equality as a measure of a nation when used by communist
states to apply to other nations leads to a black and white
approach to politics in which non-communist nations are guilty
"by definition":
A revolutionary nation is guiltless because the 
guilt of 'imperialism' has been confined to 
'capitalistic' nations 'by definition.' Thus 
the lust for power which enters into most indi­
vidual and collective human actions, is obscured.
The priest-kings of this new revolutionary state, 
though they wield inordinate power because they 
have gathered both economic and political control 
in the hands of a single oligarchy, are also, in 
theory,.innocent of any evil. Their interests and 
those of the masses whom they control are, by 
definition, identical since neither owns property.^2
By the illusions of national innocence, on its part, the communist
state has precluded the elements of self-criticism necessary to
escape irony. The Soviet communist illusion of innocence, like that
of American democracy, leads to a distorted foreign policy in which
the nation plays the role of political "exorcist" to rid the world
of the evil spirit of capitalism, and more specifically of American
capitalism:
Thus the conflict between communism and the bour­
geois world achieves a special virulence between 
the two great hegemonous nations of the respective 
alliances, because America is, in its own eyes, a 
symbol of pure innocence and justice.23
The import of Niebuhr's idea is not found so much in the "Cold War"
context of his statements as in the insight that there can be no
claim of innocence in the world of politics. No matter what national
images maintain, when a nation is acting in the world, it is acting
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to preserve and promote its self interest, not to make the world
a better place in which to live.
The second irony in communism is found by Niebuhr in the
Marxist ideal of society after the revolution. The irony of
revolution comes in its assertion that utopia will enter history
after the political change to communism takes place. Niebuhr
describes this belief as "hard utopianism" with its claim that a
new age of history will dawn with the elimination of the capitalists1
system of economics. Niebuhr interprets the communist belief in
utopian ideals as a type of "faith" in revolution to bring the
Kingdom of God to earth in a new communist society:
Communism is a religion which has corrupted the 
Christian version of a Kingdom of God upon earth...
It sought _a kingdom of perfect justice, a classless 
and universal society... For it thought that the 
abolition of the institution of property would 
assure a harmonious society and ultimately a sin­
less human nature. It promised a Kingdom of God
without repentance.24
One could argue that the terror of Stalin's purgeis awaken the thinkers 
promoting communism to the fact that the original dream of a pure 
classless society was in reality a myth. But as a system of faith, 
its tenets were not open to critical discussion. Moreover, like the 
pigs in Orwell's Animal Farm, even the leaders in Stalin's reign could 
deceive themselves into believing that they were bringing the ful­
fillment of the original dream of equality to reality. It is the 
blindness caused by images of equality and revolution as innocence 
and virtue that Niebuhr argues must be overcome before a realistic 
approach to politics can begin for communist states.
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III
Perhaps the most profound area of Niebuhr’s analysis of 
irony comes as he deals with the use of power by America and the 
issue of guilt. In his discussion of guilt, Niebuhr explores the 
proper use of national power. The discussion is developed through 
two themes that demonstrate the problems that come with American 
wealth and power. The first theme is that the economic development 
of America leads to problems of irony and guilt. This is developed 
in terms of a contrast between the American view of its wealth and 
that of other nations. The second theme discusses the role of America 
as a world power and guilt in the contradiction between American 
"images" and the responsible use of power in the world political 
situation.
The first theme of economic development and guilt revolves
around our image of being a special nation, or as Niebuhr terms it,
the irony of Israel. America views herself as the "chosen one" and
therefore accepts wealth as a sign of divine blessing and national
virtue. But other nations not affected by our national images view
our wealth, at best, as a sign of national greed and at worst, a
product of international exploitation. The situation denotes irony
in that America fails to escape the illusions of its national image
and fails to understand those not taken captive by our images:
We are also offended by the contumely of allies as 
well as foes, who refuse to regard our prosperity 
as fruit and proof of our virtue but suggest that 
it may be the consequence of our vulgar Philistinism.
We are therefore confronted for the first time in 
our life with the questions:-whether there is a 
simple coordination between virtue and prosperity; 
and whether the attainment of happiness either
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through material prosperity or social peace is a 
simple possibility for man, whatever may be his 
scientific and social achievements.25
Beyond those who question the link between American virtue and wealth
are those who believe American wealth serves as proof of our inter-
26national exploitation of others. This in turn casts America in
the role of an imperialistic power whose gain comes from the
economic loss of less powerful nations.
The problem of American wealth is compounded by the fact
that both our national image and the international conception of our
wealth are involved in false views of wealth. Niebuhr argues neither
the American theory of wealth through virtue nor the Marxist theory
of wealth through exploitation are realistic. The dilemma is compounded
when economically poor nations become easy prey to the Marxist view,
while the foreign policy of America fails to grapple with, a perspective
that could call into question its self-image as a chosen nation. Our
foreign policy to be effective must come to terms with the Marxist
interpretation of wealth and its basic appeal to third world nations.
Niebuhr argues:
The indictment against us achieves the greater plau­
sibility because the facts are interpreted through- a 
Marxist ideology. According to this ideology, poverty 
is caused solely by exploitation. Such an explanation 
is no more true than the contrasting bourgeois belief 
that distinctions of poverty and wealth are due 
primarily to differences of skill, thrift and 
industry. The truth about poverty and wealth is not 
fully disclosed by either theory. But the Marxist 
theory has the advantage of satisfying a deep 
instinct in the human heart. It places the blame for 
an unfortunate situation entirely upon others.27
Poverty-stricken nations are more than psychologically ready, they
are politically ready, to blame the richer nations* especially the
United States, for their lack of wealth. The same wealth America
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views as a sign of virtue is condemned by third world countries as
28a cause for national shame.
Niebuhr argues that both the American democratic and Soviet 
Marxist interpretation of wealth are inaccurate and distort the fact 
that American wealth is neither a sign of virtue nor exploitation, 
but a result of natural resources and material productivity. Niebuhr 
finds it remarkable that wealth is given a moral interpretation when 
wealth, in and of itself, is neutral in the context of morality.
Wealth isn't a result of either virtue or evil but a result of 
favorable economic conditions and circumstances that can literally 
vary as often as the weather. The realism of Niebuhr's view of 
wealth serves to dispel illusions of wealth and overcome the irony of 
false images, but such a conception is not as psychologically satisfying 
to those who seek to justify their wealth or create scapegoats to 
explain their lack of it.
The second theme that Niebuhr develops involves the role of 
America as a world power and the issue of guilt. Here Niebuhr is 
concerned with the problems of American ’’images" as they confront 
the reality of power politics in world affairs. The issue of guilt 
is a crucial one for America because it hinders acceptance of 
responsibility in the role the United States must play as a world 
power. As a world leader in military and economic might, America 
has to deal with alterations of international power which involves 
guilt when a nation that views itself as innocent must build and maintain 
the most destructive weapons known to man. Niebuhr perceives that 
the images of national innocence and virtue are in conflicting posi­
tions in foreign policy issues involving guilt. Virtue as an image 
is maintained by moralistic intervention in world affairs while
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innocence is maintained by isolation from international politics. 
Guilt will be felt for failure to meet world responsibilities
29or when the image of innocence is broken by foreign involvement. 
Niebuhr argues that when faced with the dilemma in which both 
isolation and intervention bring guilt, idealists seek to escape 
the guilt of international involvement by even greater illusions 
of the virtue and goodness of America in the manipulation of 
history:
Our age is involved in irony because so many dreams 
of our nation have been so cruelly refuted by history.
Our dreams of a pure virtue are dissolved in a 
situation in which it is possible to exercise the 
virtue of responsibility toward a community of nations 
only by courting the prospective guilt of the atomic 
bomb. And the irony is increased by the frantic 
efforts of some of our idealists to escape this hard 
reality by dreaming up schemes of an ideal world order 
which have no relevance to either our present dangers 
or our urgent d u t i e s . 30
Niebuhr finds the idealists’ solution to guilt unsatisfying
because _it fails to come to terms with the methods of modern warfare
and their massive potential for destructiveness. The idealist
speaks of nuclear disarmament and a peaceful world order with a
faith in science and education to overcome world problems. Niebuhr
argues that even a superficial reading of human nature and history
31exposes the naive assumptions of such, a position. Niebuhr finds 
the solution not in shallow schemes of a new world order to justify 
the use of power, but in coming to terms with the guilt that is the 
normal part of the use of power in world politics. A less probable 
but more adequate solution for Niebuhr would be to overcome the 
illusions of our nation’s historical images so that the guilt that 
results from the conflict of politics! acts with American ideals
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would no longer be a factor in foreign policy. Though it may not
be likely, Niebuhr in no way eliminates the possibility of escaping
the historical images of innocence and virtue that cause guilt:
Yet our American nation, involved in its vast 
responsibilities, must slough off many illusions 
which were derived both from the experiences and 
the ideologies of its childhood. Otherwise either 
we will seek escape from responsibilities which 
involve unavoidable guilt, or we will be plunged 
into avoidable guilt by too great confidence in 
our virtue.32
In the final analysis, Niebuhr would admit that no political act is
33totally free from guilt. In light of this, he argues that America 
should accept its role as a world power which means giving up the 
false comforts of seeing ourself as innocent and realizing that 
virtue is found more in responsible action than moral crusades of 
liberation. ~*
IV
Niebuhr applies the concept of humility as the means to 
overcome irony. Humility is necessary because ironic situations all 
involve the deceptions of pride that prevent a nation from developing 
a self-critical perspective. It is pride that allowed America to 
form and maintain its image as a chosen nation of God that embodied 
innocence and virtue. Niebuhr argues that humility rests on the 
insights of the Christian faith which poses God as a transcendent 
judge of all human claims of goodness. Niebuhr wants to remind us that 
all nations are finite and temporal in nature and that even true
34
Israel was judged for its illusions of virtue and self-righteousness. 
Theology functions as the ultimate solution to irony for Niebuhr
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because when humans or nations in their claims of virtue and
goodness are confronted with absolute righteousness and virtue
(which exist in God alone) then irony ceases to exist as human
claims are exposed as vanity and self-delusion. Niebuhr argues
that no temporal claim to glory can be justified under the judgment
35of a transcendent absolute. Pretension is destroyed as it is
measured by perfection. It is when the illusions of men are
discredited that the powers of irony are dispelled, but for this to
take place man must see himself in relation to God who in turn
liberates man from his self imposed misconceptions of grandeur.
Ironic situations, Niebuhr argues are direct results of man's failure
to realize his limitations:
The Biblical interpretation of the human situation 
is ironic, rather than tragic or pathetic, because 
of its unique formulation of the problem of human 
freedom. According to this faith man's freedom does 
not require his heroic and tragic defiance of the 
forces of nature. He is not necessarily involved 
in tragedy in his effort to be truly human. But
neither is he necessarily involved in evil because
of his relation to the necessities and contingencies 
of the world of nature. His situation is, therefore, 
not comprehended as a pathetic Imprisonment in the 
confusion of nature. The evil in human history is 
regarded as the consequence of man's wrong use of 
his unique capacities. The wrong use is always due 
to some failure to recognize the limits of his 
capacities of power, wisdom and virtue. Man is 
an ironic creature because he forgets that he is not 
simply a creator but also a creature.^
Niebuhr also serves to remind the strong and powerful nations of the
earth that their power is not the result of special blessing or
its manipulation of the process of history but rather is merely the
turn of historical destiny:
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The great nation is likened unto a cedar whose 
boughs are higher than all other trees. This 
eminence tempts it to forget that the waters 
made it great and the deep set it on high.37
For Niebuhr, judgement upon pretension defines the limits of human
boasting and allows those caught in irony to reach a conscious
realization of the unconscious factors that cause irony. This in
turn points to the destruction of the ironic situation:
If participants in an ironic situation become 
conscious of the vanities and illusions which 
make an ironic situation more than merely 
comic, they would tend to abate the pretensions 
and dissolve the irony.38
In the same fashion Niebuhr attempts to expose American illusions and
deliver the nation from ironic situations. It is interesting that
Niebuhr uses the example of Cervantes who exposed the anachronistic
system of feudalism through his bumbling character, Don Quixote.
Perhaps Niebuhr sees himself in the role of Cervantes who will save
America from the embarassment of national illusions that continue to
live beyond their time.
V
A critique of Niebuhr’s concept of irony could take many 
different approaches. One could argue that Niebuhr overworks the 
term irony and attempts to explain too much (everything?) by its 
usage. One could also argue that his use of the tags "Puritan" and 
"Jeffersonian" was too general to reach historical exactness in an 
evaluation of the formation of irony. Or one could argue that Niebuhr’s 
use of irony was so pessimistic that it did not give approval where 
it was due. Along with these, many other criticisms could be raised,
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but the problems which such approaches raise could serve to point 
out only the more superficial faults, and perhaps unavoidable 
faults, that result from the use of irony in a critical study of 
history. My approach to the problems of Niebuhr’s use of irony 
focuses on his proposed theological "solution" to irony and his 
personal involvement in the ironies of the Cold War era in which 
The Irony of American History was written.
The unique element of Niebuhr’s use of irony is his
theological insight that human standards of pride and pretension
are crushed only under the judgment of an absolute level of 
39righteousness. I have problems with this because it fails to 
leave room for a distinction between the pride and pretension of 
American ideals and say, the pride and pretension of Nazi ambitions.
By lumping all human claims into one category - pride and then 
contrasting it only with an absolute, transcendent standard,comparison 
may indeed be humbling, but it hardly helps to distinguish between 
levels of human pride and their various degrees of danger. Niebuhr 
does believe Soviet illusions to be more dangerous than American 
illusions, but he fails to even suggest a standard of comparison 
between the two. My complaint at this point is that it is useful 
to say divine perfection judges all human pretension, but that 
these are levels of human pretension that pose such a threat to 
humanity that judgments must be made of degrees of pride. At times, 
in other words, man in humility under God must also judge man and 
check hisidangerous ambitions. Niebuhr could respond that there can 
be only One who can judge and establish universals and would accept 
that man is not God, but would add nor is he a brute who lacks
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ability to judge threats to justice. It is not enough to say all
nations are guilty and prideful when some are much more guilty and
prideful than others. One more radical than myself would perhaps
argue that transcendent standards and divine judgments are not
relevant to power politics. In defense of Niebuhr I would say,
however, that an absolute measure beyond time and history protects
against those who find the need for only human standards of
judgment and somehow end up failing to escape the ironies of their
own historical situation and the blindness of their own judgment.
There is much truth in the position that man always looks good in
comparison with man and that a nation can always vindicate itself in
a comparison to its neighbors. Niebuhr is insightful in the
realization that after all have found themselves to be innocent that
they need the reminder that, under God, all are guilty.
My second criticism of Niebuhr’s use of irony is that
Niebuhr himself fails to escape the trap of irony. Niebuhr's book
The Irony of American History reflects an uncritical acceptance of
much of the Cold War rhetoric that was part of our national
perspective of anti-communism. In the very first paragraph of his
book he casts international politics in a framework of good against
evil and freedom against oppression. Niebuhr writes:
Everybody understands the obvious meaning of the 
world struggle in which' we are engaged. We are de­
fending freedom against tyranny and are trying to 
preserve justice against a system which has, 
demonically, distilled injustice and cruelty out 
of its original promise of a higher justice.^0
This reflects an extremist view of anti-communism generated in the
McCarthy era which intrepreted the international (and national)
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struggle for power in the terms of a battle between forces of good
and evil. America was cast in the role of the defender of liberty
against the demonic tyranny of communism. Throughout The Irony of
American History and a slightly later book, The World Crisis and
American Responsibilities, are found emotionally packed words such
as "demonic", "cruelty", and "distilled injustice" which Niebuhr
used to describe communism. What Niebuhr has done is become blinded
by his own historical setting in the Cold War era. Niebuhr
contradicts his own system of irony that exposes all human pretension
and virtue before the judgment of a transcendent standard. Such a
standard is so objective and set apart that all distinctions of
human pride are blurred in the contrast. Niebuhr in his extreme
criticism of Soviet communism, even going as far as calling it pure 
41evil, has set himself as the judge of human pride and pretension.
Niebuhr in his subjective evaluation violated the stance of a
detached observer that Woodward earlier stressed was a necessary
mark of an ironic historian. In his criticism of the evils of
communism, Niebuhr has gone from the role of an ironic historian to
the role of an historian caught in the irony of anti-communism.
If Niebuhr were true to form and consistent ;:in>. his analysis
of irony he would not judge the Soviet brand of irony any more "evil"
than its American counterpart. , Niebuhr’s view of communism is
itself ironic because he writes with an uncritical acceptance of
religion; if so, he sees the demons in communism more clearly than
42many of the idolatries of the "free world". It was not untilcthe 
end of the era of McCarthy that Niebuhr was able to see through the 
irony of anti—communism. A marked change is found in his book The
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Structure of Nations and Empires published in 1959 in which he 
advocated:
a less rigid and self-righteous attitude toward 
the power realities of the world and a more hopeful
attitude toward the possibilities of internal
development in the Russian despotism.43
Niebuhr even went so far as to see the need to "share the world"
with the Soviets, an early proposal as it were, for detente. It
is important to note the change in attitude from condemnation of
communism as an inherent evil to a more tolerant view that refused
to divide the world in terms of good and evil that was evident by 
431968.
To Niebuhr’s credit, it must be said that even in the Cold 
War period,he did not promote a blind acceptance of a shallow form 
of Americanism that was present in that era. Rather Niebuhr’s 
realism allowed him to see that no nation was innocent or guiltless. 
After being caught in the irony of anti-communism Niebuhr was able 
to put moral judgments aside and return to a realism that exposed the 
ironies of anti-communism, yet shrewdly realized the powers of irony 
that makes one "incapable of correcting or modifying one’s own 
national myths." In this Niebuhr served both as a personal example
and as a witness to the greatest problem that comes with the use
of irony, that which might be called the irony of irony.
The irony of irony is that when irony is used as a critical 
tool to dispel the illusions of history and politics the critic 
who has exposed the ironies of history often uncritically accepts the 
irony of his own history and perspective. This would be very 
much like a psychologist who has helped others deal with their problems 
but is unaware of his own. Niebuhr himself recognizes this danger:
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Our unenviable position is made the more 
difficult because the heat of (the battle gives 
us neither the leisure nor the inclination to 
detect the irony in our history or to profit 
from the discovery.^
Niebuhr argues that history can play a determinative role on the
formation of ironic situations that could change the view of the
historical observer. Niebuhr wrestles with the difficulty of being
objective and detached when we come to our historical existence:
There is the final difficulty that involvement 
in the actual urgencies of history, even when 
men and nations are confronted with less vin­
dictiveness than communism generates, makes the 
detachment, necessary for the detection of irony, 
difficult. Could Tolstoi have written his ironic 
interpretation of Napoleon's invasion of Russia 
at the time of that struggle? ^
This is to say that there is a grave danger in the assumption that
in the discovery of ironies of the past that one is free of the
ironies of the present. For myself this is a serious objection to
the use of irony as a tool of historical criticism. Irony has its
own irony.
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CHAPTER IV
DEMOCRACY AND POWER
Niebuhr states that "the contest of power...is the heart of
political life.11^" The concept of power is an important foundation to
Niebuhr’s approach to politics. For Niebuhr, all political struggles
involve a conflict of power among individuals, groups, and nations
in their attempt to change or preserve present establishments of
power. Niebuhr in his discussions of power never gives one set
definition to fit all circumstances, rather he defines power according
to its use. The use of power by individuals is a result of an
attempt to overcome anxiety by gaining control over others. An
appropriate term for the individual’s struggle for power is domination.
The use of power by groups^Niebuhr argues, is an attempt to establish
its goals and purposes through group pressure which is aided by its
degree of ideological cohesion and effective organizational structure.
3
The proper term for the exercise of group power is force. A third
expression of power is found in the balance of social forces which
if left unchecked would cause social disruption. Niebuhr uses the
term the "balance of power" or "the state of equilibrium" to describe
4
such a use of power. Not only do the meanings and usage of power 
shift in Niebuhr’s use of the concept, but also the moral implications 
vary from one use of power to another. The individualos use of power 
in an attempt to dominate others and gain security is motivated by
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narrow self-interest, yet the individual in his quest for power is 
not blind to the interests of others. The group in contrast, argues 
Niebuhr, uses its collective force without consideration of interests 
that conflict with their own. Hence Niebuhr would argue that 
neither individual nor group attempts to gain power are moral, but 
that the group is much less moral than the individual when it comes 
to clashes for power.^ Finally, the use of power to establish social 
and political equilibrium is for Niebuhr the essence of justice.^ 
Government in its use of power is responsible for maintaining order 
and controlling sources of power that would disrupt social equili­
brium while at the same time dealing with the ever-present problem 
of inequality and the need for social justice. Thus when Niebuhr 
applies the idea of a balance of power to national and international 
politics, there is a positive* . and hopeful, dimension to it.
I
Niebuhr starts his analysis of the individual’s quest for 
power with the argument that man’s drive for power over other men 
is a natural result of the will to live.^ The will to live is 
based on the physical needs of man that involve the necessary 
requirements for growth and survival. But once man has met the basic 
physical needs, Niebuhr argues, then man is not just interested 
in physical well being; he then seeks social prestige and power 
in his society. As a result, the energy and effort that was spent 
in the will to live is transformed into a drive to overcome social
g
insecurity; this Niebuhr terms the will to power. The will to 
power is the expression of man’s effort to overcome the anxiety of
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his existence through domination over others in the hope of gaining
significance for himself. This is why Niebuhr, the arch enemy of
man’s pride and false pretension, describes the will to power as
"sin in its quintessential form." Niebuhr finds the will to
power in man’s denial of his finite nature:
Man is insecure and involved in natural contingency; 
he seeks to overcome his insecurity by a will to 
power which overreaches the limits of human creature- 
liness. Man is ignorant and involved in the limita­
tions of a finite mind; but he pretends that he is not
lim i t e d . ^
Niebuhr argues the pride of man, unlike his physical needs, knows no 
limits.
Niebuhr attributes the disharmony of social relations and 
political institutions to the pride of man in his attempt to overcome 
limitations upon his power. For Niebuhr the quest for domination' 
over others is a reflection of the root sin of man who seeks to 
escape his finite nature to stand in the place of God to "make a
name for h i m s e l f . F o r  Niebuhr, sin exists when man refuses to
either acknowledge his potentials that result from his creation 
in the image of God or his limitations that result from his being 
a creature with natural limitations rather than the Creator. In 
man’s attempt to carry out his will to power, social harmony is 
disturbed and political control become necessary to prevent men 
from using their power to dominate others.
The will to power in human nature involves politics because 
the pride of man is part of social relations and leads to a constant 
struggle for domination. In what is a paraphrase of Hobbes* "state 
of nature", Niebuhr argues that self-interest leads to nonstop social
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struggle:
Consequently the perfect accord between life and life 
is constantly spoiled by the inordinate concern of each 
life for its own weal... Human society is full of the 
friction of cross purposes. Indeed it is in a 
perpetual state of w a r . 1 2
By necessity, the will to power must be checked to prevent social
chaos or political oppression that would result from either the
unlimited expression of man’s will to power or the rule of one
will to power over all opposing expressions of power. Niebuhr
recognizes that even greater than the danger of human self-interest
in society is the danger of organized individuals who affirm their
"wills" and ambitions through the formation of groups. The groups
argues Niebuhr, poses the chief threat to social and political
equilibrium because its narrow interests further blind the individual
to the realities of the limitations of his perspectives and motives.
II
The basis of Niebuhr’s analysis of groups and their use of
power is found in his book Moral Man and Immoral Society. Niebuhr
argues that individual restraints on power are removed once the
13individual becomes a part of an identifiable group. Once within
a group, Niebuhr argues, the individual takes upon himself the
objectives and goals of the group and as a result loses the critical
ability to evaluate the demands and interests of the group. The
ability to be tolerant toward others with conflicting interests
is therefore dissolved in a group:
As individuals, men believe that they ought to love 
and serve each other. As racial, economic and 
national groups they take for themselves, whatever
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their power can command.^
As a result of the individual losing his ability to judge fairly
the objectives of the groups in which he is involved, the group
itself loses the insight that its members have as individuals.
For Niebuhr it is of critical importance that the individual in
spite of his will to power has an ability of self-transcendence
in which he can see beyond his narrow interests. No group, however, has
ability to transcend itself in the manner of the individuals of
which it is composed. Thus Niebuhr draws a crucial distinction
between the quest for power among individuals and groups:
Individual men may be moral in the sense that 
they are able to consider interests other than 
their own in determining problems of conduct, 
and are capable, on occasion, of preferring the 
advantages of others to their own. They are 
endowed by nature with a measure of sympathy 
and consideration for their kind, the breadth 
of which may be extended by an astute social 
pedagogy. Their rational faculty prompts them 
to a sense of justice which educational discipline 
may refine and purge of egoistic elements until 
they are able to view a social situation in 
which their own interests are involved with a 
fair measure of objectivity.
But all these achievements are more difficult, 
if not impossible, for human societies and social 
groups. In every human group there is less 
reason to guide and check impulse, less capacity 
for self-transcendence, less ability to 
comprehend the needs of others and therefore more 
unrestrained egoism than the individuals who 
compose the group reveal in their personal 
relationships.^
Groups suffer from the uncritical use of force in their
attempt to establish the interest of the group over the interests
of other groups or individuals. This is particularly dangerous when
groups lack the insight to evaluate the interests of its opponents
16
and fail to recognize the legitimacy of opposition. Niebuhr 
finds a direct correlation between the idealism of a group and its
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inability to judge fairly groups whose interests conflict with
their own.^ This problem is compounded when groups feel their
cause is righteous and its members affirm this, giving the group
greater pride and increased desire to maximize its interests through
the exercise of its force. The lone individual within the group
is forced to reconcile his interest with the collective interest
of all the individuals within the group and therefore his
claims to power are channelled into conformity to the collective
will of the group. Because the group has a tendency to narrow the
individuals1 ability to discern the selfish use of power, the
groups quest for social domination can be more oppressive than
that of individuals:
A distinction between group pride and the egoism 
of individuals is necessary, furthermore, because 
the pretensions and claims of a collective or 
social self exceed those of the individual ego.
The group is more arrogant, hypocritical, self- 
centered and more ruthless in the pursuit of its 
ends than the individual.18
Niebuhr leaves little doubt that the pursuit of power is not the
same among individuals_and groups. The group for Niebuhr is not
the expression of free thinking individuals that many believe it
to be; rather a group is more like a "tribe" of men who are
organized and shaped by similar interests and prejudices.
Niebuhr also raises the question of group size and power.
Niebuhr maintains that as the group grows in size the individual’s
ability to control the group decreases proportionately. Increased
group size also adds to the narrow vision of the group because it
makes it more difficult for an individual to voice his opposition
to group policy due to the sheer magnitude of numbers. Niebuhr
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adds to this the dilemma that the greater diversity that comes with
greater size will be organized with the force of passion and
impulse rather than self-conscious reason:
The larger the group the more certainly will it 
express itself selfishly in the total human 
community. It will be more powerful and there­
fore more able to defy any social restraints 
which might be devised. It will also be less 
subject to internal moral restraints. The 
larger the group the more difficult it is to 
achieve a common mind and purpose and the more 
inevitably will it be unified by momentary 
impulses and immediate and unreflective purposes.
The increasing size of the group increases the 
difficulties of achieving a group self-conscious­
ness, except as it comes in conflict with other 
groups and is unified by perils and passions of 
war. It is a rather pathetic aspect of human 
social life that conflict is a seemingly unavoidable 
prerequisite of group solidarity.^
Niebuhr finds the greatest danger of groups in their failure
to respond to limitations upon their power. Just as the will to
power in individuals is never satisfied, the quest to force its will
upon others is never satisfied among groups. This leads to a
situation of struggle that "nature, with its competing impulses
20of survival, does not know:" Niebuhr argues:
The basic pattern of man's collective life thus 
corresponds to Augustine's description of the 
civitas terrena, the concord which is alterna­
tively or simultaneously corrupted by conflict 
and domination. The conflict is the inevitable 
consequence of the tendency of partial and 
particular communities to make themselves their 
own end... Thus man's collective, like his 
individual life, is involved in death through 
the very strategies by which life is maintained, 
against both external and internal peril.
The use of force by groups to establish their will leaves society a
battle zone of competing interests all of which seek, without limits,
the establishment of their objectives and the elimination of
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opposition. Thus both the limitless ambitions of individuals and 
groups point to the need for a balance of power in politics and 
an equilibrium of disruptive social forces.
Ill
As Niebuhr wrestles with the issue of power-seeking groups
and the need for a balanced equilibrium of power in society, he
gains insight from James Madison's view of self-interested groups
or "factions". Niebuhr gains credit to Madison for his understanding
of the potential danger that selfish groups posed to the existence
of constitutional government. Niebuhr finds Madison's interpretation
of human nature perceptive in recognizing the need to separate and
balance the institutions of government to prevent domination by one
faction or group of interests. Niebuhr finds the insight of Madison
embodied in the spirit of the constitution as opposed to the more
optimistic view of man found in Jefferson's Declaration of Independence.
The realistic Madison was able to see the root of blind "self-love"
in the formation and existence of factions in society. Like Niebuhr,
Madison also found the organization of political interest groups an
inevitable occurance, given the nature of human society:
While Thomas Jefferson was the most consistent 
Lockean of our founding fathers, the fear of 
collective or class interests is most vividly 
expressed in James Madison's fear of 'faction.'
Madison's fear was all the more remarkable 
because 'reason and self-love' persuaded him 
that factions in a free society were inevitable.
'By a faction,' he wrote, 'I understand any number of 
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority 
of the whole, who are united and actuated by 
some common impulse, passion, or interest, 
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or
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to the permanent and aggregate interests of 
the community,' thus accurately defining at 
least one aspect of the political parties 
that have, without constitutional warrant, 
become servants of our political p r o c e s s . 2 2
Madison realized the need to control the different factions 
that would develop in society. In the motivation to use power to 
gain dominance over other groups or individuals, Madison saw the need 
to restrain groups by external checks on their power. Robert Dahl 
argues that Madison's view of democracy was based on its ability 
to balance the collective interests of its citizens without allow­
ing the minority or the majority to gain control over the political 
23
process. Madison also saw that the diversity of a society would
cause an organization of different interests groups which would
check the power of one another through political competition. In
this way a balance of influence could take place because no one group
could be able to gain control of power structures due to the power
24
of opposing factions. It is this insight that leads both
*
Madison and Niebuhr to see that allowing groups of different interests 
to compete for the resources of society was a wiser policy that 
the suppression of the numerous factions.
Niebuhr argues that Madison, like himself was not only able 
to see the dangers of factions, but also the greater danger that 
would result from an attempt by government to eliminate' factions.
For both Madison and Niebuhr the acknowledgement that the formation
\
of factions had its basis in the diversity of the talents and values 
of the different members of society precluded the use of force to 
prevent the free expression of similar interests in existing social
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and political groups. Both realized the danger of suppressing social
groups that are a natural expression of man's self-interest:
Madison accurately defined the root of these 'factions':
!,As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and 
he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions 
will be formed. As long as the connection subsists 
between his reason and his self-love, his opinions 
and his passions will have a reciprocal influence 
on each other; and the former will be objects to 
which the latter will attach themselves.' The 
primary cause of faction, according to Madison, lay 
in the varying degrees of talent and the correspond­
ing varying economic interests in the community, 
giving a very realistic pre-Marxist account of the 
political process. But while factions were dangerous,
Madison saw clearly that the suppression of" faction 
would lead to the totalitarian state.25
To suppress the organization of groups would lead to a greater danger
than the groups themselves because it would both eliminate a means
to balance competing interests and also give government a monopoly
of power over its citizens. Without the power check of diverse
interests the possibility of the domination of society by minorities
26of the rich and powerful is increased. In addition the danger of the
loss of liberty is posed by a government with too much control over
society. Madison placed a high value on liberty even for factions
because an attempt to end factions could easily in turn be an attempt
to end liberty through the imposition of social and political 
27uniformity. Niebuhr's use of Madison shows an essential agreement 
among their views and more importantly confirms the need for dealing 
with the threat of factions that goes beyond the simple use of 
government oppression.
Niebuhr's approach to the dilemma'-'G'f factions is to use a 
balance of power among groups in society that will allow liberty to 
exist within a framework of order. Niebuhr believes that an
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equilibrium* of power in society is needed to balance the various
drives of factions who seek to exercise a disproportinate degree
of £>ower in society. In fact, Niebuhr would go as far as to say
that justice depends on the ability of a nation to maintain a
tolerable equilibrium of power:
The domination of one life by another is avoided 
most successfully by an equilibrium of powers and 
vitalities, so that weakness does not invite 
enslavement by the strong. Without a tolerable 
equilibrium no morals or social restraints ever 
succeed completely in preventing injustice and 
enslavement. In this sense an equilibrium of 
vitality is an approximation of brotherhood within 
the limits of conditions imposed by human selfish­
ness. But an equilibrium of power is not a
brotherhood... The principle of the equilibrium 
of power is thus a principle of justice is so far 
as it prevents domination and enslavement.
Niebuhr argues that there is no inherent ability in man to realize
just at what point an equilibrium of power is necessary, so the
dangers of anarchy or authoritarianism pose a constant threat to
democratic government. Consequently, the management of power must be
a conscious process in a democracy:
Temptations to the unjust use of power can always be 
mitigated by bringing every centre of significant 
power under social control and surveillance. The 
need of such control makes the instrument of democracy, 
whatever their limitations, a perennial necessity 
in any society.^9
Niebuhr argues that the challenge of democracy is to adopt
a "radical" policy of putting power against power to protect the
harmony of society from a concentration of excessive power:
A political policy which deals effectively with the 
problem of life as impulse, and knows how to gain 
a rough justice and a minimal harmony from the chaos 
of human passions, must be radical... It must be 
radical not only in the realistic nature of its 
analysis but in its willingness to challenge the
101
injustice of a given social system by setting 
power against power until a more balanced equili­
brium of power is achieved. Radical policy in­
evitably grows out of a radical theory which 
recognizes that human life is never completely 
moral and that minimum justice therefore depends 
upon the ability of society to level the centres of 
excessive power which are bases of injustice.30
For Niebuhr the struggle for justice is secured only through an 
equilibrium of power that democracy maintains by the tension between 
the liberty to organize groups' and the order maintained through 
a constant balance of power by government. Democracy allows govern­
ment to check the power of its social organizations while at the 
same time placing government under the power and consent of its 
members. Democracy is thus a necessity given power and its abuse:
Democracy is a perennial necessity because justice 
will always require that the power of government be 
checked as democracy checks it; and because peace 
requires that social conflict be arbitrated by 
the non-violent technique of the;democratic process...
Power must be held under democratic restraints 
because irresponsible power is always dangerous.
It is dangerous because a dominant oligarchy always 
pretends a false identity between its interests and 
the general welfare.31
To balance the different power factions in society and to place
restraints on the will to power among individuals, Niebuhr places
his trust in the potentials of democratic government.
IV
Niebuhr proposes that his view of Christian realism provides 
the most adequate conception of man and therefore the most accurate 
view of man1s use of power. Niebuhr argues that without Christian 
realism democracy will lack insight into the nature of man, preventing
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32it from effectively balancing power. In the past, Niebuhr 
argues, democracy has been based on a conception of man prone to 
illusions of optimism. The application of optimistic idealism to 
the problem of power failed to realize man’s ability to corrupt 
freedom in a quest for dominance over others. As a result it 
failed to provide a check against social anarchy. The application 
of pessimistic realism to the problem of power failed to understand 
man’s capacity for freedom and as a result used government authority 
to oppress individuals and groups. Niebuhr argues that history has 
shown that democracy must struggle to resist the dangers of anarchy 
and tyranny which are the fruits of an inadequate conception of 
man:
The achievements of democracy have been tortuously 
worked out in human history partly because various 
schools of religious and political thought had great 
difficulty in fully comprehending the perils to justice 
in either one or the other instrument of justice - 
the organization of power and the balance of power.
Usually the school of thought which comprehended the 
moral ambiguities of government did not understand 
the perils of anarchy inherent in uncontrolled social 
life; while those who feared this anarchy were 
uncritical of the claims and pretensions of govern­
ment. History had to stumble by tortuous process 
upon the proper techniques for avoiding both anarchy 
and tyranny, against the illusions of idealists and 
of realists who understand only one or the other
side of the p r o b l e m . 33
Niebuhr argues that democracy has been unable to balance 
effectively social forces due to a misconception of human nature. 
Niebuhr argues the philosophy of the French Revolution with its 
illusions of progress and reason led to the belief that man’s 
use of power in a democratic society was not corrupted by sin and
3 Aself-interest. Niebuhr argues that, some of the illusions of
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the Enlightenment about the nature of man were incorporated into
35conceptions of democracy during this century. American democracy
also during this century has many elements of the optimistic view
of man that is very different from the view of human nature that
characterize the Constitution with its structural checks and balances 
36
on power. The problem that faces democracy is one that results
from a need to construct a more realistic view of human nature.
Niebuhr’s answer to democracy comes in his application of
his philosophy of Christian realism. This philosophy centers
around a dual conception of the nature of man as both good and evil,
finite and infinite, just and unjust. As it relates to power,
Niebuhr suggests that man is sufficiently evil to require government
to limit his power yet good enough that government can allow him
freedom to pursue his interests. He justifies this position on the
basis of the Christian view of man as a finite creature of nature
and a being of infinite possibilities due to his creation in the
image of God. Niebuhr argues this is the basis to overcome the
37flaws of idealism and pessimistic realism. The Christian view 
of man overcomes the false optimism of idealism through its view 
of man as a sinner who disregards his finite limits in his will to 
power. The Christian view of man also overcomes the flaw of 
pessimistic realism which underestimates the good in man by the 
realization that man has the potential for freedom due to his 
creation in the image of God. Niebuhr, therefore, finds Christian 
realism the means to preserve democracy from the dangers that result 
from a misunderstanding man’s nature and his abilities.
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V
An adequate evaluation of Niebuhr's view of power must be
based on an assessment that includeaa comparison of his view of
the need for democracy to be based on Christian realism and his
analysis of individuals and groups in their expressions of power.
The question that must be wrestled with in such a comparison is -
does Niebuhr's analysis escape the overly optimistic idealism and
pessimistic realism as he claims it does in his perspective of
Christian realism? As a framework for this evaluation of Niebuhr *
I accept E.H. Carr's definition of realism as a theory of government
that provides.a basis for the critique of utopian ideas while at the
same time avoiding the conclusion that there is no ground for
38meaningful social action and improvement. Niebuhr's concept of 
power can be evaluated using the two requirements for a successful 
realism as understood by Carr. Such an evaluation is based on 
Niebuhr's ability to reject optimistic idealism without falling into 
a pessimistic realism which denies man's ability for social 
improvement.
Even a superficial reader of Niebuhr realizes that in 
exposing the utopian illusions that affect democracy, Niebuhr has 
few equals. His books reflect a deep interest in being able to 
see through the faults of an overly optimistic view of man or. history. 
Moral Man and Immoral Society exposes the dangers of group power 
that those who held an optimistic view of man arid liberal views of 
Christianity failed to take into account. Christianity and Power 
Politics provide a critique of those who take a pacifist stance in 
blindness to the harsh realities of power and its abuses. The Nature
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and Destiny of Mao (divided into volumes on Human Natiure and Human 
Destiny) attacks the idealistic views of human nature and the progres­
sive view of human history because they provide no adequate explana­
tion for evil in man and history. In his book Faith and History, 
Niebuhr reviews the utopian fallacies of Marxism which led to the 
abuses of power in communist nations. The Irony of American History, 
in turn, exposes American illusions of innocence and virtue that have 
served to cover the reality of power politics. His critique of 
American views that are unjustifiably utopian is found in Pious 
and Secular America. This list could include many of his other 
works that argue against utopian illusions and a shallow optimistic 
view of man, but the point here is merely to establish that Niebuhr 
meets the first criterion of an effective realism.
The problem with Niebuhr's conception of power emerges as
it is evaluated by the second criterion - the basis for meaningful
action and hope for improvement from the use of power. When
Niebuhr's concept of power is examined the reader will find that it
is excessively broad in its scope and its*impact. As Niebuhr defines
the use of power by individuals and groups it is any use of force
that serves to alter the present balance of power in society. A use
of power that upsets social harmony is seldom "good" in Niebuhr's
view. Add his argument that all expressions of the individual's
will to power and all quests for power by groups are motivated
29by sinful self-interest. then it becomes hard to see how using 
Niebuhr's concept of power provides a basis for a moral justification 
in the use of power. It is hard to see how Niebuhr can avoid 
pessimistic realism when the only "good" use of force comes as means
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to prevent the domination of society by power hungry individuals
and zealous groups blinded by their own prejudices.
I would argue that Niebuhr's overly pessimistic view of
power would cause him to violate his own system of Christian
realism of consistently applied. The reason for this is that
Niebuhr puts himself in the position of saying that the normal
expressions of power by individuals and groups are always a
40reflection of unjust desires, while at the same time building his 
doctrine of Christian realism on the ability of man to create
41democracy through the exercise of justice in social relationships. 
Niebuhr may argue this is is just a paradox of man, but this fails 
to answer how the same man who is created in the image of God with 
capabilities to love others, grant justice to others, and creatively 
express his freedom in the creation of democratic society can some­
how never use power as a member of a group in a manner that is not 
selfish and exploitative. I think Niebuhr missed that parts of 
history where men and groups of men used power not motivated by a 
selfish will to power or quest to dominate, but in the hope of helping 
others or establishing a more just society. The examples that I 
immediately think of are the use of power by Parliament to end the 
slave trade and establish child labor laws during the last century or
the Marshall Plan after World War II, and, on the Individual level, the
A 2 '1
altruistic giving of blood. In man's use of power, I would agree 
that it is not a simple matter, but add, nor an impossible one.
Another argument made by Niebuhr was that the drive for 
power among individuals and groups never reaches a level of being 
satisfied. The problem I have with this is that it rests on a
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questionable assumption, namely that self-interest always seeks 
absolute power. If every man really has a will to power that could 
not be satisfied until it had absolute power over others, then 
no room would be left for the element of compromise that is necessary 
for a democratic political system. More importantly, given the 
second criteron of an effective realism, how can there be a ground 
for meaningful political action when every expression of power is 
a grasp for domination? Niebuhr's view of power is much closer to 
the "pessimistic" Hobbes than he would be willing to admit. In 
man's use of power it is hard to see the image of God when the image 
of the brute looms so large.
Niebuhr's theological belief that man can transcend himself 
and view the interests of others as important seems to be lost in his 
discussion of power. There seems to be no point of balance against 
man's quest for power over others. A trust in man in terms of 
Niebuhr's theology at thin point does not carry over into his analysis 
of power and its political implications. As such a tension exists 
between Niebuhr's view of man as a political action and his view 
of man as a religious being that must be dealt with.
The final question that must be asked of Niebuhr is, is 
his political realism truly Christian or does Niebuhr introduce his 
doctrine of man to save democracy from the implications of his 
analysis of power? To answer this question requires one to go 
back to 1932 when his book Moral Man and Immoral Society was 
published and caused an incredible reaction in the theological 
community. Theologian Edward Carnell argues the reaction to 
Niebuhr's view of power and groups caused a revolution as large
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as that brought about by the publication of Barth’s commentary
43
on Romans in Europe. The reaction was chiefly from religious
liberals whose optimistic view of man was put under massive attack
by Niebuhr’s position. Yet I do not believe the liberals’ trust in
man is totally based on optimistic illusions; in fact they were
much closer to seeing the image of God in man that Niebuhr spoke
of in his Gifford lectures, than Niebuhr was in the early thirties.
The contradiction between Niebuhr’s pessimistic political realism
with his concept of power and his theological realism which grounded
democracy in the Christian view of human nature is found in the
evolution of his thought. The political realist and pessimistic
interpretation of man is found exclusively in his early writings
Does Civilization Need Religion (1927), Moral Man and Immoral
Society (1932), and Reflections on the End of an Era (1934) which
used a Marxist analysis of human society as a basis of exposing
44self-interest in power. This stands in contrast to The Nature and 
Destiny of Man (1941, 1943), The Children of Light and the Children 
of Darkness (1944), Faith and History (1949), and Christian Realism 
and Political Problems (1953) all of which constructed a defense 
of democracy not on the need to balance social and political power 
but on the nature of man with his capability for both the injustice 
that makes democracy necessary and the justice that makes democracy 
possible. The problem that exists for Niebuhr is that he never 
bothered to reconcile his Christian realist position that developed 
in the forties with the pessimistic realism of his works during the 
thirties. Thus a valid criticism can be made of Niebuhr in that 
his pessimistic realism was not fully Christian and his Christian
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realism is not truly consistent with his earlier analysis of
power.
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CHAPTER V 
DEMOCRACY AND TOLERANCE
Niebuhr's idea of tolerance centers around the basic 
problems of a democratic society and its need to seek the truth 
while at the same time avoiding the establishment of one mode of 
"truth" as an absolute, exclusive standard. Niebuhr believes that 
the insight of the Christian faith can offer the best basis for 
tolerance by forcing the individual to confront a transcendent God 
whose embodiment of absolute truth exposes man's claim to truth as 
tainted with self-interest and false pride. It is when man believes 
he owns the final word of truth that an intolerant attitude arises 
toward those who see things differently. Niebuhr reasons that the
social harmony that is necessary for the survival of democracy can
only exist when the various political, ethnic, religious, and social 
groups realize that no monopoly on truth is possible. This is because
a democratic system is based on compromise by different groups which
act and react toward a constant power shift throughout society. The 
art of compromise is destroyed by groups who claim to have the truth 
and refuse to recognize the legitimate interests of conflicting 
groups. Then either the group attempts to gain absolute power over 
the less enlightened opposition or disrupts the social order by 
its challenge to its authority. Such is the danger of intolerance 
to democracy.
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I
In Niebuhr's view it is the narrowness of pride that is 
the great enemy of democracy. In a democratic society power is 
used to check the pride of men and groups which would seek the 
control of power. The separation of powers and constitutional 
limitations that are present in most democratic nations reflect 
a defense against any ideological establishments of absolute truth, 
which Niebuhr terms as fanaticism. Democracy is an enemy of a 
fanatic because of its institutional pluralism and its corresponding 
necessity to compromise, both of which fail the fanatic:- with 
his dream of the "pure race" or the utopian reign of the 
revolutionaries. Niebuhr argues that fanaticism is a manifestation 
of intolerance so great that the legitmacy of opposition is under­
mined and endangered. If the fanatic, ruled by his intolerant pride, 
is allowed to gain power then the existence of democracy is threatened.
When fanaticism is found within political and social 
groups, it is often hidden behind the words, "the general welfare" 
or for the good of "the people", when in reality a certain group 
is using popular ideology to mask its vested interest. In Moral 
Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr develops the idea of group intoler­
ance as a reflection of a hidden quest for power that results from 
pride.^ The nature of groups is both to narrow the tolerance 
of the individual who is committed to the interests of group and 
to insure the individuals intolerance by the separation of himself 
from those outside the group. The man, who outside the group 
identifies himself with "humanity" or persons anywhere on earth, 
through group participation defines his identity in terms of being
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a Virginian, a Repubulican, a cattle rancher, a Rotary club member,
and an advocate of particular social policies. In each instance
the individual is caught in the pride of the group and its
interest and views become his own. Pride then takes this one step
further as the individual begins to assert that the "thing" to be
is an American, or Republican, or Rotary club member, or even a
cattle rancher. When such pride asserts itself, Niebuhr argues,
the danger of being blinded by self-interest is a constant danger.
Self-interest leads the group to think that its own interest can be
part of, or even dominate, the entire value system of a society.
When the pride of a group overcomes the realization of its limits,
then democracy is in danger from those groups whose pride will not
bend to other groups, which have an equal right to exist and express
themselves. Niebuhr argues that the danger of pride is one that
affects most individuals, groups, and cultures:
The inability of any age, culture or philosophy to 
comprehend the finiteness of its perspectives and 
the limits of its powers always produced a presumpt­
uous claim of finality... They identify their own 
age or culture, or even their own philosophy with 
the final fulfillment of life and truth in history.
This is the very error which they have not taken 
into account or discounted in their basic principle 
of interpretation. ^
Niebuhr finds the resolution to the conflict between pride and
tolerance to be based on the paradox of seeking the truth, but
tolerating others with views of the truth that differ. Niebuhr
knows this is not easily done:
It is as rare an achievement for the pious man to 
be charitable as for the rational man to be 
'reasonable'. Both achievements depend upon the 
recognition of the limited character of each one's 
vision of the truth.2
116
For Niebuhr every attempt to finalize the truth is motivated by a 
pride blind to its own intolerance and open to the evils of 
fanaticism.
II
Those who read Niebuhr know that fanaticism is a hard
problem for him to deal with for two reasons: first, the inherent
nature of the groups in a society is intolerance toward other
groups and, second, that history has shown that Christian groups
are no less guilty than other groups when it comes to intolerance
and fanaticism. Niebuhr argues that the danger of fanaticism is
a part of every world view or philosophy and that the pride of every
perspective leads to an attempt to finalize its view of reality:
Fanaticism is, of course, no more simply the fruit 
of religion than of irreligion. The similarity 
between the fanaticism of the sects of the Cromwellian 
revolution and the fanaticism of the various rationalist 
sectaries of the French Revolution refutes the theories 
both of traditional religion and of secularism, that 
utopianism is the result of either of faith or want 
of faith. Religious faith or any system of philosophy 
may create a universe of meaning which transcends, or 
seems to transcend, all particular historic norms and 
concepts. Wherever this transcendent meaning is 
taken seriously a tolerant attitude is developed 
toward means, ends, and purposes other than our own.
But all systems of meaning, whether founded in 
religion, philosophy, or science, more frequently 
tempt men to identify their norms and ends with the 
final meaning, thus generating fanaticism.3
On the positive side Niebuhr is honest in dealing with
intolerance and Christianity and does not try to cover up or ignore
evidence that would hurt his case for the basis of tolerance through
faith. Niebuhr himself is able to escape from the trap of intolerance.
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that plagues many versions of Christianity by the realization
that one never comes to a full knowledge of God and that the
search for ’’the truth" is a continuous one that cannot be finalized
in any one version of Christianity. Niebuhr’s argument that the
truth of the Christian faith cannot be claimed by any religious
group is also found in John Locke’s work "A Letter Concerning 
4
Toleration." Niebuhr’s defense of toleration is based on the 
finite nature of the human mind and its inability to reach absolute 
truth. Niebuhr shares his view of the limits of the human mind 
with Locke:
Locke is 'fallibilist1 about the powers of man’s 
mind. His accent on the 'incertitude of things' 
gets its greatest support from a critical survey 
of religious beliefs. For matters of faith to 
him are, by definition, neither provable nor 
disprovable; they are simply believable, or 
disbelievable. Hence anyone can propose them, 
but nobody has a right to impose them on others...
[Locke] attacks the principle of persecution for 
religion on the ground of human fallibility.5
The danger of intolerance for both Locke and Niebuhr comes when any
view claims to be the whole truth, for at that point anyone who
differs with such a view becomes a liar or a heretic. In spite of
the fact that Locke did allow for the persecution of religious
and non-religious groups that he felt posed a danger to the civil 
£
society, he did have great insight into the implications that
a modern pluralistic society has for religious belief.
Niebuhr is highly critical of Roman Catholicism for its
failure to accept that its interpretation of Christianity is
limited and finite:
Catholicism is impelled by its whole history 
and by its peculiar doctrine of grace to claim
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unconditioned possession of the truth. In this 
claim in the realm of culture it obviously destroys 
the Biblical paradox of grace. It pretends to 
have as a simple possession, what cannot be so 
possessed. It may vary its attitude slightly 
towards other versions of the Christian faith 
from time to time but it is completely consistent 
and unyielding in its conviction that it alone 
possesses the truth and the whole truth.7
Niebuhr argues that a version of Christianity that claims to be
absolute is not only open to a dangerous intolerance, but also
prey to a human "will-to-power" that would attack and oppress all
opposition and leave no alternative to its own self-righteous
fanaticism. Niebuhr, in response, stands firmly in the Protestant
tradition of religious liberty and toleration on matters of conscience.
The leading spokesman in history for the cause of religious
toleration is most likely Roger Williams. Williams was banished
from Salem because he held views that differed from the religious
views of the Puritans who held both the political and religious
authority in the community. In response to their intolerance,
Williams wrote the famous tract in religious liberty, The Bloudy
Tenent of Persecution. In his tract Williams wrote that true
religion was based on liberty of conscience and not coerced belief:
While I plead the Cause of Truth and Innocencie 
against the bloody Doctrine of Persecution for 
the cause of conscience, I judge it not unfit 
to give alarme to my selfe, and all men to pre­
pare to be persecuted or hunted for the cause 
of conscience... if those huntest any for cause 
of conscience, how canst thou say thou followest 
the Lambe of God who is abhorrfd that practice.&
Niebuhr, like Williams, knew that faith without humility is fanaticism.
In the Nature and Destiny of Man, Niebuhr is forced to
deal with the issue of humility and tolerance. On one hand, Niebuhr
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wants to preserve faith and the existence of truth from skepticism
and, on the other, he wants to incorporate the insights of the
Renaissance and Enlightenment which helped to overcome religious 
9
dogmatism. It is the tension between the claims of Christianity 
and the insights of the Enlightenment that leads to Niebuhr*s 
formulation of the paradox of truth. The paradox is that truth 
does exist and one must always seek the truth, but at the same time
one must be tolerant of divergent views of the truth because of the
limits of the human mind and its inability to ever reach final 
truths. When Niebuhr applies the insights of the Enlightenment to 
faith he quickly takes the role of an iconoclast, because Christianity 
has a history of making finite conceptions of truth into absolute 
dogmas. Niebuhr applies the paradox of truth to establish a basis 
for religious tolerance in which beliefs are held, but are acknowledged 
as finite in their conception of God and the truth of religion. Niebuhr 
reasons that because beliefs change as truth develops that limitations 
can be placed on dogma so variations in faith can be tolerated."^
Niebuhr readily admits this is not always easily done:
Religious toleration through religiously inspired 
humility and charity is always a difficult
achievement. It requires that religious convictions
be sincerely and devoutly held while yet the sinful
and finite corruptions of these convictions be 
humbly acknowledged; and the actual fruits of 
other faiths be generously estimated. Whenever the 
religious groups of a community are incapable of 
such humility and charity the national community 
will be forced to save its unity through either 
secularism or authoritariaism.
Niebuhr argues in defense of Christianity against 
skepticism that the willingness to search for the truth is not enough, 
but that a concept of an absolute standard of truth is necessary
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to avoid giving up the quest for truth. For Niebuhr man must act on
an incomplete view of truth rather than choose inaction or pretension
in the quest for truth:
Loyalty to the truth requires confidence in the 
possibility of its attainment; toleration of 
others requires broken confidence in the finality 
of our own truth. But if there is no answer for 
a problem to which we do not have the answer, our 
shattered confidence generates either defeat 
(which in the field of culture would be 
skepticism); or an even greater measure of pre­
tension, meant to hide our perplexities behind 
our certainites (which in the field of culture
is fanaticism).12
To reject the tension of acting on an incomplete view of the truth results 
either in intolerance, in the claim to absolute truth, or the refusal 
to act upon an incomplete truth, which ends in apathy and skepticism. 
Niebuhr argues that a democracy cannot survive the tyranny of dogmatism 
or the anarchy of skepticism in its quest for truth. For Niebuhr the 
final answer to toleration in a democratic society must come from 
religious humility.
Ill
Niebuhr claims the Christian faith provides the means to 
bring about the humility necessary to overcome the dangers of pride 
without yielding to the pitfalls of skepticism. This is possible 
because when man is confronted by the absolute standard of truth 
found in the infinite God, then the finite mind of man is made humble 
and aware of its limitations. Yet man in faith does not give up in 
skepticism because he knows the reality of truth as embodied in God.
As Niebuhr applies this to democracy, he finds religious humility the 
key to toleration:
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Religious humility is in perfect accord with the 
presuppositions of a democratic society. Profound 
religion must recognize the difference between 
divine majesty and human creatureliness; between 
the unconditioned character of the divine and the 
conditioned character of all human enterprise...
Religious faith sought therefore to be a constant 
fount of humility; for it ought to encourage men 
to moderate their natural pride and to achieve 
some decent consciousness of the relativity of 
their own statement of even the most ultimate 
truth.
It is the gap between divine majesty as the essence of 
absolute truth and the human creatureliness with its rational, moral, 
and religious limitations that cannot be bridged by humans* claims of 
truth. For truth to be absolute its source must be God and not man, 
Niebuhr argues. What Niebuhr means by this is that all human 
knowledge is finite and ever-changing, while God alone is a source of 
unchanging truth. On this basis no maif can support a claim of having 
absolute truth in his grasp and at his disposal. To overcome the 
problem of truth and leave a place for tolerance, Niebuhr would argue 
that no monopoly on God's truth is possible and that man must accept 
that his views will always be finite and influenced by narrow self- 
interest :
The real problem of human community begins when men 
who are absolutely certain that they are unselfish 
and equally certain that they know God's will, come 
in conflict with other men who have the same certainty 
but whose political, social and economic convictions 
have nothing in common with their own. It is at 
that point that we face the issue of the relativity 
of all human perspectives; the sinful tendency of 
finite men to deny this relativity and to claim 
absolute validity for opinions which God supposedly 
gave them; the necessity of living by God's will 
insofar as we can apprehend it for us; and finally 
the need of forgiving the foe in the knowledge that 
our own perspective, ideals and goals are tainted by 
sin as certainly as his.
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For Niebuhr, Christianity cannot adopt any one view of "right" or 
claim any one standard as "God's will" because justice is found in 
the balance of different claims to right and in toleration of 
different views of truth.
Niebuhr argues, following the view of the New Testament, 
that none are righteous and that all have fallen short of the divine 
standards and are thus sinners before God.^^ The Christian faith 
shows that social and political conflicts do not take place between 
sinners and righteousness men, but only between sinners in search of 
support for their interests. It is the divine righteousness of God 
that exposes the pride of man and the self-deception of his claims to 
righteousness. The realization that all men are sinners liberates man 
to be tolerant of others because he knows his own intolerance and 
falsehood:
True self-knowledge delivers the self from cynicism 
in regard to their neighbor because it discerns the 
similarity between the corruption in the heart of 
the neighbor and the heart of self. It is from 
such "pessimism" that gratitude and charity flow, 
provided that there Is an assurance of final 
forgiveness for the ineradicable evil in the human 
heart.U
It is from such a perspective that humility comes when human claims 
are met by divine standards. The acceptance of faith in God leads 
to the position that the truth is not just in us, it is also beyond 
us. In fact, Niebuhr's paradox of truth is such that we can claim 
truth for ourselves only when we refuse to claim truth as "our" own. 
The truth of Christian revelation will not let man claim to know the 
truth fully or pretend that he does. It is from such humility that 
tolerance is allowed to survive the desire of man to establish his 
personal or national ideology as universal truth.
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Christianity to Niebuhr, is the basis for tolerance for 
it serves to prevent man from finding truth in himself or his world. 
Truth in the absolute cannot be made part of man who must find ultimate 
meaning beyond himself. Christianity adds to the practice of tolerance 
because:
It fulfills what is valid, because man’s self 
transcendence enables him to hope for and desire 
the disclosure of a meaning which has a center 
and source beyond himself. It negates what is 
sinful because it disappoints that element in 
all human hopes and expectations, which seeks 
to complete the meaning of life around the self, 
individual or collective, as the inadequate 
center of the realm of meaning.
Finally, the hope of Christianity as a source of tolerance is the
acceptance that faith cannot be forced on another and that our efforts
cannot create faith, but that one is forced to rely on the Giver of
all faith as the means to change others without force of intolerance.
Thereafter, one humbles himself in the belief that truth can be in us
only to the extent that we accept that truth is over us. Out of this
the fruit of tolerance may grow and democracy develop into a system
to harmonize interest, rather thanr one that has to use force to resolve
conflicts bred by intolerance.
IV
In the secular community, Niebuhr1s argument for tolerance
has not gained attention because it is not viewed as unique, but as a
19reinterpretation of the classical secular arguments for tolerance.
In the community of faith the reaction to Niebuhr’s view of tolerance 
has been unfavorable because many find it to be theologically untenable.
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The close relation between Niebuhr’s view of tolerance and the classic
secular views would not be as great a problem for Niebuhr if either
he had admitted it (he did not) or else had proved that tolerance is
based on theological insight (which he attempts). The reader of
Niebuhr can become skeptical of Niebuhr on this point because Niebuhr
makes the claim that tolerance is based on religious humility and that
it takes such a perspective to recognize the partial and fragmentary
nature of all human wisdom. Yet this definition of tolerance is a
restatement of the classic secular argument for tolerance which grounds
tolerance in man’s limitations but without the "necessity1' of religious
humility. Tolerance can be based on and justified just as much by
anthropology as it can by theology:
The classical secular argument states: All
political theories assume, of course, that most 
individuals are very ignorant. The classical 
argument for tolerance... rests, of course, on 
the recognition of this ignorance of ours. It 
is a special application of general considera­
tions to which a non-rationalist insight into 
the working of our minds opens the doors...all 
institutions of freedom are adaptations to this 
fundamental fact of ignorance, adapted to deal 
with chances and probabilities, not certainty.
Certainty we cannot achieve in human affairs.21
The classical argument for tolerance and Niebuhr’s argument for
ance both rest on human ignorance and limitation. One could take
issue with Niebuhr for failure to give credit to those who went before
him and worked out the problem of tolerance on the same ground^ but a
more likely reaction would be to accept Niebuhr’s basis of tolerance
to the extent it rests on human limitation, but reject his claim
that religious humility is necessary for tolerance in a democratic
society. The secular thinker will have little problem with Niebuhr’s
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analysis of tolerance from his anthropologicalbasis, but usually will
find religion to be an enemy rather than friend of tolerance in 
22
society. As such Niebuhr’s argument for tolerance based on man’s
ignorance is not unique or original; rather it is his approach to
tolerance through the insights of theology that is unique, original,
and worthy of consideration.
As mentioned earlier, most religious thinkers will find
Niebuhr’s theological justification of tolerance to be untenable.
The reason for this is that Niebuhr's theological basis for tolerance
is based on the axiom that only God can "have*' the truth and that man
can only know that truth exists in God and not in his finite conception
of reality. This is made untenable by the Christian view of
revelation in which God and truth are revealed to man, not in a
comprehensive manner but in a manner in which the absolute truth
23
embodied in God is comprehensible to man. It is through revelation 
that even man with his natural limitations can be said to "have" the 
truth in the absolute sense. John Locke makes this argument in 
The Reasonableness of Christianity in whidh he suggests that revelation
as absolute truth is both necessary for man and within his power to
24 ,comprehend. Revelation is necessary in the sense that where man s
knowledge of God’s laws of nature is incomplete or where man’s reason
is misguided by self-interest or passion, revelation is necessary to
reveal the truth to man. Locke further argues that the ’truth of
revelation can be gained through a proper understanding of God's
revelation in Scripture, by which he means an understanding not
25contrary to reason. As such, Locke would say that divine revelation 
gives one truth that is both consistent with natural reason and truth
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about God from both a rational understanding of revelation in nature 
and from Scripture. This is a major problem for Niebuhr because his 
defense of religious tolerance is based on the inability of man’s 
reason to possess absolute truth of God, while his system of theology 
is based on affirmations that involve claims of absolute truth about 
God. For example, Niebuhr accepts the theological belief that: God
was in Christ, Christ died for man, sin is rebellion against God,
Love is the noun of man's existence in Christ, pride is the worst 
manifestation of sin, justice is the basis for ethics and many other 
beliefs that involve truth in an absolute or universal sense. If there 
is an unsurpassable gap between God's truth and man’s understanding 
of that truth, then Niebuhr has no ground for any of his theological 
affirmations. If a theologian cannot know truth about God, is his 
understanding ever more than vain speculation? Niebuhr's argument for 
tolerance based on man's inability to have truth about God, as applied 
to basic Christian beliefs, is theologically untenable. Furthermore, 
if his basis for religious tolerance were consistently applied, it 
would lead to a position that justified not tolerance in religior^ but 
absolute relativism in religion. This is because if no human is able 
to grasp any of God’s truth, then it would follow that no true knowledge 
of God is possible. If man knows nothing of God,then one could hardly 
say to a person who chose to call an inanimate object "God", that he 
fails to understand the nature of God - since no one has any knowledge 
of God's nature or being. In sum, I would argue that Niebuhr is 
taking an inadequate position with his argument that religious 
tolerance oan be based on man's ignorance of truth about God. I would, 
on a positive note, add that I think Niebuhr is right to base tolerance
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on the limitations of man's reason and its fallibility, but in this 
accessment he adds little to what has already been said by others 
outside the theological community. As for his argument to base 
religious tolerance on man's inability to have truth about God, I 
find this to be destructive both of his own theological beliefs as 
well as any attempt to construct a basis to understand God's revelation.
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CHAPTER VI
DEMOCRACY AND HUMILITY
The concept of humility is present throughout the works of 
Niebuhr. This concept is very important to Niebuhr because of the 
crucial need of individuals, groups, and nations for humility. Niebuhr’s 
use of the word humility does not mean meek or modest, as a standard 
dictionary meaning would render the term. For Niebuhr humility is not 
a personality trait or disposition, rather it is the relationship of man
before God in which the pretensions and pride of man are measured by the
absolute holiness and righteousness of God. Humility is not within us, 
but comes only when one is brought by comparison to an uncorruptable 
standard.of judgment to the self-realization of his own futility. It is 
characteristic of individuals, groups, and nations to present their own 
values and goals as those of God, thus reducing God to an instrument of 
human pride and power. Such pretension is made impossible by an encounter 
with God in which the claims of man are confronted by His judgment of our 
self-exaltation. Humility is not easily possible on a human level of 
comparison because one can always rationalize away one’s failure to meet 
social standards of various kinds with the phrase "I’m only human." 
Moreover, self-interest often blinds individuals, groups, and nations 
from seeing themselves objectively. It is only when human judgment is 
confronted by divine righteousness, Niebuhr believes, that one is able
to see his or her true self and the masking of corruption by pride. From
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this confrontation comes humility in the self-knowledge of our own 
weakness as one discovers his or her acts in the light of divine 
judgment. It is such humility that shows individuals that their 
virtue is dominated by selfishness, groups the infection of pride 
in their wisdom, and nations the corruption that lies in their 
exercise of power.
I
In Niebuhr’s view humility is based on faith; hence to under­
stand the nature and significance of humility one must turn to the 
insights of theology as it applies to man. Niebuhr argues that if man 
is left only with his personal subjective standard of judgment, then 
even the worst of acts against man and God can be rationalized away.
Man needs an infinite and absolute standard to allow him to understand 
his finite nature andtthe depths of his weakness. Niebuhr uses humility 
as a theological concept, as the first step to grace in which man 
accepts his finite existence, and his spirit is open to search for the 
absolute that ends in the acceptance of grace or in the rejection of his 
finite existence. The failure of man to accept his limitations leads 
to the quest for power ;to fill the void of meaning left by a lack of 
faith.^ It is the power of humility that frees man from the need for 
the self to assert its power and -dominate society. Humility frees 
man from the will to power and makes it possible for man to be concerned 
for others:
In humility Niebuhr sees a primary effect, perhaps 
the decisive effect of religion. Humility, conferred 
by the source of religion, presages man’s mounting 
renewal and progress. It frees man from the self- 
seeking egotism which keeps him in isolated self-
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relatedness and results in manifold injuries to his 
personality, hinders his effectiveness in society, 
and worst of all makes impossible man's true function 
as mediator of the relatedness between God and the 
society of man in the world.^
Humility has an impact in changing how the individual relates 
to society and those around him. In humility man is forced to acknowledge
his status as a creature of God, but when such faith is not a guide,
then man makes his own guidelines which sets him in a role of self- 
sufficiency. The danger is that every man is finite and for man to set 
himself up as the focal point of reality is to ignore that no man can
begin to comprehend reality at a point wide enough to escape being
caught in his own ignorance and personal prejudice. Niebuhr argues that 
when the individual is confronted with the fullness of reality beyond 
the self, the individual is faced with the incompleteness of his nature.
It is when man realizes that he is not self-sufficient that humility
before God becomes possible. For Niebuhr the finite nature of man as a
creature serves as a basis for man to be dissatisfied and in his freedom 
search for the sufficiency that can come only from the Creator:
'Not that we are sufficient of ourselves,' declares St.
Paul, 'to think anything as of ourselves; but our
sufficiency is of God.' This is an acknowledgement of
the limits of human powers and at the same time an 
expression of the belief that the limits of human 
powers are not the limits of the meaning of existence.
We are too limited either to comprehend the whole 
world of meaning or to complete and fulfill the mean­
ing which we comprehend. This human situation either 
tempts us to despair, if’ it should persuade us that 
our inability to complete the world of meaning 
destroys such partial meaning as we do discern; or 
it prompts us to faith, if we should find the power 
and wisdom beyond our own, in the very realization 
of our limited power and w i s d o m . 3
The faith that Niebuhr advocates is unique in that it does not laud the
strong and mighty but is open to the weak and humble who in faith
measure their self-righteousness as pride and their virtue as sin
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because no human effort can be totally acceptable to God.
Niebuhr finds the root of sin in the pride of man which
seeks to claim self-sufficiency and man's deliverance from his
dependence on God. For man to attempt to go beyond his natural
limitations is to deny his subordination to God and his creatureliness.
When man asserts his pride as a being independent of God, he brings
judgment upon himself. Niebuhr argues that the excessive pride of
man robs glory from a "jealous" God, who in turn forces man into
humility. To support this view Niebuhr uses the Biblical examples of
the Garden of Eden and the Tower of Babel:
In the Genesis myth of the Fall it is suggested that
false pride lies at the foundation of human sin.
Man sought to penetrate to the final mystery of the 
'tree of the knowledge of good and evil', which, 
alone among the trees of the garden, was forbidden 
to him. That was the' cause of his Fall. In the 
profound parable of the Tower of Bable, we are told 
that man sought to build a structure 'whose top
may reach into heaven' and 'made [us a name]?’ God is
pictured as jealous of this... therefore he confounded 
their language and 'scattered them abroad.'
Pride in its essence is a rebellion against God. The highest expression
of humanity comes in obedience to God in recognition that the self is
in a subordinate position to a higher will. But human nature within
itself lacks the power to trust in God and submit to a divine will.'*
This lack of faith begins in pride because the individual who views
himself as the center of reality and meaning will leave no place for
a divine standard upon which to order his life. From the individual
who sees himself as the point of universal meaning comes the will to
power over others; blinded by self-interest the individual's pride
motivates him to view others from the narrow focal point of his reality.
The self-love which is the basis of pride is found by both Niebuhr and
134
Augustine to be the basis of disharmony in man and his relation to 
society:
Augustine's conception of the evil which threatens
the human community on every level is a corollary
of his doctrine of selfhood. 'Self-love' is the 
source of evil rather than some residual natural 
impulse which mind has not yet completely mastered.
This excessive love of self, sometimes also defined 
as pride or superbia, is explained as the consequence 
of the self's abandonment of God as its true end of 
making itself 'a kind of end.' It is this powerful 
self-love or, in a modern term, 'egocentricity,* 
this tendency of the self to make itself its own 
end, or even to make itself the false center of 
whatever community it inhabits, which sows confusion 
in every human community.^
The corruption caused by pride is the sin that most interests Niebuhr.
It is a sin that cannot be confined merely to human nature or limited to
the whim of personal choice. For Niebuhr the sin of pride comes from
the insecurity that man feels without faith. To overcome his insecurity
man sets up and worships false gods in an attempt to give meaning to life.
Niebuhr suggests the most popular of these false gods is the god of self.
Niebuhr argues that the problem of pride affects groups to a
greater extent than individuals. Groups in search of power to overcome
their sense of insecurity overstep their bounds and go as far as to
'use God' to justify their cause. The problem is compounded, Niebuhr
argues, in that groups infected with pride are much more dangerous
than prideful individuals. Following Niebuhr's analysis of groups in
Moral Man and Immoral Society, it is evident that the larger and stronger
groups develop a pride to such an extent that it is beyond the restraint
of its individual members. In fact the individual who gains identity
from the group is often caught in the pride of the group and becomes
both a willing advocate and an ignorant victim of group pride and the
dangers that follow its pretensions.^ The individual by himself has the
135
potential, even in his self-interest, to evaluate the interests of others 
and may even give up some of his rights on liberties to benefit others. 
But the same individual when placed in a group loses the ability for 
self-transcendence and consideration of those outside the bounds of 
his group. Niebuhr argues that not only is man blinded by the pride 
within a group, but also that the moral insight of its group members is 
also compromised by the collective will of the group. The result is 
that groups and nations need "a measure of coercion, which is not 
necessary in the most intimate and the most imaginative individual 
relations:'*1
The same problems that pride causes for groups applies
equally to nations. Nations not only blind their citizens to national
pride, they instillnational pride through education, the mass media,
and governmental propoganda. Due to the numerous resources available
to a nation, very few people are able to see beyond the nationalism
that is promoted in every area of life. Niebuhr argues that the pride
of nationalism serves to blind a nation to its own weakness and that
humility is necessary to recognize the rights of other nations:
But a sense of humility which recognizes that 
nations are even more incapable than individuals 
of fully understanding the rights and claims of
others may be an even more important element in
such a discipline. A too confident sense of 
justice always leads to injustice. In so far as 
men and nations are 'judges in their own case'
'they are bound to betray the human weakness of 
having a livelier sense of their own interest 
than of the competing interest. That is why 
'just' men and nations may easily become involved 
in ironic refutations of their moral pretensions.^
The pride of a nation that claims to be just and honorable has not
measured itself against the standard which would expose its greed and
injustice. For Niebuhr the absolute measure is a righteous God whose
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standards make all human claims of virtue tarnish with the knowledge
of their own self-serving pride. Niebuhr applied the concept of
humility to the situation faced by the United States after World War II
when it was at the height of its newly discovered power. He argued
that the nation had a special mission to the world, but to avoid the
dangers of pride it would be necessary to develop an attitude of
humility. Faith would be the power that could separate the reality of
American power from the claim of American virtue:
There is no case for the pride of a virtuous nation 
but pure religion. The pride of a powerful nation 
may be humbled by the impotence which defeat brings.
The pride of a virtuous nation cannot be humbled 
by moral and political criticism because in compara­
tive terms it may actually be virtuous... 'In God's 
sight' they are not just; and they know it if they 
place themselves under the divine scrutiny, that is, 
if they regard their own history prayerfully rather 
than comparatively and measure themselves by what is 
demanded of them rather than by comparing their 
success with the failure of others.10
Niebuhr realizes that humility runs counter to the normal 
tendency of a nation - especially a powerful nation or one that views 
itself as being a "beacon" to the world. Every nation that exalts its 
achievements as their own making and refuses to confess its own 
limitations is caught in a blinding nationalism that brings God's 
judgment. In their success, every nation must beware the illusions of 
pride:
However, each of the nations would also, in turn, 
fall under the divine condemnation. The cause of 
the condemnation was always the same. They 
exalted themselves above measure, and engaged in 
pretensions which exceeded the bounds of human 
mortality... The prophetic judgments against the 
nations are always prompted by their pride, which 
seeks to hide the common fraility of all achievements 
and constructions of men, or which denies the divine 
source of their power and pretends that their posi­
tions among the nations is due altogether to their
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own achievements.H  
Niebuhr*s political realism will not allow him to accept that a nation's
power and success are results of its goodness or merit.
Niebuhr, wrestles with the problem of using humility to
apply as a measure of nations in his books Man's Nature and His
12 13 
Communities and Pious and Secular America. Niebuhr viewed power
as a fragile possession that was in constant need of renewal and re-
evaluation. To this need faith adds a humility that leads to a realistic
evaluation of the power of the state. It also opens the path to
renewal because God shows favor to the humble while he judges the
prideful: "the first shall be last and the last shall be first." Even
the most powerful nation must either realize its own limitations or be
reminded of them by an enemy who as the tool of judgment forces a
prideful nation to realize that no nation is a permanent power except
through the grace of God. The power of humility is needed if a nation
is to avoid the pride that would lead to its destruction:
It is possible, for instance, for a shrewd political 
observer to know in advance that the display of 
power by a single nation or groilp of nations cannot 
permanently secure the acquiesence of other nations.
But ultimately this humility is a religious achieve­
ment. Rather it is not so much an achievement as it 
is a gift of grace, a by-product of the faith which 
discerns life in its total dimension and senses the 
divine judgment; and of the divine majesty which is 
justifiably jealous of human pretensions. The more 
men and nations fear the wrath of God, the more can 
they anticipate doom, the more can they avoid it.14
In his book Europe's Catastrophe and the Christian Faith,
Niebuhr argues that pride is the element in human nature and the life of 
nations that destroys the harmony of life.^ Niebuhr saw in the Europe 
of 1940 the danger that resulted from the vain and arrogant pride of a
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German nation whose power was allowed to go unchecked until it became
a direct threat to the survival of democracy in Europe. Niebuhr saw
the threat of <:'totalitarianism as much more than a political expression;
it was an example of the pride of man at its worst. The pride of race
and power led Germany not only to destroy democracy but also its own
population when it did not meet the high standards of the Aryan race.
Niebuhr's point is perhaps best expressed by Erich Fromm who argues that
authoritarianism by its very nature is destructive of life:
Authoritarian philosophy is essentially 
relativistic... It is rooted in extreme despera­
tion, in the complete lack of faith, and it leads 
to nihilism, to the denial of life.16
Niebuhr finds pride in the nature of the authoritarian temperament which
in the exercise of power uses authority as a means to force social and
political conformity. The life blood of democracy for Niebuhr is
found in its ability to have unity in diversity and allow each individual
full freedom of expression. Niebuhr is not alone in his argument that
conformity is a threat to freedom within a democratic nation. Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr. makes the same argument:
The gospel of adjustment condemns us as a nation
to mediocrity by lopping off the eccentrics, the
originals, the imaginative, lonely people from 
whom new ideas come. What begins as a conspiracy 
against individuality ends as a conspiracy against
creativity.17
From this it is not hard to see how the power of pride is an enemy to 
democracy. Pride by its very nature involves an assertion of 
inequality. Being proud that one is a German, or scientist, or country 
club member involves the assumption that being an Englishman, or 
cook, or Playboy club member is not as good. Pride is the Pharisee
thanking God he is not the publican or in today's terms pride is the
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corporation executive who brags that he never had to be a steel worker. 
The root of pride is a false inequality that can corrupt even the best 
of people, groups, or nations. As for governments, Niebuhr places his 
hope in democracy as the means to confront inequality, but with the 
realization that no form of government ever escapes the deception of 
pride. All individuals, groups, and nations face the constant tempta­
tion of pride with its unjustifiable assertion of inequality that ends 
in the claim to be better, more virtuous, or somehow superior to the 
object or subject of comparison. It takes humility to realize that the 
claim to be better, more moral or superior is in reality an illusion of 
pride.
II
Niebuhr, following the tradition of democracy, will not allow 
the state to become an end in itself. The state is always seen as in­
complete and limited, which means it can make no absolute claims on the 
inalienable rights of its citizens. One does not have to be a theologian 
to realize that there are areas where government must not infringe.
The great democratic principles of liberty and restraint on power are 
consistent with Niebuhr's application of the concept of humility to 
nations. It is because of the distinctive limitations of power with its 
affirmation of popular consent and' participation that Niebuhr can accept
democracy as the best model of government and the one most free of
18illusions of pride. Furthermore, Niebuhr's critical view of 
nationalistic pride is consistent with democratic insights into the role 
of man as a citizen of the world rather than merely a citizen of his
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19particular national state. Niebuhr would even go one step further 
to argue that man, due to his spiritual nature, is a citizen of 
eternity bound neither by the confines of the state nor by his place 
in the world.
In Niebuhr’s view democracy requires the spirit of humility
which is a product of the Christian faith. Neither the pessimist nor
the idealist can provide a basis for democratic toleration:
Democratic life requires a spirit of tolerant 
cooperation between individuals and groups 
which can be achieved by neither moral cynics, 
who know no law beyond their own interest, nor 
by moral idealists, who acknowledge such a law 
but are unconscious of the corruption of it by 
even the most disinterested i d e a l i s t s . 20
Niebuhr uses his concept of humility not only to point out the taint
of self-interest, but as a tool to guide human action toward a more
complete means to establish the balance of interests needed for democracy.
This is aided by Niebuhr's theological insight that accepts democracy
not as a divine ideal but as a human construction. His view of humility
does, however, lead him to find in the spirit of democracy something
better than the alternative forms of government can offer. By making
the value judgment as to the utility of democracy, he is able to accept
its strengths and weaknesses without patriotic adoration or critical
condemnation.^
Niebuhr's political realism allows him to see both the
limitations and the possibilities of democracy. From this view,
Niebuhr is able to argue that democracy is the best form of government,
but that if democracy hopes to avoid the destructions of pride that
would set individual against individual and group against group, it
must be renewed by the power of humility. For Niebuhr the relationship
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between democracy and humility is a necessary one:
The real point of contact between democracy and 
profound religion is in the spirit of humility 
which democracy requires and which must be one of 
the fruits of religion... Democracy therefore 
requires something more than religious devotion 
to moral ideals. It requires religious humility.
Every absolute devotion to relative political 
ends (and all political ends are relative) is a 
threat to communal peace. But religious humility 
is no simple moral or political achievement. It
springs only from the depth of a religion which
confronts the individual with a more ultimate 
majesty and purity than all human majesties and 
values, and persuades him to confess: 'Why
callest thou me good? There is none good but 
one, this is, God.'^
When the individual and group are confronted by an absolute that
makes them realize their finite interests cannot be forced upon society
without the final result of injustice, then the grounds for compromise 
are established. As such, Niebuhr's concept of humility can add a 
great deal to democracy. The question remains: does democracy need 
religious humility? Niebuhr would argue in the affirmative for two 
reasons: first, the democratic virtue of individualism is. inadequate
to face the problems of group power and the immorality of such groups;
second, democracy without the insight of faith cannot transcend the
limits of mere social existence. Niebuhr in On Politics argues that the 
nature of democracy cannot be the fulfillment of man's social life 
in itself:
Democracy cannot be the final end of life for
various reasons. It is a form of human society,
and man is only partly fulfilled in his social 
relations. Ultimately each individual faces not 
society but God as his judge and redeemer.
Democrats talk very much about democratic indi­
vidualism. But what does it profit a society 
to refrain from making ultimate claims upon the 
individual in principle, yet in fact make 
ultimate claims because it is the kind of society
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in which the individual is supposedly accorded 
higher rights than in other societies? And 
what does it profit an individual to be free 
of social compulsion if he lacks every ultimate 
point of reference for the freedom of his soul 
which exceeds the limits of his social institu­
tions. Democracy is certainly a better form of 
society than totalitarianism. But many proponents 
of it share one mistake of communists at least: 
they know no other dimension of existence except 
the social o n e . 23
It is because man cannot find total meaning in democracy that
the realm of faith becomes important. Faith becomes the basis for
humility by pointing out the difference between the divine and the
temporal and allowing no one to justify his acts in the name of
democracy without first facing the "finiteness and contingency which
24
creeps into the statement of even the sublimest truth." If the
influence of humility is lost to modern democracy, as Niebuhr fears,
a powerful tool to make men look beyond narrow self-interest will be
lost. If democracy reaches a point where it is faced by groups that
refuse to accept limitations upon themselves, then democracy will be
in a precarious position and, given other examples in history, will
25
probably not exist for long. There is little doubt in Niebuhr’s 
mind that democracy would be jeopardized by the loss of religious 
humility:
The toleration which democracy requires is diffi­
cult to maintain without Christian humility; and 
the challenges to pretensions of every kind which 
are furnished in the give and take of democratic 
life are, on the other hand, strong external 
supports for the Christian grace of humility which 
recognizes the partial and particular character of 
everyone’s Interest and the fragmentary character 
of every human virtue.^6
The encounter of God with nations, even democratic nations, leaves
them humbled in the realization that the tolerance and freedom they
have achieved must be preserved against the dangers of self-interest 
and pride that exist in the life of each of its citizens, in the 
organization of groups, and in the power structure of government 
itself.
Niebuhr also applies the concept of humility to man’s
attempt to construct philosophies of history. Niebuhr argues that
all human perspectives of history are influenced by personal bias.
The liberal democrat writes history from a liberal democratic
viewpoint, the Marxist in a Marxist view, and a conservative from
a conservative perspective, and one might add, Niebuhr as a
theologian writes history from a theological viewpoint. As a theologian
Niebuhr is critical of any attempt to put faith in history as the
source of man’s redemption. Niebuhr argues that both Western culture,
27with its belief in the progress of man, and Marxist thinkers with
the dialectic of history, are putting their faith in history. Niebuhr
sees such thinkers as Leibritz, Kant, Hegel, Herder, Mill, Marx,
28
Spencer, H.G. Wells, and Dewey as holding this mistaken view.
Niebuhr argues that faith "in history is a version of the optimistic
view of man that refuses to learn the lessons of history. This type
of reaction against a faith in progress comes from a major element
in Niebuhr’s theology - the criticism of the optimism of nineteenth
29century liberal theology. But It should be noted that the dominance 
of the Neo-Orthodox theological movement did not occur in Europe 
until the first World War and in the United States during the depression 
It was not until these events that the tide turned against the 
nineteenth century progressive view of history. Niebuhr’s criticism of 
the liberal—optimistic view of man and history developed from his
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experience of the tragic conditions of twentieth century industrial
31life that was recorded in his early works.
Niebuhr first applies the concept of humility to historical
perspectives in his theological classic, The Nature and Destiny of
Man. Niebuhr argues that the basis of the view of progress in history
as redemptive is motivated by pride that fails to accept the limits
of human ability and progress:
The belief that man could solve his problems 
either by an escape from history or by the 
historical process itself is a mistake which
is partly prompted by the most universal of
all 1 ideological* taints: the pride, not of
particular men and cultures, but of man as 
man... Our most reliable understanding is 
the fruit of * grace* in which faith completes 
our ignorance without pretending to possess 
its certainties as knowledge; and in which 
contrition mitigates our pride without 
destroying our hope... Thus wisdom about 
our destiny is dependent upon a humble rec­
ognition of the limits of our knowledge and 
our power.32
To reach the level of humility that will escape historical illusions
requires that one measure man's righteousness and historical progress
against a divine standard of history whose * perfection turns the notion
of human progress into a vain delusion of pride. Niebuhr would have
man give up his early shattered pretensions about human progress.
From the reality of human failure and cruelty, Niebuhr would have man
trust a power beyond and above history:
Repentance is the first key into the door of the 
Kingdom of God. God resisted the proud and giveth 
grace to the humble. Whenever men trust their 
own righteousness, their own achievements, when­
ever they interpret the meaning of life in terms 
of the truth in their own culture or find in their 
own capacities a sufficient steppingstone to the 
Holy and the Divine, they rest their life upon a 
frail need which inevitably breaks and leaves
t h e i r  l i f e  m e a n i n g l e s s . 3 3
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It is from the meaninglessness of life and history that man 
is driven into the depth of his own frail and transitory existence.
From this depth of humility man searches beyond himself. Theology 
leads Niebuhr to recognize that man is not complete in himself and 
to overcome his limitations he must drive for and dream the illusions 
of power and grandeur that will give his life security. In anxiety 
about his limitations, man must cover his weakness with pride or 
through humility accept his first nature and give up his pretensions.
Ill
My evaluation of Niebuhr will focus on his concept of 
pride and the use of theology in connection with his view of humility. 
Problems arise in Niebuhr’s use of pride due to its broad range and 
scope. The scope of his concept of pride is so broad as to cover any 
act motivated by ego-centered self-interest, that is lacking the 
theological perspective that brings humility. For all practical purposes, 
it is hard to imagine any act that does not participate in the sin of 
pride. Niebuhr does not list any act, with the exception of those 
involving Christ as an example, that is not affected by pride. For 
Niebuhr pride encompasses the full range of motivations and actions 
by individuals, groups, and nations. I must question the
usefulness of a concept that can apply to all human acts £nd organizations,
and in all circumstances. In fairness there are passages in Niebuhr’s
writings that seem to be making distinctions between different degrees 
34of pride. But the problem with this is that Niebuhr gives no 
hint as to how one could objectively determine which forms of pride 
are the lesser evil. Yet Niebuhr does make subjective
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judgments in which he maintains that some nations are more "virtuous" 
than others. Yet Niebuhr himself condemns the attempt of a 
"virtuous" nation to make a distinction between itself and the 
virtue of another, thus making any claim to virtue or goodness an 
act of pride. Niebuhr here is caught in the tension between the 
political necessity of making distinctions in judging the prideful 
ambitions of nations, while at the same time maintaining that pride 
is so universal that no nation can claim to be more innocent or 
virtuous than another. For example, Niebuhr on the level of practical 
political realism makes a distinction between the territorial ambitions 
of Great Britan and those of Nazi Germany, but as he uses pride as a 
theological concept to condemn an attempt of a "good" nation to 
distinguish between itself and another nations all nations become 
equally guilty and Niebuhr offers no criteria to judge between a 
greater or lesser evil of pride. What Niebuhr’s concept of pride 
lacks is the ability to determine the intensity and the effect of 
pride. No room is left to argue in favor of a lesser as opposed to a 
greater form of pride. The reason Niebuhr,, on his part, does not 
develop criteria to judge degrees of pride is because it would make 
the concept useless for his purposes. Those purposes must be 
understood in his role as a theologian and as a social and political 
critic of the United States. As a theological concept, Niebuhr uses 
pride to show the limitations of man, his groups, and nations as 
their claims to virtue, power and glory are humbled before God. As 
such God stands as an absolute source of judgment against the 
pretensions of man. Niebuhr must make pride an all-encompassing element 
of human nature and activity to maintain the need for the solution
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which is found only in God. Hence if Niebuhr had criteria that 
allowed for a lesser form of pride, it would at the same time allow 
for a lesser need of humility and God - something Niebuhr would 
not find satisfactory. Beyond this theological objection to making 
any measure for degrees of pride, Niebuhr would have objections as a 
social and political critic of the United States. Niebuhr’s concept 
of irony was used to show the falseness of any claim of national 
innocence or virtue on the part of the United States. Niebuhr's 
concept of pride condemns all nations, and to allow distinctions to be 
made with regard to pride would only serve to reinforce the American 
claim to be free from the guilt and self-interest of other nations. 
This Niebuhr would never find acceptable. Niebuhr does not make 
explicit any criteria to differentiate between levels of types of 
pride because to do so would hinder his applications of humility as a 
theological and political concept that applies to all nations.
The second problem I find with Niebuhr’s use of humility 
is due to the problem of making humility inherently related to a faith 
perspective. The basis of, Niebuhr's concept of humility is found in 
the act of man realizing his limitations as he is confronted by the 
unlimited God of the Christian faith. One can easily raise issue 
with this view, because what can Niebuhr say to the man who is humble 
and realizes his personal limitations on a human level, yet is lacking
i
in the perspective of one humbled before God? Niebuhr argues that if 
man is given anything less than divine standard to judge himself 
by, then man will always judge his cause to be right and just.
Niebuhr maintains that as long as man compares himself to other men 
or human standards that he will either appear to be righteous or
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dismiss the unethical nature of his conduct based on the fact that
others have done the same thing. It follows logically from this view
that Niebuhr would, and does, argue that man needs to view himself
from the point of a transcendent standard that leaves no ground for
self-justification. The problem I have with Niebuhr’s stance is
that it fails to leave room for any effective measure of human ethics
as a means to humble man. Most thinkers in the area of social and
personal ethics maintain that man is humbled when he violates his
personal ethical code or the social norms of society - no transcendent
35standard is necessary for man to judge and humble himself. Niebuhr 
must accept the fact that other standards may function in ways similar 
to our absolute. Niebuhr cannot escape this problem by arguing that 
God is the only true standard. What Niebuhr’s argument requires 
is change from an absolute stance (only the transcendent can humble 
the pride of man) to an argument based on its effectiveness (humility 
is best accomplished when the finite standards of man are contrasted 
with the perfect standard of a righteous God). Thus Niebuhr’s argument 
should be altered from the claim that only a faith perspective of 
man before God causes humility, to the claim that humility is deepened 
and made more rich through the confrontation of man with God.
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CONCLUSION
In;concluding the thesis, I shall examine one of the major 
assumptions of Niebuhr’s argument - that of the many possible forms 
of political regimes democracy is most compatible with human nature. 
Niebuhr recognizes that no form of government is perfect, because no 
groups of persons is perfect, but democracy, he believes, is best fitted 
to meet the changing and inevitable tensions of society. He argues 
that democracy, better than any other political structure, can resolve 
the problems of power, intolerance, pride, and irony that otherwise 
would destroy social order and justice. Unlike Augustine, Niebuhr is 
riot blind to the relative merits of different types of political order: 
he does not place the "City of God" so high that the ethical distinctions 
of the different cities of man are lost. For Niebuhr other-worldly 
ideals do harm when it diverts one’s attention away from the quest 
for a just society. Niebuhr has little tolerance for any theology that 
rejects the responsibility of man as an actor in this world. Rather 
man is accountable for both his actions and their results in the day 
to day social-political choices of his life. As such, politics is not 
an evil of this world to be ignored in the hope of future bliss, 
but rather a challenge to conceive, to construct and maintain the most 
just form of government in the present. In his role as a twentieth 
century theologian, political philosopher and teacher of social ethics,
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Reinhold Niebuhr saw democracy as the best path toward good government 
given the abilities of man and their potential for corruption.
Democracy is best fitted to fulfill the moral capabilities of man 
which in turn, through tolerance, humility, and justice make democracy 
possible.
Democracy fits the capability of man in its potential both to 
maintain order and provide for peaceful reform in the political 
structure. Niebuhr is alert to the nature of power which could be a 
tool used to bring about a higher level of justice or enforce injustice 
upon the less powerful groups in society. The virtue of demo­
cracy is found in its ability to change unjust power structures with­
out the chaos of the destruction of social order:
It is the highest achievement of democratic societies 
that they embody the principle of resistance to 
government within the principle of government itself.
The citizen is thus armed with constitutional power 
to resist the unjust exactions of government. He 
can do this without creating anarchy within the 
community, if government becomes an instrument of 
better government and not a threat to government 
itself.1
Using Christian realism as a foundation of his understanding of human 
nature, Niebuhr argues that democracy embodies the principles of order 
necessary to check the abuse of power while at the same time allowing 
man the freedom to create and renew freedom through the use of power.
This is a commitment to democracy, not as an end, but as a means to 
a peaceful resolution of social conflicts. This is not to say that 
disorder and social protest will not challenge the political order, but 
rather that reform and not revolution is the norm for change. Thus 
democracy provides the fullest expression of the nature of man as a 
being incapable of having freedom without order and incapable of building a
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just society where order destroys freedom.
Democracy is also the best political system, Niebuhr argues, in
terms of its ability to bring about a broad distribution of power
throughout the political system composed of interest groups, corporate
interests, and individual citizens. This is true because a social
equilibrium of power provides the greatest check on the abuse of power.
Niebuhr argues that:
Democracy holds every possible power under scrutiny 
and challenges every pretension of wisdom and 
balances every force with a countervailing force. 2
Democracy, Niebuhr argues, recognizes the danger of concentrated and 
uncontrolled power,and the advantage and even necessity of a balance 
of power. The wisdom of democracy is found in its recognition that no 
man is good enough or wise enough to be entrusted with absolute power. 
Democracy is able to succeed only where power is distributed widely 
enough to prevent any man or group from dominating society, while 
structured sufficiently to provide for order. Universal suffrage 
diffuses power in a political system even though it does not make each 
man’s power equal and it also serves to check a ruler’s preten­
sions and lusts for power. Niebuhr argues:
Democracy never gives all the power to the proponent 
of any dogma; it holds all claims to truth under 
critical review; it balances all social forces not ^ 
in an automatic, but in a contrived harmony of power.
Niebuhr views this not only for its protection against arbitrary govern­
ment, but also as a distinctly positive advantage. When the full 
range of social forces, all of which have some power, are allowed to 
confront each other, then a "modicum of truth" will be distilled from
4a "conflict of error." As a result a democracy can draw upon the 
virtues, and correct the vices of various components of the
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community by contervailing influence of other components." In the 
competitive quest for power, a democratic society is able to profit 
from the interested desires of particular groups who, through conflict, 
tend to restrain each other. As such, the limited conflict that 
results from the pluralism in a democracy provides a healthy atmos­
phere for freedom. Democracy recognizes both the dangers and the 
possibilities of power and is best able, through checks and balances of 
power, to minimize the dangers and maximize the possibilities.
In spite of its advantages, Niebuhr refuses to treat democracy 
as a utopian answer to the problems of governing man. He argues
"democracy is a method of finding proximate solutions for insoluble 
6problems." Niebuhr finds no final solutions or total solutions in
history. The human drive for power to dominate others, the human
blindness to self interest and pride, and the human danger of
intolerance and violence are forever with us, Niebuhr argues. Thus
he neither believes in, nor seeks after, simple solutions that will
forever fall short of changing man's nature. Niebuhr finds no total
solutions to the problems of man. Democracy's toleration rests upon
the recognition that no truth, knowledge, interest or system in
history is perfectly good or the findl solution to the riddle of
human destiny. In fact Niebuhr goes as far as to say the difference
of power in a democracy "makes for a fortunate confusion in defining
7
the goal toward which history should move." Democracy is organized 
to prevent any man or group of would be "world savers" from grasping 
a monopoly of power. The problems of democracy are never ending in 
the attempt to balance the advance of justice with the maintenance of 
a stable society. Niebuhr argues in regard to the ever growing
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problem of ethnic pluralism:
A democratic society must . . . seek proximate solutions 
for this problem in indeterminate creative ventures.
But the solutions will be more, rather than less, 
creative if democratic idealists understand the depth 
of the problem with which they are dealing. There is 
no unprejudicial mind and no judgment which is not, 
at least partially, corrupted by pride . . . Upon the 
basis of such a presupposition we could work indetermi- 
nantly on many proximate solutions for the problem of 
ethnic pluralism. Our knowledge that there is no com­
plete solution for the problem would save us from rest­
ing in some proximate golution under the illusion that 
it is an ultimate one.
The problems of democracy may be recognized, accommodated, or settled
but they are never solved. There is the ever present chance that even
the settlements reached are inadequate or inappropriate and thus the
competitive process continues, maintaining an openness to the system.
Niebuhr argues that "a democratic society must assume that even the
9
best possible government must stand under scrutiny and criticism." 
Democracy is capable of correcting its mistakes as well as responding 
to new conflicts that arise in the political arena. Democracies are 
not final solutions to the age-old problems of governing but rather 
are:
. . . political devices for choosing rulers by the 
free consent of the governed. They are fluid 
communities in which interests and powers can 
compete with each other and displace one another 
as dominant or cooperative forces in society.
Democracy therefore is the political method necessary for the endless
power struggles which are necessary to achieve a just balance among
the changing power groups, values, and interests of a pluralistic
society. Democracy is, for Niebuhr, the expression of peaceful
compromise among the various interests in society.
Democracy, for Niebuhr, is not merely the best means to handle
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the power distributions of society, but also the best means to deal 
with intolerance in society. Democracy is based on the art of 
compromise that quickly breaks down if conflicting groups refuse to 
acknowledge the legitmacy of groups that oppose their interests.
In a democratic society in which cooperation is necessary for the 
process of government to function, intolerance poses a threat to the 
very foundation of democracy. As Niebuhr approaches the problem, he 
finds that intolerance is rooted in pride. Pride by its very nature, 
Niebuhr argues, is anti-democratic because it is based on making 
distinctions based on notions of superiority. Intolerance is not 
far from those who take pride in being a member or person of "superior" 
race, social class, sex, or heritage that provides the means to 
"prove" oneself better than others in society. The claims of the 
intolerant to be somehow superior to others in society cannot be 
reconciled to the democratic principle of "one man, one vote."
Niebuhr finds the root of intolerance in human insecurity. 
Niebuhr argues that man as a finite being feels insecurity when con­
fronted by his environment and,in an attempt to control his environment, 
he seeks not only to gain control of his environment, but also to 
use power to limit the rights and freedoms of those unlike himself.
The history of our nation all too well records what great lengths 
were taken to deny the right of suffrage to blacks in the South. But 
such is just one instance in which power was used to thwart the 
rights of those with less power and "less value." The root of 
intolerance, for Niebuhr, is more than a collection of isolated 
events; it is a reflection of human nature driven by fear and insecurity. 
The seeds of intolerance are deep within man, not simply on the political
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surface. To deal with this, however, Niebuhr proposes an approach to 
intolerance that is neither political nor psychological: one must
consider, he argues, the relationship of man to the transcendent.
Niebuhr believes that when man is confronted by God-and his petty 
beliefs of superiority over others come in contact with the infinite 
and eternal,then man’s intolerance is exposed as an unjust bias 
against others. In confrontation with God the difference in black 
and white, male and female, Democrat and Republican become meaningless 
because all claims of superiority are judged as unworthy distinctions 
made by those who have failed to see their own limitations. The 
pride that allows man to glorify himself fails to come to terms 
with the selfishness that denies others the rights one already has 
gained. Niebuhr’s insight into the problem of intolerance is based 
on the necessity of man to accept his finite nature with its insecuri­
ties rather than attempting to overcome his insecurity by using 
power to enforce the dictates of prideful intolerance. The individual 
or group that refuses to accept its limitations will inevitably 
confront others with intolerance.
Niebuhr goes beyond the problem of intolerance in his discussion 
of humility as a means to overcome the dangers ' °f intolerance and in- 
ordinate.pxide*. As Niebuhr uses the concept of humility it is a tool 
to bring about the balance of social and political'interests necessary 
for a stable democracy. The power of pride, Niebuhr arges, poses a 
constant danger to democracy which must be in constant with the "spirit" 
of humility. The "spirit" of humility comes when man is confronted 
by the infinite God who reveals to man the finite and temporal nature 
of the great interests that he prides himself on. When one
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is humbled he cannot turn to another and claim to be superior because,
as Niebuhr expresses it, "only God is good." For Niebuhr, the pride
of man that refuses to admit that all human interests are notoriously
biased is the essence of sin:
Man is a sinner not because he is finite but because 
he refuses to admit that he is. And there is no 
life which is not involved in this tragic self 
deception. This is a factor in history to which 
modern culture is completely oblivious.H
Not only is culture oblivious to the power of pride, the works of 
democratic theory are noticeably silent on the subject. Breaking 
silence* Niebuhr speaks of the dangers posed to democracy by inordinate 
self-interest and pride. Niebuhr’s approach to politics sees beyond 
the "journalistic" side of political issues that records the surface 
events and personalities in the struggle for power, but fails to 
reveal the root cause of the struggle. Behind the harsh realities 
of power politics, intolerance, inequality, political deception, and 
racism lies a vast reserve of pride that refuses either to realize its 
limitations or accept the fact that others also have rights. Unless 
checked by a spirit of humility, the destructive potential of pride 
will leave democracy no defense against those who feel they have be­
come the "elect" and seek to enforce their blindness upon others.
The issue of irony is one essential to Niebuhr’s understanding 
of American democracy. Few realize with the same degree as does 
Niebuhr the possibility of being blinded by a national ideology. On 
a personal level, my critique of Niebuhr showed how he was himself 
trapped in the ironies of the Cold War period. Niebuhr’s critique 
of national ideology comes mainly from his work The Irony of American 
History. This work demonstrates how ideological "images" have been
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transported through history lodged in the subconsciousness of our 
philosophy of Americanism. These images from the past affect not 
only the way our nation views itself, but also determines a pattern of 
response for today’s political situation based on the preservation 
of past national images. With regard to this, Niebuhr argues that it 
is time for American democracy to outgrow its false images of 
virtue and innocence. This is particularly relevant to the present 
generation which has already begun to forget the mistake of Vietnam.
The tension that came from the guilt of Vietnam served to leave 
assertions of American innocence and virtue in the background, but less 
than a decade later, such assertions are once again being heard.
Niebuhr finds little sympathy for a political stance which rests on 
prideful claims of innocence and virtue. Foreign policy is not 
like a John Wayne movie in which "black hats" and "white hats" can 
be assigned respectively. For Niebuhr, foreign policy demands that 
a nation face the tensions that come cuts with action where evil is 
mixed with good, selfishness with altruism, and guilt with innocence.
To accept blindly the view that American power in international poli­
tics is always "right" is not merely short-sighted, it is dangerous. 
Niebuhr argues in contrast that power should be not linked to morality 
but to the responsibility that comes with its possession.
Beyond the issues posed as crucial to democracy and the 
philosophical underpinnings necessary to build a foundation for 
democracy, Niebuhr finds the source of success and failure of democracy 
in the nature of man. Niebuhr’s approach is based on a theological
anthropology called Christian realism. From this perspective he sees the
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problem of democracy in terms of its ability to understand the depth
and breadth of the nature of man. For Niebuhr the foundation of
democracy is not its political structures, but rather its understanding
of man as a creature of both time and eternity, being both a natural and
spiritual being. In Niebuhr’s analysis, any philosophy that fails
to account for the dialectical nature of man’s existence will fail
to provide an adequate basis for democracy. The philosophies of
naturalism can measure man only in terms of a being in time and
nature and, as a result, fail to account for the image of God in man
that enables man to transcend his environment. In contrast, idealistic
philosophies fail to account for the importance of man as a finite
and historical being. Both philosophies fail to measure the "humaness"
in man. Niebuhr finds in the Christian faith the most complete view
of the nature of man, which accounts for both man’s limitations and
capabilities. Niebuhr argues:
Without the presupposition of the Christian faith 
the individual is either nothing or becomes every­
thing. In the Christian faith man’s insignificance 
as a creature, involved in the process of nature 
and time, is lifted into significance by the mercy 
and power of God in which his life is sustained.
But his significance as a free spirit is under­
stood as subordinate to the freedom of G o d . 12
Niebuhr’s measure of man is a theological one in which man lives
in tension between two worlds (history and eternity) and two
selves (natural and spiritual). It is out of such tension that
man seeks to escape through philosophies that would limit him
to time and nature or a spiritual eternity with little concern
for this world. But democracy is based on ideals that require both
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direct and active concern in this world and an ability to comprehend 
and formulate concepts that are eternal and spiritual. As an eternal 
and spiritual being man is able to see beyond his own interests and as 
a result has a capacity for justice; but man, at the same time, is 
also a finite creature of nature and time whose concern for himself, 
if made absolute, leads to injustice. The problem of Christian 
realism is to provide a philosophy of democracy that will balance 
freedom and order in a manner that best fits the capabilities of man. 
If democracy allows an optimistic idealism to dominate its philosophy, 
it will place too great a trust in man. The result of such a mistake 
is the failure to realize the evil in man which would abuse freedom if 
allowed liberty without responsibility. If democracy allows a 
naturalistic realism to determine its political policy, freedom will 
be crushed by a philosophy which recognizes self-interest and power, 
but fails to measure the good in man. As such the challenge of 
Christian realism is to provide a philosophy from which democracy 
can survive the twin dangers of anarchy and tyranny when the tension 
between freedom and order is broken by man .himself.
Finally, democracy more than its alternative allows for the 
expression of the "unique worth of the individual which makes it
13
wrong to fit him into any political program as a mere instrument." 
Democracy is based on the worth of the individual as an end rather 
than a means toward a particular political function. Niebuhr argues 
that the value of democracy is found in the realization that men are 
more than things to be manipulated as a tool of some "socially 
approved" ends. Niebuhr would add that man's unique value and 
dignity are highlighted by Christian realism which views man in terms
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of his creation in the image of God. Such an image not only makes 
man capable of freedom, but also reflects upon the nature of man as 
something more than a deterministic animal unable to exercise rational 
choices.
In an overall critique of Niebuhr, I would say that both his 
unique insights and strength and his most glaring weakness flow from 
the same source - his theological method. In taking a perspective 
from a theological standpoint Niebuhr makes definite-claims upon his 
audience. It is not possible for the reader to separate Niebuhr the 
theologian from Niebuhr the political thinker. As a result one is 
forced to deal with Niebuhr on his own ground and such is a source 
of his strength. But this also serves as a weakness to those who 
would either ignore or choose to be more critical of his arguments as 
a result of his perspective. The price Niebuhr pays for his 
theological insight may very well be counted in terms of how it limits 
his audience.
A greater problem that Niebuhr is faced with is not from those 
who ignore him or approach him in a judgmental fashion, but those 
who will find his theological claims often overstated in both its 
argument and its implications. Niebuhr’s strength is often seen in 
his comprehensive claims for the Christian faith as a perspective 
that best understands human nature as it is expressed in social and 
political terms. It is his perspective from faith that humbles the 
pride that would serve as an instrument of injustice. It is in con­
frontation with God that man comes into the realization of his 
limitations in the quest for power and domination over others. It 
is from this acceptance of limitations upon his claims in society that
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man becomes tolerant of those who differ from him. It is through the 
exposure of false pride that the unrealistic ideals of innocence and 
virtue are shed by American democracy. It is from the foundation 
of the Christian view of man that the twin dangers of idealism and
realism are seen as a threat to democracy which needs to account for
both the goodness of man and the corruption of that goodness. After 
reading Niebuhr one would think that theology holds all the answers.
But few critics, even theological ones, would let the limitations of
this method go uncriticized. The chief limitation to be found in
Niebuhr's comprehensive theological approach is that it fails to give 
credit where credit is due. For example, his approach to tolerance 
based on human fallibility and limitation was stated as a perspective 
that results from man's encounter with God but numerous secular scholars 
who know little of such encounters have based arguments for tolerance 
on the limitations of human reason. Niebuhr acts as if his view is 
somehow new and unique when it is placed in a theological context.
He leaves himself open to criticism by failing to acknowledge those 
who have gone before him and made the same argument but without a 
theological justification. Though I would not go that far I could 
see a basis for a critic to say that in dealing with the issue of 
tolerance and possibly irony, that Niebuhr has taken non-theological 
arguments, dressed them in clerical garb, and then preached the
theological argument as if it were the only one that exists. In 
Niebuhr's defense I would say that this could not be said about his 
approach to the issues of humility, power, or those dealing with 
human nature as expressed in his philosophy of Christian realism.
On the issue of irony Niebuhr is silent about those like Woodward,
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Harty, and Boorstin who have used irony outside of a theological 
perspective. Yet as an ironic historian, Niebuhr has certainly 
not restated secular arguments in a theological context; rather I 
would argue that many have followed him and in their use of irony would 
not mind borrowing from him, minus the theological garb of his argument.
Beyond the fault of Niebuhr to, at times, fail to give 
philosophical credit where it is due, is the problem that results 
from the failure to give man credit for his efforts where it is 
sometimes due. This is a result of the radical distinction Niebuhr 
makes between God and man. God alone is fully righteous, just, holy, 
and loving— man always stands in judgment based upon the absolute 
standard of God and as a result is always humbled in an encounter with 
God. But the problem arises in Niebuhr’s theology that the distinction 
between the perfections of God and the imperfections of man are so 
completely different that all human action is under condemnation so 
broad that distinctions with regard to human virtue are blurred. This 
serves as a strength in Niebuhr’s system because it points mans toward 
a transcendent ideal, which, is one of Niebuhr's primary objectives.
But this is a serious weakness for any attempt to construct criteria 
for human action. It is not enough to say in sophisticated theological 
terms, God is good and man is less than good, when broad distinctions can 
be made between the goodness of spme men, groups, or nations in compari­
son with their counterparts. Using his theological basis, Niebuhr 
argues that all men, groups, and nations stand under the judgment 
of God. But in criticism, I would say that John Doe and 
John Dillenger, the Kiwanis Club and the KKK, and Great
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Britain as opposed to Nazi Germany, require different appraisals'.
Niebuhr refuses to justify such distinctions because he fears if 
distinctions are made, then every person, group, and nation will 
see itself as righteous and innocent. The point Niebuhr wants to 
make is that all are guilty and less than virtuous and stand under 
judgment for their faults. Niebuhr does not want to give any ground so 
for pride and intolerance can be built upon human claims of superiority. 
This serves as a great strength to-Niebuhr as a social prophet telling 
Americans that our national image as the greatest and most 
virtuous nation of all history is an illusion, and that America, like 
all other nations, stands under God's judgment. While the absolute 
distinction between God and man serves to humble American pride, it 
hardly provides an adequate measure for human action. This can be 
seen in Niebuhr himself, who would place all nations under God's 
judgment without making distinctions, yet without hesitation would 
in a non-theological context, assert that American democracy is 
better than Soviet communism. My point is that such distinctions 
must be made because, not only is God good when compared to man, 
but also some men, groups and nations are better than others in 
comparison. Not to make such distinctions Is to leave' human behavior 
without a standard for judgment. This is a dilemma for Niebuhr 
because the failure to make such distinctions on a human level 
strengthens his theological stance and his criticism of American 
pride, but weakens the validity of his overall argument. But once 
again such a problem is inherent within his method.
My final point of criticism of Niebuhr is based upon my belief 
belief that many of the goals or objectives he believes in can be reached
167
without theology. My chief example is the goal of humility. Niebuhr 
argues that only God can fully humble man in his pride and quest for 
power. I think it is true that the divine-human encounter can 
humble man, but this is by no means the only path to humility. Many 
men, groups, and nations have been humbled by defeat, humiliation, 
and human error without the help of God. As such Niebuhr can hardly 
claim humility to be a virtue belonging only to a theological per­
spective. At this point, I feel Niebuhr needs to be more humble in 
the claims he makes. He needs to be more willing to admit that the 
goals he seeks (tolerance of others, the responsible use of ,power, 
a humble perspective, the overcoming of false ideals) can be approached 
without a theological basis. Nevertheless, his theory of democracy 
is insightful and calls attention to a range of issues and problems 
that a more humanistic theory must also confront and ponder.
A conclusion to the study of Niebuhr on the issues of democracy 
must not make claims of finality. As Niebuhr saw it, the problems 
that face democracy have no ultimate solutions that will end all 
questions. The issues that Niebuhr deals with are without final 
answers. Democracy is not a war that can be won for all time, but 
rather a never ending battle fought by men who. have the capacity to 
use their freedom constructively or destructively. This may be a 
disappointment for those who want simple solutions and total cures 
when all Niebuhr promises for democracy is that it is a challenge.
It is a challenge to preserve equality when man longs to be better 
than another. It is a challenge to preserve freedom when man desires 
power to oppress the rightsccf others. It is the challenge of humility
when man’s pride drives him beyond his limits. It is the challenge to
168
maintain tolerance against groups and a society that looks for
scapegoats to cast blame upon. It is the challenge to expose
irony in a nation that lives by its false images. It is the
challenge to use power in a responsible manner - even when profit
and pride do not result. As we have found throughout Niebuhr's
approach to the issues of democracy:
Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible, 
his inclination to injustice makes it necessary.14
Democracy is the proximate institutionalization of Niebuhr's theological
understanding of the nature of man. Though it is cthe "best possible"
method of government, it remains, "an imperfect method for imperfect
15men to work at the problems of an imperfect world."
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